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M A T R I X I E L : 
L ’ É V É N E M E N T - R E N C O N T R E 
P S Y C H A N A L Y T I Q U E  C O M M E 
P R É G N A N C E 1  D A N S  L E  B E A U 
( 2 0 0 7 )
B r a c h a  L .  E t t i n g e r *
Le transfert d’espace-bord matrixiel
Ce texteEtt.1 fait partie de mes travaux théoriques en cours (publiés 
depuis 1992) sur un complexe conceptuel qui donne voix et articule une 
dimension féminine, fœtale et maternelle (et prématernelle) inconsciente 
que j’ai appelée l’espace-bord2 ou espace-de-bord psychique matrixiel (ou 
matriciel).3 En psychanalyse, au sein du transfert d’espacebord matrixiel, 
1 Les notes de bas de page sont de la traductrice (NdT); celles référées par le sigle ‘Ett.’ et 
rassemblées en notes de fin de texte, sont la traduction des notes originales de l’auteur.
 Conformément à l’étymologie du mot anglais pregnancy {grossesse, gestation, gravidité} et à la 
pensée matrixielle de Bracha L. Ettinger (Matrix and Metramorphosis, 1991), nous traduirons ce 
terme par grossesse quand il fait référence à la dimension corporelle, par prégnation ou prégnance 
quand l’accent est mis plutôt sur la dimension relationnelle de la reliance. Mais cette distinc-
tion imposée par le contexte et les contraintes linguistiques, est artificielle et plutôt étrangère à 
la pensée de Ettinger, c’est pourquoi dans les occurrences où il est impossible de trancher, pre-
gnancy est traduit par grossesse-prégnation. (NdT)
2 Ettinger a créé les termes borderlink et borderspace dans les années 1980. Elle les a dévelop-
pés dans une longue série d’articles publiés à partir de 1992. Borderlink est une reliance-par-le-
bord ou bordureliance, celle du travail reliant de l’Eros féminin-maternel matrixiel. Espace-bord 
(espace-de-bord) signifie l’interface spatiale liminale du psychisme partagé par la femme enceinte 
et le fœtus, la mère et l’infans, l’analyste et l’analysant. La traduction en français par espace-bord, 
avec trait d’union et écart entre les termes, souligne qu’il ne s’agit pas d’une délinéation statique 
mais d’un espacement relationnel dynamique, commun et différenciant; ainsi Ettinger parle de 
reliance-bord ou bordureliance et de bordurespacement dans l’espace-temps-de-bord matrixiel. 
Son livre ‘Regard et Espace-de-bord Matrixiels’ a été publié en français, en 1999 (Bruxelles, La 
lettre volée). (NdT)
3 Il est entendu que le mot latin matrix signifie l’anatomie féminine de la matrice. Cependant 
‘la matrix’ ici ne désigne pas une contenance ni un investissement d’organe — pas plus que ‘le 
phallus’ ne désigne le pénis–mais concerne un processus de subjectivation dont Ettinger a fait un 
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la subjectivité de l’analysant engendre de nouvelles limites tout en étant 
engendrée dans un franchissement des frontières et une transgression 
des limites. Son devenir est élaboré au sein de la subjectivité-comme-
rencontre entre le je et le non-je.4 Dans le contexte de la cure psycha-
nalytique, l’expression le ‘je’ fait référence aux moments d’expérience-
de-soi précognitifs de l’analysant et l’expression le ‘non-je’ aux moments 
d’expérience-de-soi déjà implantés en modulations incognisées dans la 
conscience de l’autre de ce ‘je’: la/le psychanalyste, tous deux étant des 
sujets-partiels. La rencontre est une co-émergence de bourgeons du soi 
avec-dans5 des moments où l’autre s’y abandonne: un(e) autre qui doit 
être pensé(e) comme mère/Autre,6 Autremère, proche en un sens du self-
objet théorisé par Kohut mais, dans le cas présent le soi est considé-
ré comme fœtal et les apports maternels et leur potentialité transfor-
mationnelle sont ceux de la grossesse, avec toutefois l’hypothèse posée 
d’une différence minimale (tel le je émergeant chez Daniel Stern), et 
non la symbiose ou la fusion. Même s’il est vrai, en effet, que la reliance 
et la transformation surviennent dans le cadre d’une communication 
inter-subjective, celles-ci ne dépendent pas de la communication inter-
subjective; elles s’appuient sur une potentialité de transmission beau-
coup plus archaïque. La trans-inscription d’ondes affectives et mentales 
et l’inscription-croisée7 de leurs traces au cours d’un transfert matrixiel 
paradigme. L’adjectif matrixial étant un néologisme, il a été traduit littéralement par matrixiel 
tout en gardant la signification de matriciel aussi. (NdT)
4 La distinction en anglais entre not {pas} et non {non} fait entendre qu’il ne s’agit pas d’une 
opposition binaire dans ‘I and non-I’ mais bien de ‘je et non-je’ qui surgissent de concert, co-
existent, sans s’absorber ou se rejeter. (NdT)
5 A partir de la préposition within {à l’intérieur de}et d’un substantif inventé withinness {inté-
rieureté}, Ettinger crée deux néologismes: with-in et with-in-ness, rendus en français par avec-dans 
et l’être avec-dans. Par cette création de mots, elle cherche à faire entendre que le fait d’être à 
l’intérieur de l’espace-bord matrixiel n’est pas une présence passive, inerte, neutre ou autrement 
inactive entre les partenaires mais bien une relation agie à la fois entre eux et avec les bords de 
cet espace. Jouant encore sur la chaîne signifiante de with {avec}, elle introduit la lettre (h) à 
l’intérieur du mot witness {témoin} pour donner forme aux concepts-clef psycho-esthétiques 
proto-éthiques de wi(h)nessing, traduits par être-avec-et-témoigner. (NdT)
6 Autremère tente de restituer le jeu de mots opéré par la scription du signifiant mother en m/
Other, qui rappelle que la mère n’est pas uniquement le site du familier connu mais aussi une 
forme particulièrement importante de l’altérité, mère/Autre. (NdT)
7 En tant que modalités d’échanges sub-symboliques, la trans-inscription est l’enregistrement 
direct et immédiat de ce qui est partagé dans l’échange et l’inscription-croisée désigne les messages 
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(ou matriciel), élargissent l’idée de cet espace-temps partageable vers la 
trans-subjectivité. Bien au-delà du Tiers de Ogden elle, commence dans 
la pré-natalité. Le sujet peut se retrouver, à certains moments, dans la 
position de je et, à d’autres, dans la position de non-je, les traces de 
l’expérience partageable étant toujours dispersées et échangeables entre 
les deux mais, dans le cadre de cet article, nous allons systématiquement 
garder le terme ‘je’ pour désigner principalement la position de l’analy-
sant s’exprimant par des flashs de type fœtal et le terme ‘non-je’ pour la 
position de l’analyste se trouvant dans une attitude de maternalité pré-
gnante à l’intérieur de ce même flash.
Le ‘je’ ici n’est pas le ‘je’ en tant que structure — le Moi — ni da-
vantage le je parlant ou un soi consolidé, renforcé par ses aspects sépa-
rateurs. Le ‘non-je’ n’occupe pas tout le temps la position de self-objet, 
elle/il s’emploie à élargir le champ de sa conscience vers la transmissivité 
et le potentiel transformationnel de la rencontre. C’est la rencontre de 
deux ou de plusieurs je(s) et non-je(s) à chaque fois regroupés deux par 
deux, et plus précisément encore la fréquence et l’intensité de la réso-
nance connective entre le je et le non-je, entre l’un et l’autre, qui sont le 
point focal de la co-émergence et du transfert matrixiels, dans la dimen-
sion de prégnance de l’événement-rencontre. Cet événement-rencontre 
constitue une advenue au niveau psychique partiel de la sub-subjectivité 
et de la présubjectivité (dans la position du ‘je’) avec-dans l’expérience 
de la con-jonction8 et de l’intérieureté, par lesquels l’autre aussi devient, 
dans l’intérêt de la rencontre, un sub-sujet qui continue à se dévelop-
per et se transformer par la rencontre. Les niveaux de conscience et de 
développement psychique du je et du non-je diffèrent. Nous pouvons 
penser, pour ce je, à un moment d’émergence subjective dans un événe-
ment-rencontre, ainsi que pour le non-je qui le rejoint à ce même niveau 
sub-subjectif, c’est-à-dire à une expérience de palpitation d’advenue-de-
soi inscrite dans la psyché et induisant une inscription d’expérience-de-
diffractés qui s’échangent et s’entrecroisent par et à l’intention des participants à un événement-
rencontre. (NdT)
8 Jointness est traduit par con-jonction, orthographié en deux mots pour insister sur le cum 
latin, soulignant qu’il s’agit bien d’un ‘se joindre l’un avec l’autre’ et marquant la différence avec 
conjonction {conjunction}. Façonné par Ettinger à partir de l’adjectif joint, le substantif jointness 
semble insister sur le fait d’être joints ensemble. (NdT)
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soi à un niveau flou très élémentaire. La palpitation d’advenue-de-soi 
et l’inscription de l’être-soi se passent avec, ‘autour de’ et ‘dans’ l’autre. 
L’inscription psychique de l’expérience de l’événement-rencontre dans 
le je est rendue possible grâce au fondement psychique de l’autre — le 
non-je — l’Autremère — à qui arrive et en qui vibre ce battement, ac-
compagné de ses modulations spécifiques. Je fais allusion ici, bien sûr, 
à la fonction maternelle précoce «alpha» de Bion et à l’objet transforma-
tionnel de Bollas mais le battement, l’inscription et le fondement ma-
trixiels élargissent les champs visés par Bion et Bollas et aboutissent à la 
fondation de la transmissivité transgressive. C’est pourquoi la fonction 
créatrice de sens et de signification reçoit de nouvelles acceptions, car 
la potentialité psychique matrixielle de transformation et les fonctions 
qui la rendent possible, n’émergent pas dans des relations d’objet ni à 
l’intérieur de relations intersubjectives ni dans la communication entre 
la mère et le bébé après la naissance, mais elles adviennent au cours de 
la grossesse et de la vie fœtale. La gestation et la fœtalité produisent un 
champ particulier d’acceptions qui résonne à la base de tout événement-
rencontre significatif. Il était une fois où nous avons tous, les hommes 
comme les femmes, été prénataux.
Au champ du sujet et à l’espace intersubjectif, j’ai donc ajouté la 
sphère transsubjective de résonance psychique et mentale que j’ai appe-
lée «matrixielle» ou matricielle. En tant que champ psychique, la matrix 
est une dimension transsubjective de co-émergence-dans-la-différencia-
tion qui apparaît déjà et avant tout au cours de la prénatalité : la fœtalité 
et la prégnation. L’énonciation de cette dimension comme psychique se 
base sur une conceptualisation de l’événement-rencontre humain origi-
naire qui serait prénatal, avec-dans-la-prégnation, en premier lieu dans 
le réel, comme empreinte de ce (corpo)réel,9 et, en second lieu, comme 
métaphore, au niveau imaginaire et dans le registre symbolique. Les 
empreintes et les inscriptions psychiques et mentales se passent entre 
les deux (ou les quelques) participants de toute rencontre-comme-pré-
gnance réelle ou métaphorique. Dans la psyché maternelle au cours de la 
9 Ettinger module le mot anglais qui signifie corporel en (corpo)real pour souligner que l’em-
preinte corporelle de la matrix est bien à concevoir comme relevant aussi de l’ordre du Réel, 
d’où la traduction par (corpo)réel. (NdT)
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gestation, chez un sujet dont les expériences sont inscrites à des niveaux 
de constitution ‘post-œdipiens’, matures, non fœtaux, les inscriptions 
psychiques de la fréquence mentale partageable avec ses vibrations et de 
l’intensité avec ses modulations se tracent à côté d’inscriptions à un ni-
veau plus mature, dans la dimension matrixielle qui remonte à la période 
archaïque et dont la continuité réside dans l’immédiateté sensitive et 
trans-sensitive. Les empreintes et les inscriptions qui prennent ces voies 
archaïques, à de tels niveaux de sensitivité et de transitivité, approfon-
dissent la vulnérabilité subjective et l’ouverture transsubjective à l’autre.
La co-émergence psychique matrixielle est en réalité simultanée et 
réciproque mais non symétrique. En tant qu’êtres humains, ses partici-
pants se trouvent sur pied d’égalité mais ils ne le sont pas en termes de 
degré de maturité, et ne se ressemblent pas quant à leur position mentale 
ou leurs degrés de différenciation distincte ou d’aptitude à la séparation. 
Le futur-sujet (le fœtus) n’est pas encore assemblé en son identité, alors 
que la future mère l’est déjà. Le je et le non-je sont évidemment diffé-
rents en ce qui concerne leur responsabilité quant aux processus et aux 
palpitations des événements-rencontre. Qu’un attachement matrixiel 
apparaisse entre l’un et l’autre lors de la rencontre primaire ou qu’il 
advienne dans le courant de la vie lors de toutes sortes de rencontres 
intimes, alors même qu’il forme l’espace du deux ou du plusieurs, il n’est 
pas symbiotique. Qu’un attachement matrixiel apparaisse dans l’espace 
du trois ou du plusieurs qui sont reliés par des liens de un à un, celui-ci 
ne constitue pas un triangle œdipien. Certains éléments de la rencontre 
intime pourraient, en fait, être partiellement anonymes. La rencontre 
matrixielle est un attachement intime potentiel entre plusieurs je(s) et 
non-je(s) avec à chaque fois l’attention mise sur les rencontres uniques 
entre un je et un non-je ou sur la co-émergence singulière permettant 
à la fois l’assemblement dans un champ de résonance partageable, la 
transmission et l’échange d’empreintes psychiques, la transformation 
psychique et le processus de différenciation croissante au cours de dis-
tinctions et de séparations-en-proximité ultérieures. Ces empreintes et 
inscriptions qui éludent la communication intersubjective forment son 
cœur esthétique et éthique.
La sphère psychique primordiale matrixielle est transsubjective, 
même si et alors que l’expérience en est faite sans réflexion ni attention 
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cognitive dans le champ du soi séparé, et même si et alors que ses pro-
cessus évoluent à l’intérieur de relations intersubjectives, et même si … 
et avant tout: nous devons l’inclure dans la dimension paradoxale de la 
présubjectivité. Nous devons faire la distinction entre la transsubjectivité 
et l’intersubjectivité. Au cours de la vie, la sphère matrixielle pulse tant 
dans le sous-sol de la subjectivité que de l’intersubjectivité. Les concepts 
clés de ce complexe théorique sont: espace-bord matrixiel, métramor-
phose, reliance-bords, co-poiésis,Ett.2 différenciation-en-co-émergence 
et co-évanescence, témoignage-avec, relations-sans-mise-en-relation, 
distance-dans-la-proximité, événement-rencontre, potentialité trans-
formationnelle métramorphique, à-côtéïté, plusieurité, partageabilité 
potentielle, com-passion,10 hospitalité compassionnelle, transcryptum,11 
trans-inscription et inscription-croisée. Ils servent à décrire et à ex-
pliquer l’Inconscient transsubjectif, là où les empreintes et les traces 
incognisées,12 des instances psychiques partageables de l’événement-ren-
contre matrixiel d’advenue (et, pour commencer, dans une dimension 
non-cognisée, entre plusieurs participants, deux ou quelques-uns, adve-
nant-ensemble et, par ce processus, advenant comme sujets partiels du 
même réseau matrixiel opérant à un niveau sub-symbolique; ces em-
preintes et ces traces précèdent ou surgissent à côté des traces incons-
cientes de chaque sujet en son identité propre (par exemple «avant» au 
niveau du présujet fœtal, et «à côté de» au niveau sub-subjectif dans la 
psyché maternelle).
Bien que les inscriptions matrixielles sont partagées par deux ou plu-
sieurs individus, elles ne sont pas les inscriptions de l’inconscient «col-
lectif» à la manière jungienne, ni les traces d’occurrences sexuelles-li-
bidinales énergétiques ou agressives, au sens freudien, ni les restes du 
10 Le concept-clef de com-passion désigne un affect primaire, tissé avec-dans la transmissivité 
primordiale qui, de ce fait, peut être ranimé à l’intérieur du transfert lorsque est vécue l’hospita-
lité compassionnelle. (NdT)
11 Le terme transcryptum décrit la forme artistique matrixielle qui retransmet les enregistre-
ments psychiques et picturaux d’un traumatisme crypté en tant que tel. (NdT)
12 Une modalité non cognitive de la connaissance est décrite par Ettinger dans ‘Regards et 
Espace-de-bord matrixiels’{La lettre volée, 1999, p.192}: ‘mes non-je ne sont jamais complètement 
cognisés ….et le bord de notre rencontre…  incognitivement connu.’ Elle distingue les traces non 
élaborées par la cognition qui sont incognisées et la dimension où la cognition est absente mais 
aussi la réalité du non-je inconnu et les moments d’expérience-de-soi pré-cognitifs. (NdT)
63
D I O T I M E  E T  L E  T R A N S F E R T  M A T R I X I E L
refoulement des signifiants à la façon de Jacques Lacan. L’événement-
rencontre «prégnant» en cours imprime des traces sensitives et affec-
tives et s’appuie sur l’Eros matrixiel à l’intérieur de l’Eros maternel, un 
Eros matrixiel qui échappe à l’angoisse de mort et se joint pourtant à 
elle d’une manière spécifique, bien plus que l’Eros maternel ne peut se 
joindre à la sexualité et à l’agression. Cette con-jonction se caractérise 
par sa vulnérabilité et par une forme particulière de passivité. Au-delà du 
lien entre la mère et le fœtus, j’entends par la rencontre de plusieurs (ou 
même de ‘la plusieurité’13 différente de la ‘multiplicité’), des ensembles 
spécifiques d’instances subjectives co-apparaissant, étant activés et met-
tant en action une camera obscura de résonance psychique chez les diffé-
rents individus prenant part à ces expériences particulières de transmis-
sion. Lors d’une immersion matrixielle transmissible, le je et le non-je 
sont réciproquement transformés et transformant l’un par l’autre, tandis 
que les traces de cette transformation sont inscrites à la fois directement 
et de manière croisée chez l’un et chez l’autre. Dès lors, les traces psy-
chiques matrixielles ne concernent ni un sujet unique séparé ni une so-
ciété basée sur un commun dénominateur général. La plusieurité est une 
configuration spécifique qui n’est ni la psyché d’« un » seul sujet céliba-
taire ni celle de « deux » sujets en symbiose ou en état de séparation, elle 
n’indique pas non plus le niveau intersubjectif d’une relation. L’espace-
ment-bord matrixiel est illicite et, en plus, attire des contacts psychiques 
transgressifs, traumatiques et fantasmatiques, réels, imaginaires et sym-
boliques, du fait de l’(en)habitation14 dans le même champ de résonance 
dont chaque participant devient partiel. Ici, les vibrations affectives et 
les traces psychiques incognisées des transmissions mentales, ainsi que 
l’immersion dans la même intensité et les mêmes fréquences psychiques, 
transforment à certains égards la psyché de chaque sujet-partiel en une 
continuité mentale et affective de la psyché de l’autre. Nous métaboli-
13 Bien que l’espace-bord soit toujours constituée d’au moins deux participants, sa capacité 
d’accueil n’est pas infinie. Nous traduisons le néologisme severality par plusieurité pour dire ce 
nombre limité à quelques-uns. (NdT)
14 Afin d’insister sur les spécificités de l’habitation dans l’espace matrixiel, Ettinger crée à partir 
du verbe ‘inhabit’, le substantif inhabitation. Celui-ci introduirait en français le contre-sens de 
‘inhabité’, alors même qu’il est question de la notion opposée. C’est pourquoi nous avons opté 
pour la formation d’(en)habitation. (NdT)
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sons donc tant des traces mentales (au-delà de l’identification projective 
kleinienne et de la fonction alpha de Bion) que des vibrations affectives, 
les uns pour les autres. La connaissance ainsi appréhendée et le savoir 
en elle circonscrit, nous les formulons dans une sphère transsubjective.
La dimension transsubjective matrixielle — et le désir qui prend nais-
sance en elle — s’applique aussi bien aux femmes qu’aux hommes, bien 
qu’établie à partir de l’attachement archaïque et du lien de chaque pré-
sujet humain avec son Autremère-femelle15 et, dans ce sens, elle est fémi-
nine et (pré)maternelle. La transsubjectivité matrixielle ne postule pas 
de sujets en interrelations ou en intersubjectivité. Elle est l’émergence 
du je et du non-je (dans leur dimension partielle) par reliance-bords,16 
sans rejet ni fusion, sans assimilation ni dévoration, et sans abandon: 
bordureliance entre un corps-psyché prémature et un corps-psyché ma-
ture de sexe féminin; elle est pour toujours liée au mystère de l’intérieur 
invisible d’un corps femelle, baignant dans un environnement spéci-
fique, acoustique et autrement sensible et trans-sensible. La prénatalité 
et la prégnance, en tant que réel, processus, image et symbole, donnent 
forme à un espace-bord inconscient de co-transformation-dans-la-dif-
férence. La Matrix fournit le symbole qui nous permet d’identifier et 
de reconnaître les motions des entités transgressivement co-impliquées 
derrière les motions du sujet différencié dans une constitution psychique 
mature. Elle nous permet aussi de tracer l’activité de l’Eros spécifique 
dont la source se trouve dans la différenciation et la différentiation et 
dérivation17 matrixielles-féminines. J’ai donné les noms de ‘métramor-
15 La traduction de female-m/Other par Autremère-femelle est difficile en français mais Ettinger 
tient à la nuance que ne peut rendre mère-Autre-de-sexe-féminin. (NdT)
16 La forme progressive, coutumière en anglais mais difficile à rendre en français, fait des 
substantifs de tous les verbes conjugués en –ing. Ettinger en fait un usage abondant pour dire 
le processus continu, toujours susceptible d’être réactualisé. Afin de souligner ce mouvement 
jamais complètement achevé, nous traduisons borderlinking par le pluriel ‘reliance-bords’ ou par 
bordureliance. (NdT)
17 Le doublet anglais differentiation and differenciation traduit par différenciation et dériva-
tion, souligne que les contacts féminins dans l’espace-bord matrixiel, bien que irreprésentables, 
marquent chaque participant de façon particulière. La différenciation renvoie aux manifestations 
graduelles des différences entre le je et le non je au fil des reliance-bords et constitue l’antonyme 
matrixiel de la séparation dans la théorie psychanaltique classique; la dérivation porte sur la ren-
contre d’une forme de passé avec une forme d’avenir et désigne le condensé du double effet de 
la différente différence féminine ou ‘woman-to-woman difference’. La différenciation recouvre à la 
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phose’18 et de ‘co-poiésis’19 à l’ensemble des rencontres et des événements 
con-joints qui co-émergent, co-changent et co-diminuent au sein du 
réseau inconscient des reliance-bords entre le je et le non-je modelées 
sur la grossesse-prégnation. La copoiésis représente la potentialité créa-
tive de la métramorphose. Le je et le non-je n’émergent pas de façon 
symétrique dans la métramorphose. À une extrémité est rendue possible 
la réalisation du sujet à partir de sa position présubjective «esthétique» 
et proto-éthique. À l’autre, c’est au prix de la fragilisation de l’Autre 
prématernelle/féminine que les frontières de ses champs esthétiques et 
éthiques sont élargies et transgressées.
Eros prégnant
Diotime — au nom de laquelle parle Socrate dans Le Banquet de 
PlatonEtt.3 — que dit-elle au sujet d’Eros ? Avant tout qu’il doit être 
compris comme un esprit qui interprète et transmet, qui remplit l’es-
pace intermédiaire entre les êtres (divins et humains) et par lequel ils 
communiquent. Eros est un moyen de communication, de relais et de 
connexion, d’interprétation et de transmission:
«C’est un grand esprit (daimon), et comme tous les esprits il est un inter-
médiaire entre le divin et le mortel …. Il agit comme interprète et moyen 
de communication entre les dieux et les hommes, convoyant et transportant 
jusqu’aux dieux les prières et les sacrifices des hommes, et jusqu’aux hommes 
les prescriptions et les réponses des dieux. Occupant cette position médiane, 
il est le médiateur qui enjambe l’abîme qui les sépare, et c’est pourquoi en lui 
tout est lié ensemble.»Ett.4
fois la différenciation progressive de l’ Autremère en deux, la femme-mère et l’enfant à venir ou 
potentiel. Elle porte sur la rencontre d’une forme de passé avec une forme d’avenir, et constitue 
le fondement de l’espace-bord matrixiel. Plutôt qu’à une différenciation en deux, la différentia-
tion renvoie à une différence d’espèce. (NdT)
18 Métramophose est une transformation du terme métamorphose, à partir du nom grec fémi-
nin metra {matrice, sein de la mère; au figuré, source d’une chose}. Ce concept exprime le principe 
créateur même de l’événement-rencontre, son processus à la fois de mémoire et de changement. 
(NdT)
19 A partir du terme grec poiesis désignant l’activité aboutissant à une création, Ettinger forme 
co-poiésis pour souligner que, dans une relation matrixielle, la co-création est un travail entre le 
je et le non-je. (NdT)
66
P O L I G R A F I
La psychanalyste travaille dans-et-avec Eros. Œuvrant péniblement 
dans un espace de passage, de transition et d’échange tout en l’inter-
prétant, la psychanalyste rend possible le bâillement d’un espace-bord 
érotique où elle/il se trouve entre-tissé(e) avec son autre, promouvant 
et participant à la co-création d’un dispositif de reliance et de mise en 
connexion et liaison dans un processus de transfert, tout en fournissant 
l’interprétation de la rencontre de l’autre avec elle/lui, et à partir de là 
créant également la possibilité de nouveaux liens, la/le psychanalyste 
travaille avec-dans Eros. Elle s’emploie à établir non seulement des liens 
entre les différents motifs refoulés dans l’esprit de l’autre qu’elle aide à 
amener à la conscience, mais aussi au niveau de la rencontre elle-même 
et à partir d’elle vers les relations interpersonnelles générées en dehors 
des relations de transfert et du moment du traitement. Elle facilite en 
cela la naissance de nouvelles connexions ‘dans la réalité’. Dès lors, il 
devient possible d’identifier Eros comme étant celui à partir duquel la 
psychanalyste exige d’elle-même d’agir afin de dévoiler et de mettre en 
acte le désir de connexion et de liaison en lui-même (et non pas le désir 
pour des objets ou pour des autres-comme-objets) et d’ainsi faire naître 
à partir de l’inconscient le désir érotique, pas seulement le désir érotique 
de l’analysant mais aussi celui de l’analyste, tel qu’il se déploie dans les 
relations transférentielles intersubjectives. Il ne s’agit pas du désir sexuel, 
ni du simple désir de rencontrer un autre sur le modèle des «relations 
d’objet» passées avec un objet absent, ni du désir de rencontrer un ob-
jet-autre selon un modèle nouveau, différent des modèles archaïques. 
Ce désir véhicule plutôt un languissement pour la connexion intersub-
jective et pour la reliance elle-même. A la fois, il recherche et amène à 
dévoiler les traces d’un tel désir ardent passé et stimule le (r)éveil d’Eros 
ainsi que l’émergence de nouveaux liens. Non seulement l’objet im-
prime des traces psychiques mais cet élan médiateur peut aussi le faire. 
Une trace peut en scarifier une autre pour la remplacer mais elle peut 
aussi rejoindre une trace; et lorsque ce mouvement médiateur20 rejoint 
un élan de reliance-bords, Eros ne tourne pas en rond en d’éternelles 
20 L’élan {move} de reliance-bord représente la motion des oscillations chargées d’affects, liée 
aux impressions sensorielles floues et partagées qui se transmettent intuitivement et que peut 
venir rejoindre le mouvement {movement} médiateur et spiralé, essentiel à la vie. (NdT)
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répétitions mais, par un mouvement spiralé où se produit et s’imprime la 
transformation, la grâce de cette rencontre et son à-côtéïté21 peuvent ap-
paraître à l’endroit même où, sans cela, n’auraient eu lieu que le sacrifice 
et le manque. Les empreintes de la transformation bloquent le retour à 
cette voie qui tourne en rond et évitent, de cette façon, les coupures et la 
substitution. Mais afin d’atteindre un seuil de changement qui transfor-
mera les cycles récurrents en aspiration d’ascension spiralée, une qualité 
particulière et supplémentaire de reliance-bords, en plus d’une qualité 
de médiation, est requise, de laquelle nous parlerons plus longuement 
tout de suite. Cet Eros signifie aussi le désir de mise au jour des mouve-
ments intersubjectifs dont le cours a été arrêté et bloqué dans le passé. 
En ce sens, la participation de l’analyste à Eros n’est pas moindre que 
celle de l’analysant, mais sa responsabilité envers Eros est plus grande 
que celle de l’analysant. C’est ce qui place Eros au plan de l’éthique de 
la psychanalyse. Cependant, Eros se tient aussi sur le plan esthétique, 
embrassant le plan éthique et s’y dissimulant, non seulement à la façon 
unique, dans le style unique de chaque nouvelle relation qui se forme en 
psychanalyse, mais aussi dans le sens où la façon «esthétique» originaire 
sensée22 d’appréhender à la fois l’autre et l’extérieur, en compassion, est 
dotée d’une potentialité proto-éthique.
De cette manière, l’attention à la texture des relations intersubjectives 
qui se dérobent à toute fixation de l’autre comme objet, situe la question 
de l’Eros non-libidinal au plan de l’éthique de la psychanalyse. L’éthique 
inhérente à cet Eros n’est pas l’éthique de la bissection, de la séparation, 
de l’obstruction ou de la castration (mise en avant dans la technique 
clinique lacanienne) mais l’éthique du mouvement vers l’autre, mouve-
ment engendrant le contact et la rencontre tout autant que l’à-côtéïté. 
Dans sa lecture de Diotime, Luce Irigaray soutient cette qualité de mé-
diation, y voyant tout le mérite du discours de Diotime dans Le Banquet. 
21 La chaîne signifiante introduite par side est révélatrice de la dimension matrixielle. Formé à 
partir de la préposition beside qui signifie à côté de, le substantif besidedness exprime la position 
éthique de l’à-côtéïté et side-by-side-ness les échanges dans la côte-à-côtéïté entre les participants 
de l’espace-bord matrixiel. (NdT)
22 Le néologisme sensical, formé à partir de nonsensical, est devenu courant et signifie ce qui est 
sensé. Le choix d’une expression construite sur le détour par l’effacement de la négation, vien-
drait-il appuyer l’affirmation que les approches esthétiques par la sensation ou celles sensitives et 
sensorielles sont parfaitement sensées ? (NdT)
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Par contre, elle critique une autre qualité de ce texte, celle de la grossesse-
prégnation, et la rejette comme une erreur de la part de Diotime (ou de 
Socrate) qui met en échec et affaiblit ses arguments. Ett.5 Personnellement, 
loin de séparer la médiation et la grossesse-prégnation, je les associe 
grâce à une autre compréhension de ces notions, issue de la perspective 
matrixielle que j’ai théorisée. La conjonction de ces deux qualités génère 
une éthique de la durée, dans la grossesse et l’accouchement et dans l’in-
tervention médiatrice et la médiation dans l’enfantement,23 en vue des 
liens et des connexions ultérieures. Il s’agit d’une éthique de la réception, 
de l’étude et de la transmission des vertus de la liance avec l’autre, ainsi 
que des mérites de la médiation et de la connexion comme co-émer-
gence qui peuvent aller jusqu’à la co-poiésis. C’est bien par l’éthique de 
la prégnance médiatrice et de la médiatité imprégnée24 que les partici-
pants de l’événement-rencontre proto-éthique, et puis éthique, révèlent 
les vulnérabilités de la co-implication entre un être qui est comme fœtal 
et un autre qui est comme gravide. Au cœur de cette éthique qui oriente 
la démarche de la clinique psychanalytique, est dissimulée, comme je l’ai 
dit plus haut, une esthétique dont le principe est enfoui dans les fonde-
ments mêmes d’Eros, dans l’éternité mystique de cette alliance, au-delà 
de toute limite ou restriction. Même si cette esthétique conserve le secret 
du Beau comme essence spirituelle révélée dans un monde de phéno-
mènes matérialisés par le corps, le niveau psychique inconscient n’est 
pas le niveau physique, et la prégnance médiatrice est à la fois une méta-
phore et une analogie pour les processus psychiques qui ont leur origine 
dans une con-jonction et fondent cette con-jonction. Néanmoins, dans 
l’humain, cette sphère psychique s’origine dans une expérience corpo-
relle qui laisse ses empreintes, qui co-émerge avec-dans la matrice de la 
mère. Des traces ultérieures vont rejoindre les empreintes précoces, les 
transformant en d’autres situations mentales de co-émergence. En tout 
23 Begetting est traduit par enfantement, comme dans le texte français du Banquet de Platon: 
Amour de la procréation (en grec: genneseôs de gennaô) et de l’enfantement (en grec: tokou, de 
tokos) dans le Beau. (NdT)
24 Le substantif mediacy dérive de l’adjectif mediate qui signifie médiat mais, en français, le 
substantif correspondant n’existe pas. C’est sur le modèle de im-médiateté que le terme médiateté 
a été forgé. L’adjectif impregnated, traduit par imprégné(e), continue de faire résonner le champ 
lexical de la prégnance. (NdT)
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adulte des traces co-émergentes des modes originaires de co-émergence 
psychique sont re-perlaborées et leur négation nuit au tissu matrixiel.
Le principe esthétique élude le plan de la représentation et à la fois 
l’établit: le sentir, le percevoir et même le Beau ne signifient pas l’acte de 
représenter ni la représentation. En psychanalyse, ce principe informe 
l’éthique par le biais de la fragilisation-de-soi en com-passion. Il se tra-
duit par une responsabilité dans la rencontre avec l’autre en tant que 
rencontre imprégnée, et lors du processus, en tant que voyage con-joint 
de gestation prégnante et d’hospitalité com-passionnelle.
Diotime nous invite à penser l’amour comme un désir qui prend 
forme dans un état intermédiaire: «Car Eros est né dans quelque chose 
de beau, que ce soit de corps ou d’âme» (Platon, trad. hébreu, 2001:81). 
Le motif de la naissance et le motif du beau demeurent dans les ver-
tus d’Eros. Elle insiste pour faire entendre que Eros n’est pas «le désir 
du beau», mais «le désir d’enfantement et de naissance dans le beau», ou 
«le désir d’utiliser le beau pour enfanter et porter la progéniture» ( Pla-
ton, 1997:41) ou le désir de devenir et de naître au cœur du beau, selon 
la traduction hébraïque qui met en évidence la dimension de la gros-
sesse-prégnation par son insistance sur l’enfantement-comme-advenue 
et naissance (Platon, trad hébreu, 2001:82). Diotime ne délivre pas le 
secret de l’éminence du potentiel érotique qui se réalise en observant 
le Beau suprême en compagnie du «Beau lui-même», du fait de regar-
der-observer-méditer l’éternel, lorsque le passage à l’enfantement et à la 
naissance se façonne et le passage au corps vivant s’actualise, mais elle 
indique les élans d’ascension dans la descente et de descente élevante, 
d’ascension vers la réalisation en esprit par l’observation (méditation-
contemplation) ainsi que la descente vers l’actualisation dans le corps, 
dans et par laquelle va se déployer la vertu du Beau en tant que secret et 
principe spirituel. Dans cette rencontre dont les traits caractéristiques 
sont ceux de la prégnance et de la naissance, Eros est, alors, rendu réel. 
La beauté25 comme secret spirituel se cache dans la vitalité qui s’accom-
plit lorsque l’observation spirituelle est à son apogée. Diotime propose 
une rencontre en Eros: «Le Beau est, alors, le destin ou la déesse de la par-
25 En accord avec les traductions françaises de Platon, beauty est traduit par le Beau et beautiful 
par la beauté. (NdT)
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turition qui préside à la naissance», «c’est pourquoi la procréation tient le 
Beau comme sage-femme et destin» (Platon, 1997:41). «Dans la naissance, 
la déesse du Beau est à la fois la Déesse du destin et la Déesse des douleurs 
de l’accouchement» (Platon, trad. hébreu, 2001:82). Le Beau, la fatalité 
ou le destin et les douleurs du travail de l’accouchement s’entrelacent en 
un instant d’observation et d’union mystique qui ont leurs racines en 
Eros. Ici, fatalité et contingence se rencontrent dans la douleur, au sein 
de la sagesse érotique du Beau qui pulse tout au long de cet événement.
L’Eros que j’ai appelé matrixiel est un Eros féminin-prématernel avec 
son éthique et son esthétique particulières, entre-tissé dans les proces-
sus de co-lucidation26 qui se déroulent au cours de la différenciation 
et la dérivation-différentiation en con-jonction, dont le paradigme est, 
selon moi, la rencontre psychique et corporelle de la gestation. Tel qu’il 
se réalise dans cette union, Eros élude la prohibition de l’inceste (étant 
donné que l’union corporelle fœtale — pré-fils ou pré-fille— et mater-
nelle est, par la force des choses, «inceste» et aussi, par la force des choses, 
inévitable) et porte donc nécessairement à jamais, chez l’être humain, 
l’empreinte d’une proximité incestueuse, bien que non sexuelle, et c’est, 
à mon avis, ce genre particulier d’inceste qui est implicite dans le se-
cret de Diotime, dans la mesure où il s’agit d’un secret féminin. De la 
même manière, ce que Jacques Lacan appelle en psychanalyse moderne, 
l’impossible sexualité féminine, autre et supplémentaire, conduit aussi, 
selon moi, au thème de ces relations «incestueuses» prénatales préœdi-
piennes non-prohibées, lors de et par la grossesse. Le souhait incestueux 
(néanmoins non-sexuel et non-génital) de s’unir par-delà l’écart des gé-
nérations, bien que non accompli dans le corps en dehors de la portée 
de la grossesse, précisément parce que ce vœu ne peut s’accomplir dans 
le corps en d’autres formes que celle de la pré-natalité et de la pré-ma-
26 Le terme utilisé par Ettinger est co-dawning. Dawn(ing) signifie l’aube ou l’aurore, le point 
ou le lever du jour, le petit matin, la naissance au sens figuré, l’émergence d’une lueur, ainsi que 
l’éveil. L’expression something dawns on ou upon somebody désigne quelque chose dont il est fait 
jour à l’intérieur de soi, qui s’éclaire, qui devient visible au sens de son accessibilité à la clarté 
comme compréhension intellectuelle. Afin de maintenir sa triple signification visuelle, de nais-
sance, et d’advenue à la compréhension, le terme « co-(é)lucidation » a été choisi. Il faut noter 
toutefois que dans certaines occurrences des termes tels que éclairage, éclaircissement, appari-
tion, illumination, luminance correspondraient mieux à sa signification selon le contexte. Dès 
lors, « co-lucidation » est aussi utilisé. (NdT)
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ternité, fonde une éthique féminine sublimée de la com-passion et une 
esthétique féminine sublimée, à savoir le Beau. Cette sphère sublimée 
est féminine dans le sens où elle s’établit d’abord dans la dimension du 
Réel en étant avec et en rapport à un corps femelle et sa différence cor-
porelle invisible (que l’on soit de sexe masculin ou féminin étant dans-
avec ce contact). En tant que dimension psychique, basée sur des sen-
sibilités et trans-sensibilités perceptives et affectives, je considère cette 
sphère transsubjective comme érotique, mentale et affective. L’espace-
ment-bord f éminin-matrixiel provenant des vibrations de l’espace-bord 
transitif de la prégnation et de la fécondité donne une sphère psychique 
qui, par essence, élude la prohibition même de l’inceste: sans le savoir, 
je blesse et je prends plaisir, je souffre et j’atteins à la jouissance de pair 
avec un inconnu-étranger27 intime mais un autre intime, ma progéni-
ture, laquelle m’est à jamais interdite, alors même que mon-notre espace 
psychique actuel dans le Réel qui enjambe le traumatique et le fantasma-
tique, est indissolublement lié en chacun de nous. Sur cette expérience, 
résonnant au niveau mental-sensoriel-affectif-corporel-psychique repose 
la sphère matrixielle inconsciente commune et dispersée, où tout signal 
qui m’est transmis depuis l’autre et transmis par moi vers l’autre, marque 
l’autre et moi-même de manière hétérogène, con-jointement mais dif-
féremment, lorsque les vibrations, les intensités et les ondes atteignent 
plusieurs entités, et que les résidus et les traces imprimés de cet événe-
ment-rencontre sont dispersés entre ma psyché et la psyché de mon autre 
de manière à ce que ce ne soit qu’ensemble, dans une autre rencontre 
qui est sublimatoire et pas nécessairement corporelle — à l’intérieur du 
même tissage ou d’un nouveau tissage de plusieurité — qu’il sera pos-
sible de retracer un ensemble appartenant à la totalité de ces marques 
déjà dispersées et d’en déchiffrer le sens. Le signal dans sa totalité ne 
pourrait s’offrir en lui-même au déchiffrage sans une autre alliance sem-
blable, composée de singularités qui se distinguent elles-mêmes dans un 
regroupement transsubjectif. Chaque individu est comme un point ou 
un pôle le long de la même corde: les pôles tremblent d’un coup, dans 
27 Le terme alien vient souligner que le fœtus est pour l’Autremère un inconnu-étranger intime 
et ajouter à la dimension de la distance-dans-la proximité {distance-in-proximité} celle de l’éloi-
gnement-dans-l’intimité {remoteness-within-closeness}. (NdT)
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le même mouvement mental-affectif-sensoriel mais non de la même ma-
nière. La cordeEtt.6 crée de concert avec d’autres cordes sa propre nébu-
leuse érotique. Il s’agit d’un regroupement, fait d’éloignement-dans-l’in-
timité ou de distance-dans-la-proximité, de moments ou d’événements 
affectifs-mentaux différents situés le long de ces cordes reliantes, et d’une 
venue-au-monde-ensemble à la limite de ce qui peut être appréhendé 
et compris par la psyché de chaque individu distinct. Dans une sphère 
transsubjective, l’Eros matrixiel absorbe et redistribue la résonance entre 
les participants du même regroupement matrixiel: entre personnes, et 
entre les personnes et les œuvres d’art. Tout nouveau non-je qui rejoint 
ce regroupement ne chasse pas le(s) non-je antérieur(s) mais se joint à 
eux.
Mon analysant M. X a décrit son expérience émotionnelle-mentale 
matrixielle de la façon suivante: « Comme enfant, j’ai souvent eu cette 
idée en tête: j’imaginais l’esprit et les pensées comme un nuage. Mes sen-
timents appartenaient à ce nuage. Ils se déplaçaient parmi les différentes 
personnes qui appartenaient au même nuage et ensuite, je les aspirais 
en moi, mais de façon passive. » Seul un nouveau «nuage» mental et 
affectif créé dans le transfert matrixiel a permis, grâce à sa perspective 
transformationnelle, la naissance et la réabsorption d’un nouvel insight, 
une nouvelle perception intuititive28 concernant le trauma silencieux 
cumulatif imprimé de façon croisée dans l’ancien «nuage».
La rencontre analytique ouvre à nouveau une brèche dans la fron-
tière de ce qui est incompréhensible et qui ne peut se contenir seul. 
D’une part, les émotions sont absorbées passivement mais de ce fait, la 
conscience de la participation active de chacun dans le processus sub-
jectivant de l’autre ainsi que dans la création de chaque nuage, surgit. 
D’autre part, de ce fait, la conscience de la participation active de cha-
cun dans la création peut surgir. Au sein de cette nouvelle rencontre qui 
est une alliance, des acceptions matrixielles antérieures vont être révé-
lées tandis que des significations matrixielles nouvelles co-surgissent: 
la révélation et l’invention s’entretissent. Le prisme matrixiel crée une 
28 Pour l’artiste qu’est Ettinger, les vibrations, modulations, transformations de la peinture 
sont ressenties, bougent, nous touchent. Pour sauvegarder cette résonance picturale intimement 
mêlée à sa pensée, nous traduisons insight par perception intuitive, tout en gardant l’expression 
originale. (NdT)
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multitude de possibilités d’interventions thérapeutiques sur le plan du 
transfert relationnel. Réaliser la transsubjectivité signifie comprendre 
l’importance de chaque composition29 unique analyste-et-analysant, 
dans le sens de la contribution de l’inconscient de chaque analyste spé-
cifique à ce qui est révélé et inventé concernant l’inconscient de l’analy-
sant. Cette importance est telle que la responsabilité de l’analyste envers sa 
propre intégrité et créativité est une partie de sa responsabilité à l’égard de 
l’analysant. Ce que cette composition spécifique permettra de faire ger-
mer, aucune autre composition ne le fera croître, parce que l’inconscient 
matrixiel ne va fleurir et s’épanouir qu’au sein d’un temps-bord et d’un 
espace-bord matrixiels spécifiques. Ainsi, à partir de cette perspective, à 
la différence d’une éthique du silence total (ou de la neutralité) concer-
nant l’identité du psychanalyste, une éthique de dévoilement partiel 
émane: il s’agit d’un dévoilement, au bon moment et dans une mesure 
appropriée et modeste, d’éléments inconscients qui se révèlent au psy-
chanalyste dans et par chaque rencontre analytique spécifique (même si, 
bien sûr, ces éléments appartiennent également à l’analysant). En cela, je 
rejoins la tendance psychanalytique intersubjective mais, de plus, je pré-
tends que les préoccupations mentales dramatiques de l’analyste doivent 
influencer l’espace matrixiel partagé entre l’analyste et l’analysant et que, 
par conséquent, non seulement elles doivent être révélées jusqu’à un cer-
tain point et être partagées de manière explicite, mais encore qu’il est 
de la responsabilité de l’analyste d’élever son niveau de vulnérabilité, de 
compassion et de connaissance de l’esprit. L’analysant a le droit de se 
soucier de l’Eros éthique et esthétique de son analyste comme de son/
leur propre champ partagé. Le déni (mais aussi parfois le simple non-
partage) d’états affectifs mentalement transférés et de préoccupations 
mentales pourrait devenir un trauma caché cumulatif pour l’analysant 
et pour le transfert analytique d’espace-bord matrixiel. Un autre aspect 
important de l’éthique matrixielle concerne l’à-côtéïté. Il importe de se 
tenir à côté de l’Autremère et de l’environnement significatif de l’analy-
sant, de ne pas remplacer les figures parentales mais de rejoindre les ré-
29 La composition doit être comprise au sens musical de la partition, faite de variations, oscilla-
tions, mouvements de transformation graduelle entre symétrie et asymétrie, continuité et rup-
ture. Elle compose un assemblement unique entre analyste et analysant avec ses modulations 
propres qui précèdent l’interprétation. (NdT)
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seaux existants tout en les transformant par le fait même de les rejoindre. 
Le remplacement de l’Autremère est une déchirure catastrophique dans 
le réseau matrixiel. Nous reviendrons sur ces questions ainsi qu’au soin 
et au tact qu’elles exigent. Mais en attendant, revenons à l’Eros féminin 
comme moyen de communication, de relais et de connexion, d’inter-
prétation et de transmission.
Certains prétendent qu’en faisant parler Diotime à travers Socrate, 
Platon souhaitait approprier pour le compte des hommes le motif de la 
naissance comme créativité et amour de la sagesse. Ils en veulent pour 
preuve que Socrate se voit lui-même comme sage-femme et considère 
la naissance humaine à partir du corps femelle comme inférieure à la 
naissance dans la créativité, et ainsi de suite. Leurs arguments sont bien 
connus. Pour ma part, j’aimerais dire autre chose, quasiment l’inverse: 
que le choix d’une femme pour initier le motif de la naissance dans le 
désir érotique d’enfantement dans la beauté, témoigne plutôt de ce qu’il 
y a quelque chose chez la femme — ou dans la venue-au-monde impri-
mée dans et par le corps féminin, dans la contribution de la féminité 
au devenir du sujet humain — dont seule une femme peut témoigner, 
sans pour autant livrer totalement le secret émanant de l’altérité fémi-
nine femelle. Ne serait-ce pas parce qu’une femme est marquée deux 
fois par la potentialité matrixielle, tant comme pré-sujet fille fœtale que 
comme mère potentielle (qu’elle veuille ou non devenir mère, en réa-
lité, n’a pas d’importance en termes de cette potentialité). Le secret n’est 
pas déchiffré car il est, pour emprunter la terminologie de Freud, au-
delà du principe de plaisir, et il se manifeste dans une jouissance «im-
possible» féminine «autre», pour reprendre la terminologie de Lacan 
(1975), qui voit dans le féminin le potentiel de transgression mystique 
vers l’union avec Dieu. Donc, en termes de perspective matrixielle, la 
différence f éminine ne se manifeste pas entre individus genrés (garçons 
par rapport à filles) mais dans les différentes manières de faire reliance-
bords vers et de faire espace-bord avec-dans le corpo-réel affectif et men-
tal féminin (par exemple, la différence entre un garçon se différenciant 
d’une f emelle-Autremère et une fille se différenciant d’une femelle-Au-
tremère). A présent, je voudrais souligner deux choses concernant l’alté-
rité féminine que le texte platonicien du Banquet nous offre par l’entre-
mise de Diotime. La première est ce quelque chose qui restera toujours 
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secret: le passage comme milieu, exister dans une étape intermédiaire, 
une médiation que j’interprète comme ce qui est incestueux dans la 
g rossesse-prégnance, paradigmatique d’un état transitoire, la plusieurité 
ou la con-jonction de l’être-dans-entre-au-milieu30 et de l’être imprégné 
en prégnance («Transitif» et «prégnant», tout comme le mot «hébreu», 
partagent en hébreu la même racine: ain.beit.resh: maavar, Meubar et 
Ivrit). La seconde chose est que le passage comme connectivité transitive 
et transgressive est à nouveau interprété comme une imprégnation. Le 
passage et la transition sont portés par cette même racine en hébreu: une 
transgression des frontières où le tabou de l’inceste dans la pré-maternité 
et la pré-natalité est, pour des raisons pragmatiques, quasiment hors-
interdi t. Seule une femme peut témoigner, non pas des rapports sexuels 
ni de la conception, mais de l’être imprégné. Socrate aurait pu parler en 
tant qu’homme de la procréation comme copulation, de l’ensemence-
ment de la graine et de la position de la sage-femme qui reçoit le bébé 
venant au monde, et de ce point de vue-là, il aurait pu contribuer à l’en-
richissement de l’idée de donner naissance de différentes façons. Mais 
en tant qu’homme, Socrate ne pouvait pas porter témoignage du dérou-
lement de la grossesse-prégnation et de l’accouchement comme actua-
lités traumatiques, ni de la tangibilité vivante de l’enfantement comme 
continuel événement-rencontre de prégnance où le trauma et le Beau 
s’entretissent nécessairement – par trauma, j’entends, pour commencer, 
celui de l’Autremère. «La génération dans la naissance», ce devenir, cet 
enfantement ou émergence, énoncé par la bouche de la figure féminine, 
témoigne de cette rencontre — avec un accent mis sur la «génération». 
Lacan, lui aussi, décrit le mystère d’une situation transitionnelle de cette 
sorte, un état médian «entre-deux», une situation «et-et», qui est pour 
lui une «femme», réalisant l’existence du secret dans un tel état intermé-
diaire d’un genre particulier (que je lis comme prégnance) dont même 
lui, étant un homme, ne peut parler et dont seule une femme pourrait 
parler – si toutefois le langage pouvait contenir ce secret sans résidu.
30 Between signifie entre et l’expression in between désigne le fait de se trouver au milieu de 
ou parmi d’autres (deux ou plusieurs) personnes ou choses. A partir de ces locutions est créé le 
substantif in-between-ness, dans lequel peut être entendue l’insistance matrixielle sur in et que 
nous traduisons par l’être-dans-entre-au mileu. (NdT)
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L’éros féminin-matrixiel et la transsubjectivité
C’est par le concept de »transfert d’espace-bord matrixiel« que j’es-
saie d’accorder toute leur valeur aux élans psychiques générés dans l'es-
pace de passage de type fœtal entre le non-je (comme future mère) 
et le je (comme pré-sujet), tous deux sujets partiels l’un pour l’autre, 
à un niveau inconscient du processus psychanalytique. Comme je l’ai 
déjà signalé, en hébreu »fœtus« dérive de la même racine étymologique 
que »passage«. Au travers de ce concept, les mystères de l’enfantement 
deviennent le support même d’une sphère psychique inconsciente, par-
tielle, dispersée et partageable. Les frontières de l’individu sont effrac-
tées dans cette sphère où les éléments mentaux sont dispersés, dès le dé-
part, entre plusieurs sujets partiels qui, par la force transformationnelle 
de cette dispersion et de cette transgression, sont confinés-et-liés-dans-
la-différence à l’intérieur d’un même réseau psychique. Il s'agit d'une 
sphère psychique de transsubjectivité, antérieure et différente du niveau 
auquel l'individu comme sujet séparé se forme et se révèle, ce sujet qui 
crée des relations intersubjectives basées sur le fait qu’il est distinct et sur 
la clarté de ses frontières, ce qui se cristallise dans l'identité.
L’investissement de la transsubjectivité matrixielle — la subjectivité 
comme rencontre et le temps et le lieu de la rencontre comme espace-
bord transgressif de prégnation — avec les affects émanant des liaisons 
et des contacts de reliance-bords, au cours de la grossesse, entre un sujet-
en-devenir (pré-sujet) et une mère-en-devenir (sujet dont les supports 
ont bifurqué) ne doit pas nous induire dans l’erreur de rechercher le 
sens de la rencontre ou de l'espace-temps matrixiels dans la nature bio-
logique, pas plus que la structure phallique et le processus de castration 
qu'elle implique en psychanalyse ne représentent les relations entre le 
père et le fils comme mettant en danger le membre mâle réel. La Matrix 
est une sphère psychique inconsciente de co-lucidation et co-évanes-
cence31 du je et du non-je inconnu, qui n’est ni fusionné vers le dedans ni 
rejeté vers l’extérieur; elle marque une position, un processus, un état et 
31 L’événement-rencontre se caractérise par un mouvement d’approche et de retrait. Ainsi, 
après la montée de la lumière vient un déclin, une atténuation qui nous fait traduire cofading 
par co-évanescence. (NdT)
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un stade qu’il convient de différencier de l’état, du stade, de la position 
et des processus de symbiose ou d’autisme qui se développent ultérieu-
rement en un futur sujet séparé. Le concept de la Matrix se base sur des 
relations entre la psyché-âme avec-dans un corps femelle et le pré-sujet 
en reliance-bord avec elle, aux derniers stades de la grossesse, ainsi que 
sur leur manière de s’articuler en termes d’espace-bord psychique par-
tagé, inconsciemment traumatique et fantasmatique, où la différencia-
tion et la ségrégation en co-émergence et en distance-dans-la-proximité 
sont continuellement réaccordées et réorganisées au travers de relations-
sans-mise-en-relation,32 de l’être-avec-dans, de la côte-à-côtéïté et de 
l’être-entre «moi-même» et le/les inconnu(s) intime(s). Les processus de 
connexion et de communication affective, d’association et de transfor-
mation dont les empreintes mentales transcendent le sujet individuel et 
dont les traces sont gravées dans plusieurs êtres simultanément (y com-
pris les transmissions «télépathiques» et «hypnotiques» dans le trans-
fert) se produisent avec des variations mais con-jointement entre cette 
pluralité d’êtres. Car la conscience matrixielle est un éveil con-joint de 
savoir, une co-naissance33 qui ne provient pas de la cognition, mais c’est 
un savoir ou une co-naissance affective fragile à la frontière entre diffé-
rents sujets, qui se passe le long des cordes de connexions traumatiques 
et fantasmatiques les reliant; c’est la transmissivité par ondes, intensités 
et fréquences, et l’impression, trans-impression et impression croisée 
(dans la psyché l’un de l’autre) des traces de l’événement-rencontre qui 
permettent aux cordes connectives (ainsi qu’à la réalisation de leur exis-
tence) de vibrer l’une pour l’autre dans l’espace partagé.
Nous avons donc affaire au mystère que j’ai appelé ailleurs la marque 
de l’Autre mère, ou du féminin-autre archaïque, dans le corps-psyché. 
Le corps ne fait pas office ici de tremplin pour satisfaire les pulsions, et 
il n’est pas non plus un symbole indiquant l’irréductibilité des instincts 
et des pulsions. Le corps pénètre depuis un autre lieu, selon d’autres 
32 Il s’agit ici d’un paradoxe: les participants de l’événement-rencontre sont partiellement 
inconnus les uns aux autres et pourtant intimement liés. L’expression relations-sans-mise-en-re-
lation {relations-without-relating} tente de rendre compte du paradoxe et de sa dimension non 
élaborée par la cognition entre les participants. (NdT)
33 L’homophonie, en français, entre la co-naissance {cobirthing} et la connaissance {knowledge} 
est à remarquer. (NdT)
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considérations, et il indique l’appel-attrait du corps-psyché du je pour 
la proximité (‘l’attachement’) avec la mère/Autre. Tout comme de 
nombreux théoriciens des relations d’objet, de l’« Intersubjectif » et du 
« Soi », tels Winnicott, Ogden, Tustin, Kohut et d’autres à la suite de 
Bowlby, je reconnais le désir de rapprochement en tant que tel et non 
comme un étayage secondaire d’autres besoins (telle la nourriture) et 
de pulsions (telle la pulsion orale). Cependant il existe deux différences 
majeures: (a) l’attachement matrixiel relève de la reliance-bords en cours 
de différenciation à l’intérieur d’une sphère déjà transsubjective, c’est-
à-dire qu’il ne dépend pas de positions autistiques ou symbiotiques du 
sujet en devenir, et (b) les premières traces psychiques sont considérées 
comme partageables et prénatales. Des traces de l’à-côtéïté, de la connec-
tivité et de l’être-entre intra-utérins — ainsi que des traces similaires 
qui les prennent pour modèle plus tard dans la vie — sont marquées 
dans le corps-psyché des quelques participants à la rencontre-événement 
matrixielle et sont distribuées et imprimées de façon croisée dans la sub-
subjectivité et la transsubjectivité tout au long de la vie, c’est à dire éga-
lement à l’âge adulte. La féminité nécessairement reliée à l’Autremère 
archaïque, pour le sujet humain généré et pour la subjectivité multiple 
(plusieurs) bifurquée dans la portée de laquelle elle éclot, dénote le se-
cret de l’altérité de toute alliance; ou, pour saisir la différence matrixielle 
qui émerge de la différenciation-en-con-jonction dans un langage plus 
adapté à la période du Banquet, nous pouvons la voir comme un voyage 
d’Eros spiralé, créant une communication interprétative entre les êtres 
dans une sphère intermédiaire de médiation par laquelle tout est atta-
ché à tout.
Au travers d’Eros, médiateur, passeur, être de connexion, créateur du 
désir d’advenue, d’enfantement et de naissance dans la beauté, nous arri-
vons à l’idée qu’il y a, dans le désir dont parle Diotime, une dimension 
dont nous pouvons affirmer qu’elle n’émane pas d’un manque, mais de 
la plénitude d’un toucher tout au long de la transformation pendant la 
prégnation, dimension qui contredit l’idée du désir qui s’origine dans le 
manque, selon la formulation lacanienne: le désir phallique dont l’objet-
cause est un manque (l’objet a). Si, selon les propos du Banquet et dans 
la pensée de Lacan, l’homme se languit de ce qu’il n’a pas (une chose 
ou un objet ou une idée ou un autre comme objet a), dans la dimension 
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supplémentaire du féminin-autre, le désir que j’ai appelé matrixiel est 
un désir de reliance-bords et de différenciation au sein d’un événement-
rencontre transgressif et un désir de l’ensemble des mouvements qui 
créent et accomplissent ces événements-rencontre par lesquels seraient 
laissées, en passant par une transformation, des empreintes pour des 
événements-rencontre transgressifs à venir. Le désir matrixiel est aussi 
le signifiant de ces mouvements, des éléments de changement, de par-
ticipation et de redistribution inhérents à chaque événement-rencontre 
nouveau: rencontre cruciale en tant qu’elle est une co-luminance et un 
espacement-bord. La ‘génération’ — l’enfantement et l’advenue — dans 
la beauté, tout en étant analogue à la naissance dont la femme, et seule 
la femme, peut faire l’expérience, d’où le choix de Diotime, est une 
advenue qui rend impossible de contourner le trauma, non seulement 
celui du manque qui est moins préoccupant ici (la grossesse n’est pas 
un manque, je le répète, mais une relation incestueuse), mais aussi celui 
de la médiation et de la connexion comme telle, saturées qu’elles sont 
de fragilisation. Il est impossible de contourner la douleur des très hu-
maines liaison et connexion dans la fragilisation avec toute leur gamme 
sémantique, ni la douleur de la perte partielle des autres matrixiels du 
fait de la transformation, de la bifurcation et du ré-accordement.
Le choix d’une femme (Diotime) comme oratrice qui conduit la pa-
role en un élan de va-et-vient du cœur du mystère du désir d’union et 
de connexion, avec ses tempêtes et ses peines, la femme comme celle qui 
sait, qui révèle et recèle le secret des vertus du passage, atteste que l’amou-
reux de sagesse reconnaît que cette connexion ainsi que la connaissance 
de cette connaissance-de-connexion, sont bien féminines. Et peut-être 
vaut-il mieux dire que cette imprégnation est une ‘femme’ — une cor-
poréité femelle ainsi qu’une connectivité corpo-réelle à un corps femelle 
— dans toute sa révélation: l’âme, l’esprit, la réalité. La féminité de la 
vertu d’Eros doit être reconnue. La possibilité de venue-au-monde sub-
jective lors de la différenciation et de la dérivation et de l’espacement-
bord comme rencontre prématernelle-présubjective de sujets partiels en 
co-émergence dans la naissance est une «femme».
Le désir d’advenue est nettement matrixiel lorsque devient évidente la 
co-génération. Le désir de connecter ce qui ne peut être uni, de joindre 
différentes manifestations du visible qui ne tiennent pas ensemble dans 
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la réalité, est une «femme»; et le secret de ses combinaisons — la sagesse 
du Beau — ce sont les douleurs de l’accouchement. Ce désir offre l’oc-
casion de transgressions au-delà du sujet isolé: le temps de la naissance 
est une métaphore pour le dépassement subjectif des frontières, réalisé 
pourtant dans la différenciation. L’Eros de transmission, de connexion 
et d’interprétation se constitue en tant qu’être intermédiaire au service 
d’un passage. L’Erotique matrixielle-féminine34 est une venue-à-l’être 
liminale, et elle est aussi le passage réel venant d’au-delà d’un être inter-
médiaire, soit une advenue liminale localisée entre l’existence et le néant, 
le spirituel et le corporel, le divin et l’humain et elle est rattachée à un 
événement-rencontre dont l’extension ne peut être contenue adéqua-
tement au moyen d’un concept symbolique ou de définitions d’objet 
(ou de relations d’objet). C’est lors d’un événement-rencontre transitif 
e xpérientiel-affectif-mental que la rencontre psychanalytique contient 
les composantes de l’Eros matrixiel, qu’elle reconstruit ses mouvements 
et ré-accorde ses vibrations. Considérons cet événement érotique comme 
mouvement, un mouvement de désir flottant entre, un désir d’enfan-
tement-génération, une émergence d’amour en com-passion, nécessai-
rement co-génération ou co-émergence. Si le sens du désir matrixiel est 
précisément transféré dans le Banquet par la femme, une inconnue, une 
étrangère35 (comme l’indique le texte) ou l’autre, une narratrice au cours 
de la rencontre et de la conversation, selon moi, il en est ainsi parce que 
des modalités non-conceptuelles de sens sont sous-entendues – sens du 
et venant du Réel enveloppé dans la présence du corpo-réel et dans la 
processus de la création, sens créé uniquement au fil du transfert, dans 
un événement-rencontre à partir du processus même de médiation, d’in-
terprétation et de transmission. Ceci signifie également que le féminin 
34 Eros est au féminin à partir de cette affirmation qu’il est un être intermédiaire au service d’un 
passage. C’est par pronom personnel au féminin que, dans la suite du texte, Ettinger désigne 
Eros. (NdT)
35 Ettinger se sert du nom abstrait foreignness {adj. foreign=étranger} pour dire l’étrangeté à l’inté-
rieur de l’intimité matrixielle. Elle distingue la qualité d’être étranger/étrangère de la qualité d’être 
inconnu/inconnue {stranger}. Diotime incarne doublement ces deux qualités: ressortissante de 
Mantinée, elle est citoyenne étrangère d’Athènes et, Socrate parlant à sa place, elle demeure une 
inconnue, néanmoins intime vu qu’il rapporte les propos qu’elle lui aurait tenus. Sa position est 
métaphorique de celle créée dans l’espace-bord entre le fœtus et l’Autremère ou entre les parte-
naires de la reliance-bords analytique. (NdT)
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que nous interprétons matrixiellement et que cette qualité d’être un(e) 
étranger(ère) que nous interprétons dans la même perspective, prennent 
part à et rendent possible ce sens à un niveau originaire.
A propos du secret de Diotime, s’il s’agit, comme je le pense, d’une 
différence féminine qui nécessite une locutrice-femme pour parler d’Eros 
comme venue-à-l’être corps et âme, c’est qu’il y a forcément quelque 
chose de scellé dans le corps femelle et d’imprimé par l’entremise de 
«la femme» en tant que l’autre – aussi bien l’Autremère que l’autre-de-
l’homme, une Autremère qui apporte une contribution à l’émergence du 
sujet humain par le biais de son désir différent et dans le contexte d’une 
contribution à la dimension corpo-réelle de l’Inconscient. Quelque 
chose que seule la femme peut savoir et dont elle seule peut témoigner 
par l’Eros de l’entre-et-dans-au-milieu-de, l’Eros du joindre, du passage 
et du transférer, du con-joindre et du transfert, est transféré et gravé 
sans signification: en secret. Elle le sait à travers l’Eros de l’être-entre-
dans-au-milieu, grâce à l’Eros du con-joindre, du passage et du trans-
fert, lorsque dans la psyché la signification de l’empreinte de son corps 
de femme — l’espace de la matrice de la mère — est incluse dans cette 
même connaissance. En tant que féminin, Eros nécessite une locutrice 
femme, dont le corps est doté d’un espace matriciel qui peut être exposé 
aux douleurs de l’accouchement, même si ce potentiel n’est pas réalisé 
ou est confronté à la douleur de la stérilité. Le secret de l’Eros émanant 
de l’altérité de l’esprit-psyché-corps féminin se tisse et se réalise, à mon 
avis, dans l’idée de jonction entre le Beau, le destin comme décret (pla-
tonicien) au niveau céleste et comme contingence au niveau terrestre, et 
les douleurs de l’accouchement comme double jouissance-et-trauma de 
con-jonction et de différenciation et de l’état séparé et de différenciation 
au sein d’une intimité incestueuse (avec le non-je inconnu) qui ne peut 
être interdite. Du côté féminin, la jouissance-et-trauma n’est pas seule-
ment celle de la naissance réelle mais c’est plutôt le traitement continuel, 
caché et refoulé, des relations apparaissant entre le je et l’inconnu-intime 
(non-je) au cours de la prégnation et jusqu’à la naissance. Après tout, 
Diotime témoigne du confinement du fœtus «dans une grande souf-
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france». La jouissance-et-trauma de la grossesse elle-même s’infiltre36 à 
partir de ce temps-bord et de cet espace-bord via toutes les relations et 
les différents processus de reliance-bords auxquels participe Éros comme 
élément caché de chaque conjonction comme fertilité spirituelle et mou-
vement de co-émergence dans toute la portée de la prégnance spirituelle, 
psychique et physique. Ce motif silencieux et continu de jouissance-et-
trauma formé d’une multitude de liens et de connexions à l’intérieur 
d’un réseau sub-subjectif inconscient imbibe l’ensemble du système de 
connexions et de relations auquel Eros participe.
Ainsi, lorsque je noue ensemble la naissance et le trauma, je ne parle 
pas du traumatisme de la naissance au sens psychanalytique classique 
(Rank, 1973) — celui du nouveau-né, sa séparation de la matrice enve-
loppante ou son arrachement à la matrice de la mère et la perte du pla-
centa — mais je parle de l’empreinte jouissante-et-traumatique que j’ai 
appelée matrixielle: la marque ineffaçable de la rencontre intra-utérine, 
au niveau du Réel de la matrice, qui infiltre le domaine fantasmatique, 
celle de la rencontre de la femme-devenant-mère avec le fœtus-inconnu 
lors de sa venue-au-monde, rencontre qui transforme la «femme» en 
Autremère archaïque et inconnue-intime pour tout être humain émer-
geant, mâle ou femelle, qui est son non-je en devenir; une Autremère 
archaïque et inconnue-intime avec qui le sujet co-émerge dans une 
a dvenue-à-l’être-con-jointe, dans une rencontre dont les retours poten-
tiels menacent de faire irruption à n’importe quel moment et de pro-
duire une connexion entre étranger et intime dans cet espace-de-passage 
supplémentaire où, une fois encore, tous les sujets participants devenus 
maintenant partiels seront connectés par des ré-accordements ultérieurs.
Le mouvement d’éternel retour depuis l’intérieur de la douleur conte-
nue dans les traces de l’événement-rencontre transgressif, ainsi que la 
possibilité d’un retour potentiel dans l’avenir, transforme le mouvement 
de différenciation qui est aussi en même temps un languissement géné-
rateur, avec et pour une femme-Autremère, en un signal qui stimule le 
niveau intermédiaire entre étrangeté et familiarité ainsi que la position 
médiatrice de l’être-entre. La rencontre transformative supplémentaire 
36 L’infiltration est un mode de passage d’affects, événements, matières et modes d’être matri-
ciels. (NdT)
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(supplémentaire à celle d’»origine») apportée par la psychanalyse conver-
tit le retour potentiel en un élan ouvert spiralé le long d’axes de temps 
et d’espace.
Le désir de co-émergence dans le Beau
L’éveil de l’Eros féminin-matrixiel en tant que désir de co-émergence 
et d’enfantement partageable dans le Beau, produit un état dangereux, 
créatif et fragile, un état d’exposition à l’inséparabilité au cœur de la 
différenciation. L’Eros féminin-matrixiel est un languissement intime, 
transgressif et générateur, envers et pour une autre personne – en tant 
que «femme». Il met en branle une situation médiatrice intermédiaire, 
continuelle et vibrante, avec ses connexions reliantes, que celles-ci soient 
destinées à être telles ou pas. C’est dans ce sens que les décrets du des-
tin interviennent dans l’événement-rencontre. La venue-à-l’être en co-
émergence au sein d’un espace-bord matrixiel qui joint l’étrangeté et 
la familiarité, est une jouissance-et-trauma existentielle continue qui 
n’expose pas au grand jour le secret d’Eros, mais fait plutôt écho à son 
intensité. La venue-à-l’être en co-lucidation dans le transfert d’espace-
bord matrixiel n’est pas juste une situation temporaire ou une période de 
temps exceptionnelle et définie, et la sphère matrixielle elle-même n’est 
pas limitée à un stade de développement, mais c’est une dimension men-
tale inconsciente qui participe à l’évolution humaine et est secrètement 
active tout au long du cycle de la vie. Eros n’est pas le seul à participer 
à cette dimension. Thanatos s’y trouve aussi.Ett.7
L’ascension à travers la spirale du savoir érotique vers l’observation 
du Beau lui-même qui trouve sa réalisation dans la vitalité du corps, 
tout en étant un élan spirituel que l’on peut considérer comme une 
voie de reliance-bords en cours, signifie en quelque sorte la jouissance-
et-trauma de la co-lucidation qui ne révèle pas son secret mais plutôt, à 
nouveau, fait écho à son intensité au cœur éthique de l’expérience de la 
rencontre psychanalytique aussi bien qu’au cœur esthétique, dissimulé 
dans le principe motivant du travail artistique.
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J’ai à l’esprit la série37 des tableaux ‘Eurydice’.Ett.8 A la manière d’Eury-
dice, dont le secret relie des unités à une série qui est en principe ouverte 
face à la peur de la mort, ainsi Diotime indique le secret d’un événement 
qui est à jamais traumatique puisqu’il appartient à un temps en dehors 
du flux du temps susceptible d’être récupéré par la mémoire, et il est 
pour toujours énigmatique, car il ne sera jamais complètement déchif-
fré à partir des marques du corps dans le réel ni à partir de la fondation 
transcendantale spirituelle dans le monde de la signification symbolique 
qui noue ensemble loi, culture, société et langage. Car le déchiffrement 
requiert un travail d’interprétation dans la dimension transsubjective 
matérialisée et créée dans un événement-rencontre de mise au monde. 
Les noyaux Diotimien et Eurydicien se voient dotés d’une certaine signi-
fication dans l’Eros matrixiel, soit à travers les rencontres, les combinai-
sons, la répétition-spiralée-par-changement et le changement-par-répé-
tition, la sérialité ouverte par à-côtéïté, les procréations symboliques et 
les transferts transindividuels.
Le désir d’émergence et de naissance dans le Beau signifie être loca-
lisé au milieu et se répandre dans l’espace entre des mondes qui ne se 
rencontrent pas, afin d’être généré comme la connexion entre eux, de 
venir-au-monde comme combinaison et comme corde vibrante et de 
créer ce que j’ai appelé: la métramorphose, des processus de reliance et 
d’échange, de suintement et de goutte-à-goutte auprès des participants 
de cette combinaison. L’événement de la venue-au-monde comme évé-
nement-rencontre recevra son sens uniquement dans et par l’Eros fémi-
nin-matrixiel, c’est-à-dire: à travers des rencontres et des transferts ma-
trixiels supplémentaires entre des sujets partiels, à travers des connexions 
et reliance-bords ultérieures dans la métramorphose. L’acte d’interpréta-
tion lui-même, qui se fait au cours de la participation et de l’assistance 
à un événement-rencontre, par la médiation de la voix, de l’odeur, de la 
37 C’est en 1992 que Bracha Ettinger a commencé sa série des Eurydice qui demeure une série 
ouverte et compte, actuellement, une cinquantaine de tableaux. Dans le récit mythique, Eury-
dice est présente souterrainement dans les enfers mais le regard d’Orphée qui se retourne pour la 
saisir, la fait disparaître à jamais. Il en va de même pour les affects primaires: ils ne peuvent être 
rencontrés que par l’intermédiaire des modalités d’échanges sub-symboliques dans l’espace-bord 
matrixiel et l’inscription de leurs traces élaborée et restituée dans la seule relation de transfert. 
(NdT)
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respiration et de l’environnement visuel, et par les mouvements d’ap-
proche et de retrait de la rencontre qui font partie de l’événement, est 
issu d’un élan générateur de subjectivité — un moment subjectivant — 
du transfert matrixiel, et au delà de tout contenu spécifique. En psycha-
nalyse, par son hospitalité compassionnelle, c’est l’analyste qui ouvre ces 
moments subjectivisants et en a la responsabilité.
L’événement-rencontre féminin-matrixiel de prégnance et de mise en 
monde n’est généralement pas reconnu lors des échanges de transfert/
contre-transfert, peut-être parce que, selon les termes de Freud, il va au-
delà du principe de plaisir, et peut-être aussi, pour utiliser le langage de 
Lacan, parce qu’il est exprimé dans un mode féminin-autre de jouissance 
que Lacan considère comme une transgression vers l’extra-humain, l’ou-
trage, la mort dont la limite est, précisément, le Beau lui-même. A mon 
avis cet événement-rencontre n’est pas déchiffré parce qu’il se rapporte 
(comme l’Eros de Diotime) à une relation nécessairement fondée par le 
souhait incestueux envers le maternel, dans le sens où un corps-psyché 
co-apparaît avec un autre corps-psyché qui lui restera à jamais interdit et 
auquel, malgré cela, il est à jamais rattaché de façon incestueuse. A mon 
avis, dans ce sens précisément, la relation sexuelle-féminine est Autre et 
impossible pour Lacan, transcendant le phallus et incompréhensible aux 
moyens du monde conceptuel, de la loi sociale, de la Loi du Père avec 
les prohibitions qu’elle active. Si c’est une relation dont (aux dires de 
Lacan) «seulement une femme» en connaît quelque chose, il en est pro-
bablement ainsi de par sa localisation dans ce même milieu dans lequel 
le passage entre-deux a lieu et dans lequel la transgression des frontières 
des royaumes de l’interdiction phallique se produit. Il se peut bien aussi 
que l’originaire Chose-comme-événement-rencontre matrixielle-fémi-
nine n’est pas déchiffrée parce que, se produisant dans une dimension 
transsubjective d’un champ intersubjectif, elle se rapporte non pas à la 
satisfaction des pulsions et des instincts, ni à un objet existant ou partiel, 
mais, comme pour Diotime, directement à la médiation en elle-même, à 
la relation-sans-mise-en-relation, à la connexion, au lien; et dans le do-
maine de l’Inconscient, elle se rapporte aussi à leurs traces gravées dans 
le corps-psyché et re-révélées uniquement à l’intérieur d’une autre rela-
tion, connexion, reliance-bord et médiation, dans la con-jonction, sans 
lesquelles tous ces mouvements psychiques n’ont pas de signification ou 
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reçoivent une fausse signification, façonnée par les outils conceptuels 
phalliques à portée de main.
Dès lors que le féminin se réfère à un type de relation-contact «autre», 
le féminin «impose différemment», dit Lacan (1972), le soi et l’autre. Et, 
à partir de cette imposition différente du soi et de l’autre, ce que sou-
tient Lacan fait référence «seulement à la femme» car à partir de cette 
figure autre, c’est elle, en effet, qui «présente à nos portes cet ornement: 
cet être entre le centre et le néant». Tout comme le rapport sexuel impos-
sible, l’être entre féminin est pour Lacan aussi un rapport impossible à 
la signification. Le féminin en tant que relation n’a pas de signification, 
pour Lacan, dans le monde des concepts et du symbole au- delà d’être 
ou de faire référence à un surplus forclos. À mon avis, un aspect de la 
relation impossible à la signification, qui échappe à la possession du 
Phallus, provient précisément de la transgression de l’interdit de l’inceste 
qui a nécessairement lieu avec-dans le corps de la femme enceinte. Cet 
être-entre-deux incestueux, c’est l’émergence et l’existence médiatrice 
lors d’un événement-rencontre prolongé. Nous devons donc ajouter à 
la question de l’être-entre la question de l’être-entre-dans-au-milieu,la 
question de la reliance-bords en plusieurité, la co-émergence et le co-
espacemen t dans la co-spatialité dans l’espace-temps partageable, et le 
ralentissement ou la prolongation du temps hors du temps chronolo-
gique du sujet historique. La sphère matrixielle comporte l’étendue mé-
diatrice, dans la mesure où elle comporte l’étendue de la partageabilité.
De même que Socrate fait parler Diotime de certains sujets, ainsi 
Lacan affirme qu’il y a des sujets auxquels seule une femme peut avoir 
accès, et comme Socrate, il fait référence au mystère entre-tissé dans 
ces sujets. Le secret de la fécondité en tant que matérialisation dans le 
corps et la vie d’un principe spirituel d’union mystique transcendan-
tale résonne depuis l’intérieur de ce mystère. Toutefois, ce que Socrate 
permet à Diotime, Lacan l’interdit aux psychanalystes. Il soutient que 
les psychanalystes ne doivent pas s’engager dans des sujets relatifs à la 
fécondité, la pré-natalité, la grossesse et la féminité non-phallique, et 
que celle qui s’engagerait dans le pré-natal ou le pré-maternel devrait 
être mise au ban de la communauté des analystes. Tout savoir issu de 
ces sujets doit être compris comme imaginaire et hystérique! A son avis, 
cette transgression féminine met en danger le savoir analytique, comme 
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si elle entraînait une transition vers le passage à l’acte ou la psychose 
(et la symbiose psychotique). Et de toute façon, il n’est pas possible, 
selon Lacan, que les analystes femmes puissent articuler quelque chose 
se rapportant à ces sujets sans qu’il s’agisse d’une simple manifestation 
hystérique, d’une aspiration au savoir vouée à l’échec, peu différente 
du désir de l’hystérique pour la non-matérialisation de son désir. Peut-
être devrait-on considérer cette restriction comme le choix de Lacan de 
la théorie freudienne des Pulsions, son détournement du mouvement 
Intersubjectif et des théories des relations d’Objet et du Soi, son occul-
tation et sa dénonciation des interprétations du transfert dans la séance 
psychanalytique. C’est toutefois Lacan38 lui-même qui met l’accent sur 
l’appel de Freud39 à ratifier l’acte de la mère et à se tenir à ses côtés (ou 
à prendre son parti), exhortant de la sorte les analystes vers ce que j’ai 
appelé l’à-côtéïté.
L’Eros matrixiel est une dimension inconsciente de reliance-bords 
non-symétrique mais mutuelle à l’intérieur d’un réseau compris dans 
d’autres réseaux relationnels. C’est un domaine de transmission et de 
lien-reliance-liaison qui sert le transfert; nous devons cultiver notre per-
ception de l’Eros matrixiel aussi bien en vue d’interprétations bi-direc-
tionnelles du transfert (transfert de l’analyste à l’analysant et de l’ana-
lysant à l’analyste), qu’en termes du monde ‘intérieur’ de l’analyste qui 
comporte des investissements de traces de l’analysant ainsi que la diges-
tion de traces émanant de l’analysant, et également d’un partage dans le 
même bain de trans-détection d’ondes trans-sensitives mentales et affec-
tives. Malgré les vertus archaïques et le statut liminal de cette dimen-
sion, l’analyste doit en devenir davantage conscient, car elle manifeste 
chez l’humain les marques de la femellité se connectant au pré-sujet 
archaïque. L’instinct-de-vie érotique matrixiel opère par reliance-bords. 
En tant qu’entité médiatrice opérant par métramorphose, Eros crée l’oc-
casion d’événements de rencontres psychiques qui précèdent les mo-
38 Jacques Lacan écrit dans Séminaire livre IV(1956–1957), La relation d’objet,{ Le Seuil, 1994, 
p. 222}: ‘Il faut à la vérité la sublime sérénité de Freud pour entériner l’action de la mère, alors que 
de nos jours tous les anathèmes seraient déversés sur elle…’. Voir Ettinger 2006c. (NdT)
39 Sigmund Freud soutient dans ‘Analyse de la phobie d’un garçon de cinq ans’ {ŒCP, volume 
IX, PUF, 1998, p. 24} que ‘ Nous devons prendre le parti de la mère, bonne et certainement très 
dévouée’. Voir Ettinger 2006c. (NdT)
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ments de «naissance» psychique et informent la proto-éthicalité pré-
subjective. Eros imprime des marques sur le pré-sujet-en-con-jonction 
et rappelle au sujet sa pré-con-jonction. Le moment subjectivant de la 
«naissance» avec ses douleurs d’enfantement n’est pas le début du venir-
à-l’être subjectif individué, et nous devons mettre au jour, au cours du 
travail d’interprétation qui a lieu dans le cadre soutenant de la proximité 
en psychanalyse, la co-émergence et la co-évanescence des transmissions 
affectives et mentales dans le transfert matrixiel, quand des traces d’évé-
nement chez le je viennent se sceller dans l’Autremère et que des traces 
d’élaboration mentale chez l’Autremère viennent s’imprimer dans le je. 
Ceci est assez similaire à la fonction maternelle alpha chez Bion (que 
j’ai déjà mentionnée), mis à part que la fonction décrite par Bion sur-
vient dans la symbiose et après la naissance et qu’elle est moins transmis-
sive puisqu’elle dépend de toutes sortes de communications primaires. 
Une autre différence concerne le moment subjectivant qui s’origine chez 
l’analyste elle-même: elle/il ne fait pas que digérer et traiter des maté-
riaux venant de l’autre mais transmet également des matériaux émanant 
d’elle-même. Elle initie des moments subjectivants. La mise au jour, la 
révélation et la création surviennent uniquement par ce qui germe dans 
cet événement-rencontre singulier, créant des transformations dans les 
traces de ce qui a germé dans des événements-rencontre antérieurs. Dans 
les relations de transfert, nous devons exposer la sphère matrixielle dont 
l’originalité est que je ne peux pas ne pas être connecté(e) et mis(e) en 
reliance-bords avec tel ou tel inconnu, et que je viens-à-l’être dans le 
lien-comme-alliance40 dans une dimension transsubjective où intimité 
et étrangeté sont jointes l‘une à l’autre par d’innombrables cordes, dans 
laquelle le sujet est un sujet-partiel à l’intérieur d’une subjectivité assem-
blée dont les traces psychiques transgressent chacune des limites du sujet 
individuel. La dimension transsubjective persiste dans l’humain à côté 
de la dimension subjective dans laquelle le sujet différencié se rapporte 
à d’autres sujets séparés mais, alors qu’il est possible que celle-ci échappe 
à la conscience phallique, dans la sphère matrixielle il n’y a aucune pos-
40 Alors que borderlinking exprime la continuité du processus de ce qui lie dans la sphère 
matrixielle, borderlinkage insiste sur l’impossibilité d’une coupure radicale dans cette sphère et 
linkage sur le fait que la venue à la vie n’échappe pas au principe vital du lien-comme-alliance. 
(NdT)
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sibilité d’éluder la transsubjectivité et sa prise de conscience peut, dans 
une certaine mesure, se faire. Et de la même manière, tout élan mental 
a lieu dans cette étendue, en parallèle à d’autres étendues.
En tant que figure de la différence, pour tout être humain, la diffé-
rence matrixielle se rapporte tout d’abord la reliance-bord à l’Autremère-
femme-femelle. Tant le fils que la fille se différencient pour commencer 
à partir d’une figure de femme-femelle. Pour les femmes, la différence 
matrixielle est une différence de femme-à-femme et non une différence 
de femme-à-homme. Cette différence se situe en dehors de la portée de 
l’œdipe, même si ultérieurement elle entre en relation avec celle-ci. Tout 
dévoilement de cette différence est d’ordinaire nié dans le domaine du 
traitement analytique (et de la psychothérapie en général) parce que les 
différentes théories psychanalytiques ne nous fournissent pas d’outils 
pour identifier son existence et ses manifestations. Par manque de prise 
de conscience du matrixiel, bien des analystes et des thérapeutes n’hé-
sitent pas à bannir l’Autremère archaïque et à congédier la mère réelle 
en se substituant à elle, foulant ainsi le principe de l’à-côtéïté, piétinant 
les réseaux matrixiels et détruisant la potentialité créatrice féminine-
matrixielle.
L’individu femelle a un double accès à l’espace-passage matrixiel car 
elle vit la matrice dans le réel de l’extérieur et de l’intérieur. Elle en fait 
l’expérience dans le réel comme frontière du corps et comme enveloppe 
d’une «con-jonction perdue» dans l’espace-temps archaïque de la ren-
contre avec l’Autremère — ce qui est également le cas pour l’individu 
mâle — mais aussi comme espace intérieur avec une potentialité de 
contenance et un potentiel pour de futures rencontres. Cette potenti-
alité imbibe41 le présent en tant que signification. Que l’individu fémi-
nin soit mère ou pas, sa matrice représente un espace inaccessible à par-
tir du réel, un temps hors du temps et une venue-au-monde érotique, 
jouissante-et-traumatique et, de manière plus générale, une composition 
imprégnée qui comporte la potentialité d’une répétition qui pourrait se 
concrétiser dans le corpo-réel mais aussi dans les champs imaginaires 
fantasmatiques et symboliques. C’est également la potentialité de répé-
41 Le verbe permeate dit la perméabilité de l’espace-passage matrixiel et la porosité des frontières 
non strictes. (NdT)
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tition d’une inscription croisée des traces, à savoir: une transgression 
mentale. En dehors de l’espace et du temps de rencontre au cœur du 
Beau dans l’art, les sujets masculins sont clivés d’une manière plus radi-
cale de cette localité archaïque de la potentialité de rencontre, puisque 
leur connexion et leur relation avec elle demeurent dans un extérieur 
archaïque et dans le trop tôt qui est à jamais un trop tard, pour avoir 
accès dans le réel au corps. L’adulte masculin ne connaîtra pas la gros-
sesse et pour cette raison ne va pas co-émerger à nouveau, matrixielle-
ment, dans ce sens réel primaire et radical. La rencontre dans le Beau, 
à l’intérieur du processus de rencontre maternelle-matrixielle, trauma-
tique, incestueuse, «platonique», non-interdite ne peut être déchiffrée 
et symbolisée en dehors d’une situation transférentielle et en dehors de 
moments transférentiels matrixiels d’ouverture, de vulnérabilité, de fra-
gilisation et de reliance-bords, car le sujet un, tout seul, dans une iden-
tité à soi fermée, ne peut rien connaître à ce propos, alors que le sujet 
qui existe dans la co-émergence-à-l’être au sein d’une rencontre avec un 
autre qui devient son inconnu intime, réalise que dans cet espace-bord 
liminal intermédiaire — où cette entité féminine étrangère l’installe, le 
transfère, l’interprète et le connecte à elle, et donne naissance, dans son 
désir à elle, à son émergence à lui au sein de la rencontre — la significa-
tion elle-même se façonne en tant que trauma: dans une rencontre qui 
est engagement, rencontre irremplaçable et singulière autant que dan-
gereuse par son degré de fragilité. Toute la noblesse de l’analyste comme 
Eros, comme amant platonique, comme quelqu’un qui met au monde 
de l’intérieur d’Eros une connexion et une interprétation à partir d’un 
état intermédiaire, se révèle ici comme responsabilité personnelle. A 
chaque moment et à chaque choix fait dans le travail avec telle ou telle 
personne, l’implication matrixielle est singulière et d’un point de vue 
éthique implique la compassion car la com-passion esthétique est très 
fragilisante. Et l’Eros qui met au monde ce trauma dans le Beau, file de 
rencontre en rencontre et transforme effectivement ceux qui viennent-
à-l’être dans une telle union, qu’ils soient masculins ou féminins, en 
femme. La jouissance-et-trauma de la rencontre, du côté de cette dif-
férence féminine matrixielle, va imprégner et résonner en tout désir de 
co-émergence avec l’autre dans le Beau; mais au moment où cet Eros 
génère sa Beauté unique, il réclame aussi son dû.
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Le témoignage-avec, l’à-côtéïté et l’éthique du non-abandon
Ce dont Socrate en tant que sujet incarné dans un corps mâle, ne 
pouvait témoigner et ce pour quoi il avait besoin d’une femme étran-
gère, Diotime, c’est l’empreinte dans le corps féminin de l’énigme du 
trauma d’une rencontre entre le je et le non-je en co-émergence. La ren-
contre matrixielle qu’est la grossesse féminine élude le tabou de l’inceste 
et le secret de l’impossibilité de la séparation totale du je et du non-je 
et ceci, en dépit de l’angoisse de séparation qui, dès le début de telles 
reliances, plane comme une ombre et se profile à l’horizon, de la même 
manière que la peur de la mort plane sur toute naissance et y est inex-
tricablement entremêlée.
La masculinité a été assignée, via le concept du phallus, aux domaines 
d’une délinéation et d’un sens différents, par exemple, ceux de la domi-
nation et du schisme, de la prohibition et de la coupure de la relation 
incestueuse-symbiotique entre la mère et le bébé, la fameuse castration 
phallique-symbolique qui s’opère par la langue, la loi, la société et la 
culture. L’individu masculin ne peut témoigner, à partir de son expé-
rience corporelle, de l’empreinte de l’Autremère-femelle dans le corps 
du pré-sujet, ni de l’empreinte de l’Autremère-femelle venant du corps 
d’une telle Autremère-femelle, d’où naît traumatique le sens du désir 
d’une co-venue-à-l’être dans le Beau. L’espace d’une telle expérience est 
pour lui trop régressif, trop psychotique, c’est un espace inaccessible. La 
voix matrixielle féminine, même si chez Diotime elle vise les profon-
deurs d’une connexion mystique a-humaine, témoigne qu’il existe bien 
un plan corporel qui n’est pas nécessairement analogue au niveau le plus 
bas de l’âme qui peut être atteint seulement dans une désintégration psy-
chotique, mais plutôt à une différence hétérogène — la matrice, dans 
le sens matrixiel que je lui donne, non celui d’origine ou de contenant 
ou d’enveloppe mais celui de l’éveil transsubjectif de la co-émergence-
à-l’être. La voix féminine matrixielle indique que, pour le sujet humain 
généré, la différence féminine n’est pas révélatrice du secret de la fémi-
nité en tant qu’altérité en elle-même ni de l’Autre par excellence mais 
révèle le trauma continu du long éveil-élucidation de l’humain dans un 
état de co-différenciation qui est quelque chose dont on ne peut attester 
sans participer à d’autres rencontres de manière matrixielle à partir de la 
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position «femme» qui comprend à la fois la position de partenaire trans-
subjectif dans la plusieurité et d’individu différencié. A partir de cela, 
il faut comprendre — et c’est un aspect que j’ai développé ailleurs — 
que la question de la différence originaire sexuelle (non genrée) s’ouvre 
pour tout sujet, fils ou fille, dans l’énigme de la différenciation d’avec 
la mère-femme-femelle. La fille aussi s’évertue à mettre en lumière sa 
différence d’avec la femme-mère-femelle. La question de sa différence 
d’avec l’homme-mâle-père surgira plus tard, après cette question. La 
différence féminine (pour une fille) est d’abord et avant tout une dif-
férence entre le corps d’une fille et le corps d’une femme-mère, c’est à 
dire entre la femme-fille et la femme-mère, et non pas entre une fille et 
un homme, père ou garçon. La différence femme/homme, sous l’angle 
matrixiel-féminin, n’est pas seulement ultérieure mais aussi secondaire 
en termes d’intensité par rapport à la différence femme/femme. Le su-
jet humain est différencié dans toute sa corporéité, qui est érotique de 
manière à la fois sexuelle et non-sexuelle, tout d’abord vis-à-vis de la 
mère-femme. La question du genre vient après. C’est une des raisons 
pour lesquelles nous avons besoin de comprendre l’Eros non-nécessai-
rement sexuel, l’Eros des relations et des connexions qui est une attrac-
tion et une répulsion au-delà du sexuel, ainsi que sa fonction dans le 
ravissement entre-femmes que Freud, par erreur, a considérée comme 
sexuelle ou lesbienne ainsi qu’hystérique (dans le cas de DoraEtt.9), alors 
qu’il s’agit d’une attraction érotique non-sexuelle et non-lesbienne. La 
figure médiatrice d’Eros est là quand une femme co-émerge en alliance 
matrixielle avec une autre femme (enseignante, amie, sœur, thérapeute, 
analyste, et finalement à nouveau la mère) afin d’établir sa différence et 
sa distance-dans-la-proximité, et d’en être transformée tout en se situant 
dans un tissu de transsubjectivité qui con-tourne sa seule subjectivité. 
Les moments où une ouverture matrixielle transsubjective est demandée 
mais non trouvée, ou lorsque l’autre n’y réagit pas, sont des moments 
d’horreur sans nom (voir mon analyse du «cas» Lol V. Stein de Duras, 
1964). La psychanalyste doit identifier de tels moments et y réagir par 
une hospitalité compassionnelle et une con-jonction vulnérable ma-
trixielles et non par des coupures phalliques. Il convient de reconnaître 
et de sympathiser avec la différence femme/femme qui apparaît avant 
que la différence femme/homme ne devienne pertinente dans l’ampleur 
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de sa signification pour une fille. La signification matrixielle n’appelle 
à une transformation que là où la dimension matrixielle apparaît dans 
les relations transférentielles et est acceptée et reconnue comme telle.
Seul le sujet désireux de se laisser reconstituer mentalement encore 
et encore en copoïésis, dans l’espace-temps de passage42 matrixiel, le 
sujet qui donc reçoit et absorbe les traces de l’autre en elle-même et ose 
déposer ses traces et diffuser ses ondes affectives-mentales en l’autre, 
peut offrir une interprétation, une transmission et un transfert dans et à 
partir de la rencontre présente vers une rencontre ultérieure, une inter-
prétation qui assimile également la rencontre matrixielle archaïque et y 
crée une transformation. Autrement dit, il est impossible de contourner 
par l’interprétation le désir même de reliance-bord à l’autre à l’intérieur 
d’une rencontre au cours de la création d’une différence d’avec «l’étran-
ger», c’est-à-dire de contourner le transfert matrixiel lui-même. Le secret 
d’Eros ne se révèle pas dans le discours mais dans l’implication dans la 
démarche érotique elle-même. Si l’Eros matrixiel-féminin est désir de 
venue-à-l’être et de naissance dans le Beau à un niveau de contemplation 
élevé, la signification du franchissement du trauma dans le Beau ne peut 
être transmis et clarifié que dans le désir d’une co-naissance ultérieure, 
d’une venue-à-l’être copoïétique dans un espace-passage liminal inter-
médiaire à l’intérieur du transfert, dans un désir d’une co-émergence 
au sein d’une prégnance, d’une co-création imprégnée où est conservé 
le principe de la proximité-dans-la-distance qui maintient actif le po-
tentiel des différences. L’antenne érotique qui connecte et transmet les 
traces, expose celle qui donne naissance dans le Beau — l’artiste dans ses 
rencontres avec ses matériaux, ainsi que la psychanalyste dans les rela-
tions de transfert — à un contact traumatique qui va la transformer, en 
tous ces aspects, en une oratrice femme étrangère, intime inconnue de 
son autre, une Diotime. Tout(e) psychanalyste qui ainsi devient femme, 
chacun, chacune de nous, est censé(e) se poser la question: est-ce que 
je peux, est-ce que je veux, suis-je disposé(e) à me constituer en une 
42 L’insistance sur le passage souligne que dans la transsubjectivité quelque chose passe de 
l’un(e) à l’autre, quelque chose se passe entre, dérive de l’un(e) à l’autre mais passe aussi au-delà. 
(NdT)
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telle inconnue-intime pour mon autre-semblable,43 à re-venir-à-l’être 
avec-dans une rencontre continue, à travailler-à-travers et à perlaborer 
le transfert matrixiel, fatal, non planifié, douloureux, avec ses retourne-
ments et ses surprises. En outre, chacun(e) de nous est censé(e) se poser 
la question que Lacan, énigmatique, réitérait si bien: quel est mon désir 
d’analyste? lorsque le désir, cette empreinte d’Eros dans le processus ana-
lytique, s’avère être en réalité la question de l’éthique du travail-passage, 
du travail-au-delà, de la perlaboration transférentielle dans la connexion-
par-la-proximité psychanalytique (sans bien sûr de concrétisation corpo-
relle), par une obligation éthique qui comporte l’Eros non-sexuel. Tel 
que Diotime le suggère, le secret d’Eros ne se révèle effectivement pas 
par le discours mais par la participation au processus érotique. Le pro-
cessus érotique matrixiel sublimé est une «ascension» — il tend vers le 
spirituel. Au cours des médiation et connexion imprégnées, dans les rela-
tions transférentielles, il y a transformation et ascension vers l’intuition, 
et le languissement érotique devient amour de la sagesse (philosophie). 
Le Beau ne se révèle que dans la reliance-par-les-bords qui n’est toutefois 
pas l’actualisation dans une rencontre sexuelle mais, tout au long, le fait 
de prendre acte des vibrations, des résonances et des réaccordements de 
la distance-dans-la-con-jonction, c’est-à-dire des signes du témoignage-
avec-l’autre, tout en reconnaissant sa différence. De la même manière 
que Diotime décrit une relation de vision-apparition-lumination entre 
Eros et le Beau aux échelons supérieurs de l’ascension érotique, ainsi 
dans le transfert matrixiel d’espace-bord est conservée la distance-dans-
l’intimité de l’événement-rencontre, nécessaire pour faire naître la per-
ception intuitive analytique érotique, l’insight: le passage de la contem-
plation à l’insight se produit par le fait de se différencier-ensemble. La 
thérapie psychanalytique comme «ascension» dans les profondeurs de 
l’inconscient est, entre autres, une forme d’initiation; les participants à 
cette rencontre ne sont pas au même niveau de connaissances ni de res-
ponsabilités; leurs attentes de la rencontre sont différentes. L’initiation 
survient inévitablement au cours de la rencontre-événement. Lors d’une 
analyse manquée, la médiation imprégnée pourrait devenir un trauma-
43 Ettinger féminise le terme fellowman qui signifie le prochain ou le semblable, en l’écrivant 
fellow(o)man. (NdT)
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tisme douloureux supplémentaire, renforçant le retour et le tournoie-
ment autour de traces traumatiques antérieures. Mais elle pourrait aussi, 
lors de l’analyse réussie toujours visée, transformer l’observation en in-
tuition, avec pour effet une modification tant de l’observation ultérieure 
que des traces antérieures, d’une manière qui permet la transgression 
des cycles de l’éternelle répétition en évitant d’être pris dans une spirale 
d’inertie. L’éthique de la subjectivation matrixielle où il est impossible pour 
le je de ne pas être-avec-l’autre-et-témoigner en com-passion, ni de ne pas se 
tenir dans l’à-côtéïté avec l’Autremère, est l’éthique du non-abandon. L’in-
tuition née comme co-lumination et co-élucidation-apparition à l’inté-
rieur du transfert matrixiel est un insight de reliance-bords.
Et l’être-avec-et-le-témoignage en art ? Le désir de l’artiste scelle des 
empreintes d’Eros dans l’œuvre d’art, telle une nouvelle nébuleuse im-
prégnée, créée comme une nuée faite de scintillements de traces d’évé-
nements-rencontre internes et externes, une nébuleuse qui produit des 
transformations d’observations antérieures et ouvre le potentiel d’une 
nouvelle intuition, pour l’artiste et pour le spectateur. Le geste de l’ar-
tiste crée à partir d’Eros dans la peinture, y inscrivant le secret de la ren-
contre entre la compassion protoéthique et la com-passion esthétique de 
chaque ex-in-tuition44 spécifique qui donne naissance au dehors interne 
et au dedans à l’intérieur dans le visible. L’intuition-insight née comme 
co-éclaircissement45 avec l’œuvre d’art est une intuition de reliance par 
les bords.
44 L’espace-bord matrixiel génère la mise en liaisons entre les personnes dans l’à-côtéïté {beside-
dness} mais aussi les échanges à partir des bords entre l’intérieur {inside} et l’extérieur {outside}. 
Jouant sur la chaîne signifiante de side {côté, bord} et son homophonie avec sight {aperception, 
vision}, Ettinger fait entendre la permutation dehors/dedans dans l’advenue côte-à-côte des par-
tenaires à l’intérieur de l’espace-bord mais aussi entre les personnes et l’œuvre d’art par la mé-
diatisation de la perception intuitive {insight}. Par le jeu de mots sur outside inside, out-in-sight 
et the inside, elle suggère que chaque ex-in-tuition donne naissance à un dehors et à un dedans 
interne à la vision. (NdT)
45 L’expression to dawn on désigne quelque chose qui se fait jour à l’intérieur de soi, s’éclaire, 
devient visible, au sens de son accessibilité à la clarté comme compréhension intellectuelle. Afin 
de préserver la triple signification visuelle, naissante et émergente de la compréhension, le terme 
co-éclaircissement a été choisi pour traduire ici co-dawning dans ce contexte du rapport vécu à 
l’œuvre d’art. (NdT)
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De même, le désir comme empreinte d’Eros dans l’œuvre d’art est en 
fait une question au sujet des irruptions de l’éthique dans l’esthétique 
au travers du geste de l’artiste.46
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N o t e s
Ett.1 Une version antérieure et plus courte de cet essai a été lu lors du Symposium «Banquet», 
Jaffa, Octobre 2001.
Ett.2 J’utilise les termes de co-poïésis et de co-émergence à la suite de Matura et Varela qui, eux, 
parlent de l’autopoïèse. Voir Varela (1989).
Ett.3 Je me suis servie de la traduction anglaise du Banquet de Platon par Tom Griffith (1997) ainsi 
que de celle faite par Benjamin Jowett mais aussi de celle en hébreu par Margalit Finckleberg 
(2001).
Ett.4 Cet extrait est traduit sur la base à la fois de Jowett et de Griffith.
Ett.5 Je considère que, dans ce sens, mon interprétation du texte de Platon est une critique de 
l’interprétation faite par Luce Irigaray en 1984.
Ett.6 Depuis la version 2001 de cet essai, j’ai élaboré l’idée de «cordes» matrixielles pour décrire 
la trans-connectivité affective et mentale (voir, par exemple, Ettinger (2005). La question de la 
compassion a également été développée plus avant (voir, par exemple, Ettinger (2006a).
Ett.7 Le problème de Thanatos ne concerne pas la présente publication. J’ai discuté de cette ques-
tion ailleurs (voir, par exemple, Ettinger (1999, 2000).
Ett.8 Les images peuvent être trouvées dans Ettinger (2000).
Ett.9 J’ai analysé le cas Dora {Sigmund Freud, ŒCP Volume VI, Fragment d’une analyse d’un cas 
d’hystérie, PUF, 2006, p.183–301} dans plusieurs essais à partir de 1993 et, également en lien avec 
la figure de Lol V. Stein chez Marguerite Duras, dans un texte présenté lors d’un séminaire de J. 
A. Miller à Paris, le 7 Juin 2000. La dernière version de cet essai a été publiée sous la référence 
Ettinger (2006b). 2000. La dernière version de cet essai a été publiée sous la référence Ettinger 
(2006b).
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O F  B E C O M I N G S : 
C O P O I E S I S  A N D  ( N O N - ) P U L S E D 
T I M E  I N  M U S I C A L  P R O X I M I T I E S
G i n a  R a e  F o s t e r *
1. Introduction
Six strings, strummed and plucked with two hands, vibrate and res-
onate as if touching each other and the instrument’s surface, its var-
nish whisper-thin over mahogany, within millimeters of their relative 
positions. A voice laces itself into these frequencies, altering and an-
swering pitch, timbre, duration. The bodies of accompanist and singer 
lean towards the guitar, lean towards each other, turn towards the audi-
ence. The audience bends toward, then falls away, pulses shoulders to 
the rhythm of the song humming through the instruments made by 
veins and bones. The time and space of performance stretch and com-
press, twist and unwind. The proximities of space and time expressed 
through bodies and through the expression of bodies become both co-
poiesis and territorialization, manifestations of an aesthetic emergence 
and coalescence into being that is also its own interference and unmak-
ing. Through the bodily proximities of performance, music reveals and 
conceals temporospatial becomings that are part of human co-emer-
gence and divergence.
2. Musical Performance as Bodily Proximity
Bodily proximity: the phrase implies nearness without intrusion, a 
measurement of distance that yet remains distinct between two dif-
ferences, two bodies, two or more tactilities. For it is tactility that is 
proximity, the friction of surfaces trembling through the disturbance 
of visible or invisible antennae that sense what approaches and retreats. 
Sound is tactile in its performance and reception, involving part or all 
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of human and non-human bodies in the play and interference of sound 
waves on surfaces. Music, as performed and received aesthetic sound, is 
also tactile, dependent on perception and the anticipation of perception.
In the examination of proximity, words come to the tongue and 
ear such as approach, proximity, and proximal: these share etymological 
proximity. Not merely nearness or the closing of enterable spaces and 
times but the “superlative” of nearness (“prope”).1 “Proche, proche,” says 
theorist and architect Paul Virilio, the French “near” (“proche”) both 
imperative and descriptive in response to discussions of the effects of 
velocity and of “collapsed” distance on the intimacy of human contact.2 
Proximity assumes the intensification and collapse of bodily owned tem-
porospatialities, bodies that may or may not be animate, sentient, or 
capable of changing direction. In the performance of music, proxim-
ity becomes the space between tones, durations, pitches, as well as the 
distance between performer and instrument, performer and audience, 
performance and recollection.
Examining bodily proximities through music (and in particular, mu-
sic as aesthetic sound) raises questions of bodies and proximities as be-
comings. The painter and psychoanalytic theorist Bracha L. Ettinger 
writes of borderspacing, borderlinking, and borderswerving in copoiesis, 
which might read as one approach to an aesthetically ontological prox-
imity. A resonant theorist of aesthetics, Gilles Deleuze, explores pulsed 
and non-pulsed time in music as an extension of his and Felix Guat-
tari’s conceptions of territorialization and time as Aion and Chronos. 
For Deleuze and Guattari, proximity implies territory as body, both 
spatially and temporally: body implies distinction, of other bodies and 
not-bodies from the body recognized as or kept separate from others; 
distinction implies difference. Time is both quantitative and qualitative. 
This might lead to the suggestion that what is not proximal is neither 
near nor different. What is not proximal invades or escapes. It is other-
than-self beyond the trace of familiarity, or perhaps it is self beyond a 
co-emergence of distinction. Although neither Ettinger, nor Deleuze, 
nor Deleuze and Guattari discuss musical performance directly in the 
texts referenced below, both offer potential conceptual temporospatial 
webs that can be examined in the proximities of musical performance.
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3. Proximities and Perception
Before engaging with Ettinger and Deleuze, it may be useful to ad-
dress certain inherited physical and theoretical assumptions of proxim-
ity, perception, and sound. For the human body, perceptions of proxim-
ity largely rely on sensory perceptions of self/other-than-self, self defined 
in terms of a reference point by which distances between bodies are 
measured, other-than-self in terms of the stretching or shrinking of in-
tensities of perceptions of self in relation to other-than-self.3 Sight and 
touch are frequent markers of proximity: for example, the use of per-
spective in visual arts and the measurement of distance by body and 
extremity lengths as distance from the border-membrane of skin. Smell 
and the related sense of taste also measure proximities in perhaps their 
closest interactions that not only collapse the distance between bodies 
but also enter human tissues and organs nearly simultaneously with per-
ception. Sound is a sense both tactile and intangible. Sound enters all 
spaces that do not impede the progress of its waves; sound, like touch 
and taste, can be intentionally initiated as well as received without me-
chanical aids. The manipulation of sound responds to changes in prox-
imity of these auditory invasions, acceptances, and diffusions, a manip-
ulation that in musical performance assumes that sensory perceptions 
blur yet also distinguish self and other-than-self.
Bodily proximities rely on perception as an integral part of initiating 
and responding to processes between and internal to bodies. Percep-
tions indicate an internal awareness of an external stimulus. Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty defines perception as “a reference to a whole which can 
be grasped, in principle, only through certain of its parts or aspects.”4 
Some perceptions seem intuitive—the proximity of a hand over a flame 
perceives heat; the proximity of a set of eyes looking at an open flame 
perceives shapes and a wavering of the air in smoke and vapor at the 
edges (proximities) of the flame. Other perceptions of proximity seem 
to require conscious effort, for example, awareness of one’s pulse or res-
piration.5
Perceptions, similarly to time, may be considered both qualitatively 
and quantitatively. In science, measurement as both static and fluid re-
lies on perceptions. Perceptions set the basis for what and how prox-
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imities are to be measured—in quantities, rates, forms, etc. Perceptions 
also ground which proximities are measurable. With the establishment 
of quantities and dimensions, the perceived object can enter into eco-
nomic and artistic play. Economic interchanges of the perceived enter 
into ethics based on the objectifying and valuing of the perceived. Ar-
tistic manipulations of the perceived enter into aesthetic questions of 
the limitations and capacities of the perceived to change its form (and 
essence, if essence is a belief ) and to relate to other “perceiveds” and 
perceivers. Thus, the proximal relations between the perceiver and the 
perceived, as well as between multiple perceivers and perceiveds, pro-
voke aesthetic questions.6
Proximities and perceptions may also be examined in terms of tem-
porospatial curvatures. Theorist and filmmaker Manuel DeLanda inter-
prets the function of a curve as an indication that a rate of change is a 
speed of becoming: every point will be defined by the speed at which its 
curvature is changing at that point (every space can be a field of rapidi-
ties and slownesses).7,8 Thus, the speed of becoming is measured by its 
proximities to changes, and the rapidity at which curvature is changing 
at every point allows for the multi-dimensionality and determination 
of space, which tangles temporospatiality in the velocity Virilio points 
to as the “light of light” or cinematic vision.9,10 Just as Virilio refers to a 
shift in perception and thus measurement as “stereometric” and “volu-
metric” (measurements of sight and sound), he then predicts that these 
perceptions of measure will be replaced by the measurement of speed: 
“the barrier of time will be broken next after sound and light,”11,12 he 
asserts, while the speed of sound, as it increases, “accelerates to inaudi-
bility.”13,14 Inaudibility, lacking the capacity to be perceived, would then 
also lack the capacity to be approached. For musical performance, per-
ception and proximity are linked to relative position as well as to veloci-
ties of becoming.
4. Sound and Music
As the means through which the sense of hearing perceives and is per-
ceived, the proximities of sound provide other considerations for bod-
ily proximity. As both body and part of animal bodies and inanimate 
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objects, sound is a test of the proximal. Sound is identifiable as distance 
and as friction. Vision may engage with the skin senses as tempera-
ture and exposure; sound engages with skin as pressure and movement. 
Sound recognizes difference and differentiation: that which is noticed 
as not part of one’s physical and mental (re)production of voluntary and 
involuntary physiology, voluntary and involuntary thought. Sound is 
also a(n) (co-) emergence of awareness of self as assemblage, of body in 
territorialization and deterritorialization.15,16
In sensory experience and expression, music forms through and 
against sound. Music performance, as an auditory (and often visual 
and tactile) sensory experience, can be described as both tangible (the 
resonance of sound waves that disturb physical barriers in their path) 
and temporal (the periodicity of sound waves, measurable by peak and 
trough). The tangible is not necessarily tactile in that what is sensed by 
the skin, blood, and nerves is not always a sense of an object or subject 
with which one can create an intentional friction. The performance of 
music is receptive as much as initiated, welcoming as much as hostile to 
being emitted or received.17
Performance, sound and music are spatial, as the work of Tim Smith-
ers and Vijay Iyers attests, positing a physical source for the sound the 
listener hears as well as connecting a cause and effect between the initia-
tion of physical action and sound for the auditory emitter.18,19 Erik Da-
vis refers to Marshall McLuhan’s “acoustic space” as “multidimensional, 
resonant, invisibly tactile…. acoustic space emphasizes simultaneity—
the possibility that many events can occur in the same holistic zone of 
space-time…. blocks of sound can overlap and interpenetrate without 
necessarily collapsing into a harmonic unity or consonance, thereby 
maintaining the paradox of ‘simultaneous difference.’”20 Auditory ex-
perience and expression depend on perceptions, then, of spatial beings 
interacting closely or at a distance with other spatial subjects/objects, 
whether those subjects/objects are imagined or factual (think, for exam-
ple, of the memory of sounds or of the imagining of conversations and 
sounds that form parts of daily lived experience). These interactions are 
proximal, sensory, “tactile”, and simultaneous while retaining individual 
identities. Acoustic space is a communal living space in which combi-
nations and re-combinations of Cage’s “five determinants: frequency or 
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pitch, amplitude or loudness, overtone structure or timbre, duration, 
and morphology (how the sound begins, goes on, and dies away)”21,22 or 
(Daniel Bernard Roumain’s (DBR’s) “sound, harmony, melody, rhythm, 
and form”23) wrestle and remake through proximity without reforming 
one another.24
In terms of sound and time, Smithers states:
A straightforward observation, though one that seems often to be over-
looked by the computational modelers of robots (so call simulation builders), 
is that with physical embodiment comes physical mass. It cannot be otherwise, 
according to accepted physical Law. Furthermore, if something has mass then 
whatever it does or whatever happens to it TAKES time to do or happen!25
Spatial proximities are therefore temporal proximities, and Smith-
ers further makes a distinction between processes (which might be 
termed participial masses) that are “embedded in time” and “contained 
in time.”26,27 Processes embedded in time measure time; this measure-
ment qualifies the movement and identity of the processes. In contrast, 
processes contained in time continue and complete themselves with-
out measurement; there is an elasticity of time that is experienced not 
as a qualification but as something external to the processes: the pro-
cesses depend on their accomplishment regardless of linear or cyclical 
markings. Embedded temporal processes quantify their proximities to 
other processes, just as described above in the curvature of the rates of 
change; the proximities of contained temporal processes occur “outside” 
what might be called “counted” time and must be described with dif-
ferent language, different codings. The performance of music contains 
and embeds time in these terms, responding to set measurements and 
yet individual and shared/conflicting interpretations of those measure-
ments as well as responding to individual and shared/conflicting desires 
to unmake or steal (“rubato” from “robbed time”28) performance from 
its original structure.
In the experience of sound, the human ear interprets this temporo-
spatial coding with its clarities and ambiguities. What is the temporo-
spatial coding of proximity? According to Ettinger, it would seem to 
originate in the linear, cyclical, and elastic gestation of the uterus, and 
thus be extended to the composition and performance of the work of 
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music, the coalescence and norms of the instruments, performers, and 
audience.29 Extrapolating from Ettinger, one could read the matrixial 
womb as more than a space of emergence: it is in its cyclical, fluid na-
ture also analogous to sound, not just subject to but constitutive of time 
both linear and circular. In reading Deleuze on the Baroque fold, the 
temporospatial coding of proximity would seem to be expressed in the 
performance of the audible and inaudible, the repetitive and singular, as 
the revealing/concealing/return of shared time and space by monadical-
ly-constituted bodies of sound, instrument, performer, and audience.30 
Deleuze and Guattari add the assemblage that territorializes these bod-
ies, bodies that in the acts of performance are also deterritorializing and 
becoming noise, silence, component parts.31 Thus, matrixiality and mu-
sical performance fold back on themselves, unfold themselves, territo-
rialize, and deterritorialize in movements similar to those of becoming 
self/other-than-self and territory/non-territory.
The performance of music raises further questions, not just of the 
temporospatial but also of the temporo-auditory. Vijay Iyer argues that 
musical performance has “physical embodiment” and “environmental 
situatedness,”32,33 and that it seems more heavily temporal than poetry, 
yet the sustaining of a note, phrase, or measure calls into question what 
is meant by the constraints of seconds and hours. Iyer also speaks of 
“‘shared time’” (time experienced in close proximity) in regards to mu-
sic as “a crucial aspect of the temporality of performance.”34,35 “Time 
framed by improvisation is a special kind of time that is flexible in ex-
tent,”36 he writes, and the improvisational flexibility of time is experi-
enced through composers and compositions that may or may not be 
strictly defined as “improvisation.” For example, John Cage destabilized 
the temporality of musical performance with 4’33”; Philip Glass desta-
bilizes the temporality of musical performance with minimalist repeti-
tion in which linear time does not develop or change. Jazz destabilizes 
time with improvisation; non-syntactical music emphasizes contained 
over embedded time.37,38 When musical performance challenges its own 
measure, it takes on a physical proximity the listener inhabits, shares, 
or finds him/herself excluded from entering. The ambient sounds and 
audience perceptions that “co-perform”38 4’33” with the immobility of 
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the pianist are musical proximities experienced as both embedded and 
contained.
Read in terms of temporospatiality, the performance of music car-
ries the intentions of proximities to be developed and ruptured between 
perceivers and perceiveds as well as for bodies to construct new capaci-
ties for proximities and thus perceptions. The word “music” takes its 
root from perception, present and past (“to think, to remember”39) and 
from the Muses, “protectors” of the arts40 and inspirations for the arts. 
Musical performance might be termed the internal made external and 
shared to be taken internally from external experience, or more simply, 
as gestation and parturition.
References to musical performance as gestational evoke Ettinger’s 
writings on matrixiality. Ettinger’s texts vibrate with feminist construc-
tions of psychoanalytic theory that cogenerate with those of Freud and 
Lacan. She writes of matrixiality as the origin of the co-emergence of 
sel(f )(ves), the womb as active rather than passive. Individuation begins 
with the hospitable and creative performance of the uterus, which acts 
as host and performer, entertaining and nourishing the fetus as guest 
and audience, inviting and expelling the fetus as composition become 
performance, which, in its temporary residence, reforms and transforms 
the uterus as dwelling and work of art.
5. Ettinger: Metramorphosis through Borderspacing,  
Borderlinking, and Borderswerving
Ettinger refers to the womb or matrix as a “resonance chamber,”41 and 
in matrixiality, proximities are transformed through the resonance of 
metramorphosis, musical and matrixial becomings that are not individ-
uation in isolation but are the co-emergence of self through proximities 
of harmonics and (auditory) interferences with other selves. “Metramor-
phosis is a process of interpsychic communication and transformation 
that transgresses the borders of the individual subject and takes place 
between several entities. It is a joint awakening of unthoughtful-knowl-
edge on the borderline, as well as an inscription of the encounter in 
traces that open a space in and along the borderline itself.” 42
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This is similar to Iyer’s descriptions of co-performance and echoes 
Smithers’ sense of contained time as elastic and co-generative. There 
is what Ettinger calls a borderspace43 between self and self, that which 
is between and yet touching on the membrane of the limits of iden-
tity. In borderspace, the friction of borderlinking rasps as self brushes 
against other self, and in this resonant/dissonant encounter, borderswerv-
ing moves these performing subjects against and parallel to each other, 
changing the linear impulse to become into something more curved, 
something intentionally melodic or dissonant.44 “Metramorphosis is a 
process of affective-emotive swerving.”45
The self finds its earliest vibrations and fluidities in the matrix, not 
as an isolated being beginning to divide and complicate itself from a 
single cell, but as a self-in-connection, self-in-copoiesis, affecting and 
being affected by its uterine mother and already dual in the coupling 
of ovum and spermatozoa. In copoiesis, the self is already musical and 
performing. Ettinger writes, “The psychic voice-link opens in us a ma-
trixial time-and-space of encounter where, like in a resonance-cavity, 
inside and outside vibrate together.” 46 Chromosomal and qualitative 
differences are present in internal borderspace from the moment being 
sounds itself as self, as subject-in-making. Borderlinking proximities of 
embrace and resistance are present as part of this borderswerving dif-
ferentiation/simulation that sways with the umbilical c(h)ord, and the 
emergence from this place/time of fetus and womb interfering and res-
onating with each other’s primary and secondary needs is punctuated 
with groans, cries, and whimpers, a primal-proximal chorus of separa-
tion, the stretching and rupture of contained temporospatiality. This is 
borderswerving as “transgressive. It is a process of differentiating in bor-
derspacing and borderlinking, of inscriptive exchange between/with-in 
several matrixial entities. It dissolves the individual borderlines so that 
they become thresholds, allowing a passage that captures for each par-
ticipant … a surplus of fragility.”47
Metramorphosis and its border-“event-encounter”-emergence48 form 
critical parts of the aforementioned copoiesis, the co-emergence/co-creat-
ing of subjects that is both ethical and aesthetic.49 In copoiesis, subjects 
continue to differentiate beyond parturition, carrying the interiorities 
of borderlinking and borderswerving into exteriorities of further vibra-
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tions and conflicts, at times (and spaces) harmonizing self with other-
than-self and at times (and spaces) clashing between individuations. The 
concept of rubato, or “robbed time,”50 demonstrates this borderswerving 
while borderlinking as musicians play loosely with embedded time as if 
it were contained.
As Ettinger writes, the encounter-emergence of the self/other-than-self 
is musical:
“When the matrixial cavity of passage becomes a matrixial acoustic-reso-
nance camera obscura, partial-objects and partial-subjects are not separated 
by a cut but are rather borderlinked by frequencies, waves, resonance, and 
vibrations. They share and are shared by the same vibrating and resonating 
environment, where the inside is outside and the outside inside. The border-
line between I and non-I as copoietic poles of the same vibrating string are 
transformed into a threshold and transgressed…. I therefore suggest speaking 
of … a matrixial voice.”51
For Ettinger, the aesthetic subject is in proximity and offers proxim-
ity; there is no absolute exteriority or interiority but rather movements, 
“oscillation,”52 between the inner and outer expressions of the self, or as 
Deleuze might phrase this, between the revealing and concealing expo-
sures of the fold.53 In matrixiality, as in music, proximities of becoming 
inculcate “desire … for further borderlinking and further resonances.”54
6. Deleuze: Proximities of Pulsed and Non-Pulsed Time
Metramorphosis read through borderpacing, borderlinking, and bor-
derswerving speaks to embedded and contained temporospatialities. 
How does the sense of different acoustical times affect the proximities 
of bodies? Does the performance of music, placed and moving in the 
space between multiple moving bodies, affect the nearness and distance 
of those bodies and thus form (and re-form) a different kind of multi-
plicity, a rippling that is a folding of bodies exposing and concealing one 
another without touching? Reading Deleuze, the difference in times, in 
“pulsed time” and “sequential” repetitions, may create “interferences” 
and conflict (sound waves crashing into each other’s obstructions) and 
yet may also create new resonances and frequencies of (re)direction that 
redirect one body in relation not only to another but also to itself.55
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In his lectures, Deleuze speaks of music expressed through pulsed and 
non-pulsed time.56 Pulsed time, or Chronos, is “territorialized time,”57 
the “marking”58 of time through measure and repetition/return (Deleuze 
speaks of the “ritornello”59) that is one expression of musically performa-
tive “time because it’s fundamentally the way in which a sonorous form, 
however simple it may be, marks a territory.” 60 He continues, “Each 
time that there is a marking of a territoriality, there will be a pulsation 
of time.” 61 If pulsed time is also musical time, and if both pulsed and 
musical time is territorial, what can be inferred of proximity?
Territorialization is the assemblage of proximities, in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s formation, bodies formed through not merely the associa-
tion but the complicity of parts in their nearness to one another that 
make up bodies/territories distinct from other bodies/territories.62 Mu-
sical performance territorializes time because the performance of music 
takes (“appropriates”63) embedded times in proximity (refer again to the 
curvature of the rate of change) and creates a body of aesthetic sound 
and practice distinct from non-territorialized or deterritorialized sound 
(the noises of traffic and machines or of digestive processes may have 
musically performative possibilities but are not themselves music or part 
of a musical territory without coming together through proximities to 
shared and changing time, to shared and changing space).
Deleuze reminds his listeners that territorialization (and thus pulsed 
time) may be embedded in measurement but is also contained in “de-
velopment.”64 “[A]s soon as you can fix a sonorous form,” he states, “de-
terminable by its internal coordinates, for example melody-harmony, as 
soon as you can fix a sonorous form endowed with intrinsic properties, 
this form is subject to developments, by which it is transformed into 
other forms or enters into relation or again is connected to other forms, 
and here, following these transformations and these connections, you 
can fix pulsations of time.”65 Pulsations of time, or Chronos, then be-
come even more subject to musical proximities that change in response 
to one another, an echo of borderswerving’s relationship to borderlink-
ing.
Non-pulsed time, Aion, is defined rather by deterritorialization and 
the taking apart of “sonorous form.”66 Deleuze relates non-pulsed time 
to velocity, recalling the rate of change described by DeLanda and the 
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dromoscopy of Paul Virilio.67 Aionic time is part of what Deleuze terms 
the “mixture” of time; Aion and Chronos blend together in a musical 
territorializing that is also a deterritorializing, and in these opposite yet 
proximal movements are proximities of becoming and unmaking. The 
experience of participating in a musical performance as a whole (in-
struments, performers, audience, composition, context, etc.) and as its 
component parts (notes, phrases, measures, dynamics, individual char-
acteristics of performers and instruments) is the experience of this mixed 
time.
And yet, not all mixed time is musical, and not all sounds in proxim-
ity are musical. For music to occur, aesthetic proximities must become 
aware of their possibilities for becoming and unmaking, must perceive 
the friction and soothing of their near surfaces. As Deleuze questions, 
“¿Cuando [sic] deviene musical una voz? Yo diría, desde el punto de vista 
de la expresión, que la voz musical es esencialmente una voz desterrito-
rializada. ¿Qué quiere decir eso? Pienso que hay cosas que aún no son 
música y que, sin embargo, están muy próximas a la música.”68
7. Conclusion: Musical Proximities  
and Velocities of Becoming
In thinking through temporospatiality, matrixiality, and territorial-
ization, Ettinger and Deleuze think through the aesthetics of bodily 
proximities, and in these proximities, the performance of music finds 
its own potentials for copoiesis through borderlinking and borderswerv-
ing, through territorialization and deterritorialization. The resonance of 
embedded and contained time with Chronos and Aion opens possibili-
ties for musical co-performances and co-emergences that not only may 
but will differ in each nearing and distancing of shared performance/
hearing, even when recorded versions are repeated. Perceptions gained 
through hearing are subject to the velocities of becoming.
The dissonance of becoming is part of the musical performance of 
deterritorialization and borderswerving, responding to an awareness of 
distinct parts that once were part of a body/performance and yet, in 
their capacities to be perceived as separate and not just body/perfor-
mance, begin to undo territory/matrixiality. In this undoing, simpler 
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and more complex performances, simpler and more complex becomings 
curve against and with each other.
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Because they were pressing me
to my body
and to the very body
and it was then
that I exploded everything
because my body
can never be touched.
[Antonin Artaud]
Dis/embodiments
Because my body can never be touched, because to touch my body 
is to touch some body else, always, this beginning will be, first and fore-
most, on the un-touch-ability of the body, of every body, of everybody; 
this beginning, as if there could be a beginning, will commence, then, 
with the question: “Comment toucher? And as the question or program 
of rhetoric, of an art of speech, is it only metaphorical? What does a 
word touch, if not a body? But there you have it: How can one get hold 
of the body?”1
There we2 have it: elsewhere, always somewhere else, as we will see.
And how can one get hold of the body if there is no body, but only my 
body—there is always a singular mine-ness involved with the body—
how can one, then, touch, or, rather, how does a—there is no the/re for 
it—body touch? How to touch that which touches, and how to touch 
that which cannot be touched? How, then, to think, how to think the 
body, how, then, to think no body? And what does a body touch if not 
itself, no body, that is, for there is no body for the body, and how to 
word this world3 — “a world in which nothing is either present or ab-
sent, where there is neither proximity nor distance, where everything 
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escapes, leaving us the illusion of having everything”?4 How, then, to 
word within this world, without any body to word?
The body, a no body, does not belong, the body belongs nowhere, 
now here, no where; and not only does it “not belong; it is mortal im-
mortal; it is unreal, imaginary, fragmentary. Patient. In its patientness 
the body is thought already—still just thought.”5 The body, and what is a 
body—we cannot and perhaps even must not know—“[t]he body does 
not know; but it is not ignorant either. Quite simply, it is elsewhere. 
It is from elsewhere, another place, another regime, another register”.6
Elsewhere, always, the body, being merely a medium, being, perhaps, 
in and as itself, being, maybe, some body else, someone else’s body, 
cannot be embodied by us. Thus “[w]hat if the body was simply there, 
given, abandoned, without presupposition, simply posited, weighed, 
weighty?”7 What if the body was simply there, out there, untouchable, 
what if the body eluded its appropriation? What, then, if all there is was 
a there is, a Blanchotian il y a? And, most importantly, what if it was 
precisely the body to de-signate such given?
Perhaps the body, as as-signed by Nancy,8 is indeed to be seen as 
“the articulation, or better yet, the organ or organon of the sign: it is, for 
our entire tradition, that in which sense is given and out of which sense 
emerges.” It makes, and it is to be made: “[s]ign of itself and being-itself 
of the sign”, formulates Nancy9 “the double formula of the body in all 
its states, in all its possibilities.” This double formula of the body makes 
for the body, makes the body to be first and last, makes it “total signi-
fier, for everything has a body, or everything is a body (this distinction 
loses its importance here), and body is the last signifier, the limit of the 
signifier”.10
All this implies, however, that there could be signification, and this 
is, after all, how we tend to speak of it: taking away its fundamentally 
origin-al mode, we grant it a meaning. But, we must not forget, “[a]
ll this would be possible only if we had access to bodies, only if they 
were not impenetrable, as physics defines them. Bodies impenetrable 
to language, and languages impenetrable to bodies, bodies themselves, 
like this word ‘body,’ which already withholds itself and incorporates 
its own entry.”11
121
I N / P O S S I B L E  R E L A T I O N :  B E I N G ,  T I M E ,  D E A T H
It is from this very impass(e)ability of the body that Nancy12 deduces 
that the body “never ceases to contradict itself. It is the place of contra-
diction par excellence. Either it is by the body and through it that signi-
fication occurs, and then signification falls within its boundaries […], 
or it is from the body and on it that signification takes shape and is de-
posited, and signification never stops reaching toward this proper locus 
where it should endlessly curl up into itself.”
By the body, from the body, on the body: all this implies the possi-
bility of proximity, of a certain intimacy to be had, and such is the site 
where contradiction takes place. To name the body a place of contradic-
tion is precisely this: the body is to be imagined (there is no is for it), and 
there is no proximity that were not bodily. There is no proximity that 
were not bodily, for there is nothing outside the body, any body, and 
no body that were no(t at a) distance. In distance, and perhaps only in 
distance, can there be relation, can there be relation of touch, can there 
be relation that touches.
(How) to touch: such is to form a(s) distance. In order to be touch-
able, the body must remain a(s) distance: as that which can/not be 
touched. For there is no relation that were not from a distance, no dis-
tance that would not bear relation.
There
our looking lead us
with this
half
we keep up relations
[Paul Celan]
No(t) wholes, but halves, eternally divided by and through differ-
ence. For, and to re-iterate Nancy13 once more, “[t]here can only be 
relation (the return, the appropriation of a subject to itself or between 
subjects, it amounts to much the same thing) if we start with an abso-
lute distancing, without which there would be no possibility of prox-
imity, of identity or strangeness, of subjectivity or thinghood. First and 
foremost, however, this distancing distends relation to the point of ex-
position: scarcely am I born before I am outside myself at an infinite 
distance, outside simply turned out, exposed to the rest of the world, to 
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all things. And the same goes for everything, each one exposing univer-
sal exposition differently.”
And what is an exposition but an ex-position? Never from with/in, 
always at the edge, at an outside yet to be made, the close is a(s) closure; 
what is closest is the most distant, and this is why every touch, every 
body, bears its closure in and as itself. For only with,in such closure lies 
there an opening; and this is not a saying. To say is a saying of differ-
ence, to say is to say in difference.
Thence every relation is as ex-position, a(s) dis-appropriation of the 
self, always already different, always in difference. In difference: the only 
form of relation possible. “Difference: the non-identity of the same, the 
movement of distance; that which carries, by carrying off, the becom-
ing of interruption. Difference bears in its prefix the detour wherein all 
power to give meaning seeks its origin in the distance that holds it from 
this origin.”14
An origin-al difference inscribed in,to difference itself, and how to say 
this closure, how to say this closure that proximity is? Proximity is (as) 
approximation, it is the process of appropriation, and how to say this 
nearness, this nearest, the nearest, how to say it in and as nearness; and 
nearness is (as) distance, how to bring distance into relation, how to 
relate distance to relation, how to re-store (the etymological origin of 
“relate”) distance (origin/ally a “standing apart”)?
To say distance as and through distance without appropriating it 
and/or making nearness out of it: such must be the aim here. “The dis-
tant calls to the near, repelling it, not to define itself in it by opposition, 
nor to form a couple with it by resemblance and difference, but in such 
a way that the separation between the two still belongs to the distant.”15
A doubled distance, a separation of and in distance, then.
Thus what must be thought is this: that there is nothing that could 
be thought, that both body and that which is closest (to it), are not, but 
are only in relation to each other; that both elude their think-ability, 
that both are what cannot be appropriated.
Thus what must be said is this: that both relate to each other as that 
which is most distant; that all there is are distances, because there is no 
nearness for the body, no body for such nearness, but only dis/embod-
ied distances.
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In order for there to be relation, there is to be a relation that relates to 
its difference: it is to “have a relation to that which excludes itself from 
any relation and which nevertheless indicates itself as absolute only in 
the relative mode (of the relation itself, multiple).”16
A relation en route, en passant, bearing witness to the almost, to the 
inchoateness of relation/ality, to the fact that there is no close, and yet 
that such close is all there is. Hence relation is possible only as an ap-
proaching, always yet a(t) distance, an such relation is, evidently, a rela-
tion of and in Otherness, for such Other is the site where they assemble.
Such is, certainly, “a thinking that is more than a thought one can 
think, more than a thought can think”:17 for such un-thinkability is what 
means to think, such is to think the Other without thinking it as Same. 
And such is, after all, “a matter of thinking the heteronomy of the Other 
in the Same, where the Other does not subjugate the Same but awakens 
it and sobers it up. The Other sobers the Same by way of a sobering that 
is a thought more thoughtful than the thought of the Same, in a waking 
up that disturbs the astronomic repose of the world.”18
No reconciliation but a relating of different relations (“[t]o cross the dis-
tant, to turn the distant back toward the distant without approach”)19; 
Levinasian experiences of alterity, always.
There ought, then, to be a distance, always. In order for there to be 
relation, distance must be kept. And for there to be relation, such re-
lation must remain outside relation. Such relation is to remain differ-
ent, is to remain a(s) different relation, a(s) relation of difference and 
in,difference. Neither one nor the other, but the Other, always.
In order for there to be relation, there needs to be a fracture, and 
there needs to be a rupture, always.
“‘Always, I come again.’—‘In as much as you find in yourself the 
ability to remain at the furthest remove.’—‘It is only here that I would 
find the distant.’”20
An absolute closeness: a distance to one’s self. For the self “has its 
originarity in the loss of self ”;21 for the self is to remain Other, for the 
“identification of the self as such […] can only take place once the sub-
ject finds itself or poses itself originarily as other than itself ”.22 For there 
can be no other self than anOther self: such must be the relation thought 
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here. From one to the other, “[f ]rom the other to the one, there is a re-
lation, even if it is a relation without a link”.23
There is a nearness, always, a nearness without nearness to be given.
As Paul Celan “I insert–I have no choice–I insert the acute”,24 or, to de-
scribe it with Blanchot,25 I insert (I have no choice) the immediate—“a 
word that designates what is so close that it destroys all proximity—a 
word before which we once again find ourselves […] the immediate that 
allows no mediation, the absence of separation that is absence of rela-
tion as well as infinite separation because this separation does not reserve 
for us the distance and the future we need in order to be able to relate 
ourselves to it, to come about in it. Thus we can begin to surmise that 
“impossibility”—that which escapes, without there being any means of 
escaping it—would be not the privilege of some exceptional experience, 
but behind each one and as though its other dimension.”
It is thus that we enter the in/possibility26 of relation.
In/possibility: a possibility/not. The prefix “in” designates closeness and 
distance at the same time; a within, and yet also a without: neither, and 
nor. A possibility that is not yet given, but that might be inherent, a pos-
sibility always yet to be-come. As such, is has no presence.
It is thus that we enter what Blanchot27 names “the relation of the 
third kind (the first being a mediate relation of dialectical or objective 
identification, the second a relation demanding immediate unity). Now 
what ‘founds’ this third relation, leaving it still unfounded, is no longer 
proximity—proximity of struggle, of services, of essence, of knowledge, 
or of recognition, not even of solitude—but rather the strangeness be-
tween us: a strangeness it will not suffice to characterize as a separation 
or even as a distance.
— Rather an interruption.
— An interruption escaping all measure. But—and here is the 
strangeness of this strangeness—such an interruption (one that neither 
includes nor excludes) would be nevertheless a relation; at least if I take 
it upon myself not to reduce it, not to reconcile it, even by comprehend-
ing it, that is, not to seek to consider it as the ‘faltering’ mode of a still 
unitary relation.”
It is thus that we might enter relation as such.
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Death
“Let us enter into this relation.
To death we are not accustomed.”28
To death we are not accustomed, for death, as the body, is that which 
cannot be owned, that which cannot be appropriated and that is yet 
ours. Death: that which we own (without which we cannot be), that 
which is ours, and that, at the same time, is Other, always Other. Death, 
it is well known, is the endless Other that cannot be attained. Its end-
ing is endless, and yet always already ending. There is no presence for 
the end.
To death we are not accustomed.
Death: the utmost ex-posure to distance, and, at the same time, to that 
which is closest.
We are with,in death, always already, to live is to die, for death does 
not take place. Death: a Blanchotian pas, a step, not, a step not beyond. 
Death cannot be done (with); each time, death must be faced, one time.
“They do not think of death, having no other relation but with death.”29
Let us, then, enter into this relation. Let us enter into this relation 
where there is no relation, for it is death that opens the in/possibility of 
relation. It does so by being in/possible: as possibility of impossibility 
(Heidegger) and as impossibility of possibility (Blanchot). And if, argues 
the latter,30 “if possibility has its source in our very end […] it is from 
this same source that “impossibility” originates, though now sealed orig-
inarily and refusing itself to all our resources: there where dying means 
losing the time in which one can still come to an end and entering into 
the infinite “present” of a death impossible to die”.
And yet, as pointed out by Levinas,31 “[i]t is not with the nothingness 
of death, of which we precisely know nothing, that the analysis must 
begin, but with the situation where something absolutely unknowable 
appears. Absolutely unknowable means foreign to all light, rendering 
every assumption of possibility impossible”.
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Let us enter into this (non-)relation, let us enter into this momentary 
site where distance and proximity meet.
Time
It is time it were time.
It is time
, reminds us Paul Celan in Corona. It is time it were about time, here, 
here, within time, as if there was an outside of, to time. And yet such 
outside of time is all there is.
For time is retarded. Time is remembrance, is anticipated remem-
brance, and we need to remember: Time does not take place, time is 
not, time [is]. Time is nothing but an ‘as if ’; there is no witness for time. 
Time, then, passes, and it origin/ates from this its passing.32
Here, we will follow Nancy33 once more and try to ex-pose ourselves 
“to what happens with time, in time”. Such ex-posure, such ex (forth) 
ponere (to put, to place), such putting forth then, is certainly itself an 
origination, and it is only within such ex-position to time that time, “the 
element of thinking”, can be thought. To think time from within time 
(and there is no inside of time):
This is to think, this is the task to be thought. A difficult task, cer-
tainly, and perhaps the only task ever given—maybe precisely because, 
as Derrida34 reminds us, it is always already too late “to ask the question 
of time. The latter has already appeared”. Its appearance is, of course, a 
dis/appearance.
À la recherche du temps perdu: For time, always unique, always out of 
(its) time, remains untimely. For time is behind the times, for time is 
a(s) beyond, is a(s its) withdrawal. Time is only when it is not; time is, 
to recall Bergson,35 “what hinders everything from being given at once. 
It retards, or rather it is retardation. It must, therefore, be elaboration. 
Would it not then be a vehicle of creation and choice? Would not the 
existence of time prove that there is indetermination in things? Would 
not time be that indetermination itself?”
And would not indetermination prove that there is time? Would not 
indetermination be the only way of experiencing time?
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The experience of time, we are well aware of this, is tied to the idea and, 
consequently, to the representation and/or represenciation of presence: 
„From Parmenides to Husserl, the privilege of the present has never 
been put into question. It could not have been […] no thought seems 
possible outside its element. Nonpresence is always thought in the form 
of presence […]. The past and the future are always determined as past 
presents or as future presents“.36
This is “the enigma of the now”;37 these are the indeterminable im-passes 
to be addressed here.
Far from being original—after all, origination does not possess an 
origin: the origin is nothing but origination itself—, far from being co-
herent—we will only touch on the impasse of touching some of the im-
passes it touches—, we shall thus continue to make up something that is 
not, something that is not even as ‘is not’, that is only as in/possibility.
The first point, or rather text, of origin here is Derrida’s relatively ear-
ly ‘Ousia and Gramme: Note on a note from Being and Time’, wherein 
he, as Derrida himself traces his text in Aporias,38 “treated the question of 
the present, of presence and of the presentation of the present, of time, 
of being, and above all of nonbeing, more precisely of a certain impos-
sibility as nonviability, as nontrack or barred path”.
In the very beginning of the note that Derrida aims to extend—the 
longest in Being and Time—, Heidegger notes that Hegel, for prioritis-
ing the now, remains “under the sway of the traditional conception of 
time”, a vulgar conception that is, and, as he excitedly adds, “[it] can 
even be shown that his conception of time has been drawn directly from 
the ‘physics’ of Aristotle”.
This being quoted, we cannot and perhaps do not even wish to further 
elaborate on Derrida’s subsequent detailed elaborations on Hegel and 
Aristotle. Let us just note that already for Aristotle the now does by 
no means represent a present presence—rather, it is to be conceived as 
something that is not: “In one sense it has been and is no longer, and 
in another sense, it will be and is not yet”, as he is quoted by Derrida.39
Yet, as the latter40 rightly asks, “is not what Heidegger designates be-
neath these points of reference that which is most simple? […] Has not 
the entire history of philosophy been authorized by the ‘extraordinary 
right’ of the present?”
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It is obvious, perhaps all too obvious, what Derrida attempts to dem-
onstrate here: pre-cipitating his conclusion that time is metaphysical, he 
suggests that Heidegger (at least in Being and Time) remains metaphysi-
cal himself and that there might be no vulgar conception of time—for, 
as he states, the concept of time “names the domination of presence. 
Therefore we can only conclude that the entire system of metaphysical 
concepts […], develops the so-called ‘vulgarity’ of the concept of time 
[…], but also that an other concept of time cannot be opposed to it, 
since time in general belongs to metaphysical conceptuality”.41
And yet it is precisely the ordinary that is itself always already “ex-
ceptional, however little we understand its character as origin. What we 
receive most communally as ‘strange’ is that the ordinary itself is origi-
nary”, as Jean-Luc Nancy reminds us.42 The ordinary, seen as such, is al-
ways-already extra-ordinary; the ordinary is always originating an Other 
(access), just as time is always an Other. And just as the “desire for the 
exception presupposes disdain for the ordinary”,43 the metaphysical (de-
sire for a) conception of time assumes that time itself were extraordinary.
However, as there indeed can be no other concept of time, we must 
not succumb to the temptation of a mere overcoming of such thinking,44 
as such overcoming falls back into the same thinking it tries to over-
come: tà metà tà metàphysiká: metàphysiká, or: Plus ca change, plus c’est 
la meme chose. It was, after all, Heidegger himself to remind us that each 
reversion of metaphysics remains metaphysical.45 But it was also Hei-
degger who coined the term Verwindung: a concept somewhat similar to 
the term ‘overcoming’ (Überwindung), while at the same time replacing 
this dialectic connotation by two meanings, namely Genesung/convales-
cence and Verdrehung/distortion.46 There is no way out of metaphysics; 
the only way out is through.
To think presence differently is, therefore, not to be based on a re-
version of the metaphysical concept of time, but it is to be a tracing—
and it is thus that we enter Derrida’s second motif regarding his exten-
sion of the footnote,47 namely “[t]o indicate […] a direction not opened 
by Heidegger’s mediation: the hidden passageway that makes the prob-
lem of presence communicate with the problem of the written trace.”
Certainly the idea of the trace is by no means post-metaphysical; the 
metaphysical traces remain, remain within the trace itself, as the very 
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names given to the trace “belong as such to the text of metaphysics that 
shelters the trace, and not to the trace itself ”;48 there is no presence for 
this trace: being a trace, presence “could not appear or be named as 
such, that is, in its presence. It is the as such which precisely, and as such, 
evades us forever”. Like Barthes’49 third or obtuse meaning, presence “is 
a signifier without a signified, hence the difficulty in naming it”.50
And this very impasse of naming reflects the impasse of thinking; the 
task of thought, one might dare to name it philosophy, is to trespass this 
impasse. Probably the most non-metaphysical gesture, if it were possible 
at all, would be to name: To name is to release the name from an impos-
sible meaning—to name is to name the metaphysical trace that cannot 
be named. We are already beyond whatever we have words for, reminds us 
Nietzsche;51 and thus it has to be named as such, as the very naming of 
that which cannot be named: presence, and time as such.
And such time, it seems certain, must be a time beyond time; for it is 
outside time that presence takes place. To be in time is to be elsewhere.
Being
“Non-present, non-absent; it tempts us in the manner of that which 
we would not know how to meet, save in situations which we are no 
longer in”.52
Death, we remember, remains an in/possibility, the possibility yet to be/
come. As such, what we are facing is not a Heideggerian being-toward-
death, but rather a being-toward-the-end, always. Our being “is in the 
mode of being-toward-the-end, and that what constitutes an event in 
this being [Dasein] is to go to its end. The energy or the very power of 
being is already the power of its end. There is a new and irreducible re-
lationship here: it is irreducible to a distance in regard to what remains 
outside of and distinct from a ripening.”53
It is in finitude that being is, and being itself is finite. Being is (in) 
time, and this time, the time of being, is (in) finitude: finitude desig-
nates the horizon of time, the origin/ation of time; original time is finite, 
as elucidated by the early Heidegger.
Here, being shall be thought in and from the end: a(s) passage to-
wards the limit, a(s) relation not/beyond, but elsewhere, always some-
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where else. In order to think the time of being, absence must be thought 
beyond its own presence— beyond its absence, that is. A with-drawal 
of its relation to—(presence), a thinking-it as such. We must, therefore, 
by no means invent a different presence for this absence that is not. For 
such absence, as Derrida reminds us, would either “give us nothing to 
think or it still would be a negative mode of presence. Therefore the sign 
of this excess must be absolutely excessive as concerns all possible pres-
ence-absence, […] and yet, in some manner it must still signify, in a man-
ner unthinkable by metaphysics as such. In order to exceed metaphysics 
it is necessary that a trace be inscribed within the text of metaphysics, a 
trace that continues to signal […] in the direction of an entirely other 
text. […] The mode of inscription of such a trace in the text of meta-
physics is so unthinkable that it must be described as an erasure of the 
trace itself. The trace is produced by its own erasure”.54
Such inscription is, then, to inscribe a presence that is not is to in-
scribe only to withdraw. Thus, to inscribe a presence “not to (re)present 
it or to signify it, but to let come to one and over one what merely pre-
sents itself at the limit where inscription itself withdraws”.55
Consequently, ousia or Wesen shall no longer be conceived in terms 
of (its) presence, but thought (of ) as ap_ousiai,56 literally un-presences: 
In contrast to parousia,57 de-signating the presence of that which has al-
ready arrived, ap_ousiai, still bearing the metaphysical trace of the idea 
of presence and absence, is to de-signate the presence of absence, the 
absence of presence, and yet something situated beyond both.
For it is only here, within this very (non)passage of and towards such 
beyond, that the in/possibility of presence is opened, and it is, then, only 
through an ab-sense of sense that (its) presence is witnessed—a presence 
which, to write with Nancy,58 “is not essence, but […] birth to pres-
ence: birth and death to the infinite presentation of the fact that there 
is no ultimate sense, only a finite sense, finite senses, a multiplication of 
singular bursts of sense resting on no unity or substance. And the fact, 
too, that there is no established sense, no establishment, institution or 
foundation of sense, only a coming, and comings-to-be of sense.”
What is of relevance here is the gap between: its mode of relation is 
that of a Verwindung. The blank, the gap, or, in German, Leerzeichen, 
literally an empty sign, an empty character, designates the only relation 
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possible. Ap_ousiai are beyond, yet they are tracing themselves, and, as la 
différance, they might allow for “a writing without presence and without 
absence”.59 Situated beyond this opposition presence: absence, beyond 
themselves and, therefore also situated beyond the postmodern novum, 
they are both fracture and co-relation. Here, we obviously face the same 
impasse as is the case with différance: such fissure cannot be heard, but 
only written. Within the empty sign, without a signifier, presence is no 
longer thought (of ) as (its) and through presenciation.
Presence, it should be clear by now, presence is an empty sign. And 
“[p]resence, then, far from being […] what the sign signifies, what a 
trace refers to, presence, then, is the trace of the trace, the trace of the 
erasure of the trace”.60
What we still face, towards this ending, as if there was an end, is the 
impasse; what we still face is the in/possibility, or shall we say potential?, 
of and for presence, that is. We must thus insert, we have no choice, we 
must insert “the old, worn-out Greek term aporia”.61
We remember: aporos, without passage, “indeed the nonpassage, 
which can in fact be something else, the event of a coming or of a fu-
ture advent, which no longer has the form of the movement that con-
sists in passing, traversing, or transiting”.62 Having “come to pass”, al-
ways, “the aporia, that is, the impossible, the impossibility”, that which 
“cannot pass […] or come to pass”,63 the aporia might indeed attest to 
“the fact that the impossibility would be possible and would appear as 
such, as impossible, as an impossibility that can nevertheless appear or 
announce itself as such”64 —
it is as such that the aporia is.
There is in fact no possibility without impossibility, for such possi-
bility would not be possible. The possibility of presence would be past 
or future, for “[s]uch is the logic of the present: at this precise moment, 
the moment erases itself, and this is how it is a moment.”65 Such is “the 
paradox of the present: to constitute time while passing in the time con-
stituted”.66 Such is the impasse of the present: a poiesis of the only once, 
as the only once. Such is to be thought: To think the once at once; only 
one time: the only time.
But can we even pose the question of an in/possibility of presence?67 
Is not every saying of presence a pre-supposition, an anticipation of 
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something that is no(t) yet? And yet is within presence, and maybe 
within presence alone, that in/possibility occurs, for “it concerns the 
impossibility of [time] itself, and not merely the impossibility of this 
or that”?68
Presence is the ultimate aporia. And this is why presence “can never 
[…] be endured as such. The ultimate aporia is the impossibility of apo-
ria as such”.69 Can one then, Derrida70 asks, “[c]an one speak […] of an 
experience […] of the aporia as such? Or vice versa: Is an experience pos-
sible that would not be an experience of the aporia?”
We know that we cannot know about the aporia: this might be its 
first, its only condition. The aporia can be experienced only as such: as 
aporia. And it is precisely because of this its impossibility that the apo-
ria, that presence can be experienced. Like presence, it is (possible) only 
when it is not: when remaining impossible. Simultaneously witnessing 
and anticipating a presence that is always already a no longer, this trace 
re-presents a trace always already erasing itself.
And so it might be the no longer that bears witness to the present, 
and its presence presents itself as the very trace of the presence that it is 
pre-tend-ing to present.
There is, in this end, as if there was an end, no presence for proxim-
ity, no presence for the close.
Neither present nor absent, proximity is as approximation, relates to 
that which is furthest, is “the ability to remain at the furthest remove”.71
Every attempt to im-pose a presence external to it, every effort of making 
it a with—, violates its only once, its in/possibility of presence, that is. 
Touch, relation, proximity: a relating to and as presence, a simulation 
of the in/possible experience of the aporia.
There is no presence for relation. Neither present nor absent, relation 
is (as) impass(e)ability: the ability to bear the impossible, the impasse, 
the aporia: such must be the closeness of relation, each time. Only thus 
can there be opened a possibility of in/possibility, only thus can there 
be proximity. In/possibility: the only form of possibility possible. Such 
must be the condition for our being-in-time, for our being-toward-the-
end.
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Then,
between her and I
between him and I
between me and I
between…
perceiving, being, knowing and taking action.
Bodily proximity
to my own physical body
to someone else’s physical body
to the idea of my body
to the idea of someone else’s body.
to
perceiving, being, relating
Bodily proximity is impossible.
Bodily proximity is impossible because of my body.
My body gets in the way.
The body is a hindrance to any kind of bodily proximity.
My body prohibits me from entering into any kind of proximity.
My body is an obstacle.
My body is a checkpoint.
My body is a barbed wire.
My body is a pain!!!!
Introduction
“No one ever says, Here am I, and I have brought my body with me.”
A. N. Whitehead, Modes of Thought.1
With the writings of Irigaray, Haraway, Ettinger, Butler and others, 
feminist discourse has moved beyond the critique and deconstruction of 
traditional Western philosophy. When I use the term traditional West-
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ern philosophy I am referring specifically to its phallocentric, patriarchal 
discourse, where binary oppositions and dichotomies have served to 
delineate women to the less-able other or the non-existent other. With-
in this master/slave dialectic, wo-man roams outside the realm of the 
knowledge power systems, namely, language, science, and philosophy.
From the ‘psychoanalytic subject’ defined, feminist philosophers 
have found and, at times have created, ruptures, spaces, and gaps to 
strategically play with, in order to ‘skip a beat’ and go back to the ori-
gins as Ettinger’s pre-subject; stop, slow down and breathe as in Iriga-
ray’s subject as self-affection; or move beyond the subject as in Haraway’s 
“Situated Knowledges”. Along with the exclusion of women, comes the 
absence of the body as a dynamic force in shaping identity/ies, and cre-
ating knowledge(s). 2
My aim in writing this paper is two-fold. First of all I would like to 
highlight the role that Merleau-Ponty, Levinas, and Whitehead have 
played in accentuating the importance of the body in terms of knowing 
and being. In fact, they have paved the way for philosophers such as Iri-
garay, and Haraway to formulate their own ideas regarding subjectivity 
and embodied knowledge. My second aim is to look at how an alter-
native pedagogy and art/artistic practices can lay the ground for a re-
working of the body in terms of Nishida’s “action-intuition”, Haraway’s 
“situated knowledge”, and Tomaž Grušovnik’s “embodied education”. 
Finally, I would like use the concrete example of the Libyan revolution 
to address the question of the impossibility of bodily proximity; namely, 
when ideology enters the stage the body takes an exit.
My Body is always me, My perceptions are me
In the world is my body. My body helps me to perceive the world. My per-
ception offers me an idea. I can know when I perceive.
For Merleau Ponty the body is not an object but is the condition 
through which someone can have a relation with objects, that is, with 
the world. Merleau- Ponty emphasises the importance of the lived ex-
perience in grasping the nature of language, perception, and the body: 
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“to be a body, is to be tied to a certain world”; he adds “our body is not 
primarily in space: it is of it”.3
Merleau-Ponty is not interested in giving privilege to the body over 
the mind, or to offer a complete theory for both. He uses the concepts 
of experience and perception to highlight that the body cannot be ar-
ticulated as either a subject or an object. Rather, that knowledge of one’s 
body and knowledge of the world can only be accessed through the body. 
It is the experience of the body and the way the body shapes experience.4
Within, and in addition to, Merleau-Ponty’s introduction of the 
body into the discourse of the ways of knowing, some feminist theorists 
have added an emphasis on the differential forms of embodiment that 
do fall within the normative boundaries of a universalised and gender-
neutral body. The female body for example, is continuously changing 
through naturally occurring life events (menstruation, pregnancy, lac-
tation, menopause).5 We have to be mindful of the fact that the very 
definition of what constitutes a body, may differ from one philosopher 
to another and that although we have utilised Merleau-Ponty’s contri-
bution to the discourse on the role of the body, this does not mean that 
we cannot challenge some of his premises.
For feminists like Spivak, the rejection of the patriarchal discourse 
as universal, objective, neutral, entails a rejection of the definition of 
the body as a neutral and universal category. As Gayatri Spivak asserts: 
“There are thinkings of the systematicity of the body, there are value 
codings of the body. The body as such cannot be thought”.6
There are only multiple bodies, marked by an infinite number of dif-
ferences, including: race, class, sexuality, age, and mobility status-none 
are solely determinate. Here the universal category of the body is lost. 
Unlike the disembodiment evident in masculinist discourse this disap-
pearance is in favour of a fluid and open embodiment.7
For Merleau Ponty, perception is always an embodied perception that 
can only take place within a specific site or context. Therefore, there is 
no body-in-itself and there is no perception-in-itself. He writes that the 
“perceiving mind is an incarnated mind.8
There is only perception as it is lived in the world. So what happens 
to the subject within Merleau-Ponty’s understanding? The subject is the 
perceiving subject that is continually changing through a process of re-
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birth. What I know is dependent on what I perceive. My perceptions 
change and with them so do my ideas or what I know and don’t know. 
The certainty of ideas is based on the certainty of perception. Therefore 
there are no universal entities at the level of ideas.
In her book The Shaking Woman or a History of My Nerves, Siri 
H ustvedt discusses Shaun Gallagher’s distinction between body schema 
and body image. Influenced by Merleau-Ponty’s writings on schema cor-
porel, Gallagher describes the body schema as a “system of sensory motor 
capacities” (unconscious). While the body image is conscious-it is the 
beliefs and thoughts I have about my physical being. I is I as an object, 
a perception of my body from the outside.9
It will suffice for us here to end our discussion of Merleau Ponty’s 
work by asking the question: If every subjective instance is a unity, pre-
sent to itself, then what about the question of otherness?10
The other is what defines me. I am defined by my relation to an other 
and through language with the other I can become a subject.
For Levinas the question of otherness plays a primary role in his phi-
losophy. His radical questioning of otherness and subject/object relations 
has influenced many thinkers including: Sartre, Derrida, and Irigaray. 
Levinas’s concept of “responsibility for the Other” reflects his own per-
sonal experiences and is highly contextual. For Levinas the Other is 
“prior to any act”.11
Levinas is disenchanted with the universality offered by traditional 
western thought. He is not interested in ontology, epistemology or rea-
son but rather the underside of rationality. He regards this as a positive 
force that challenges the dominance in philosophy of the universal, 
where the Other is reduced to the Same. Levinas defines transcendence 
as a rupture: an opening up to the Other while universality leads to dis-
embodiment and idealism. He tries to bring together to closer proxim-
ity: thought and embodiment.
In a 1985 interview, Levinas wrote that in 1948, while writing his lec-
tures, titled Time and the Other, he thought that femininity was the 
modality of alterity that he was looking for.12 In a conversation with 
Bracha Ettinger about the feminine, Levinas answers:
Woman is the category of the future, the ecstasy of the future. It is that 
human possibility which consists in saying that the life of another human be-
145
T H E  I M P O S S I B I L I T Y  O F  B E I N G  S E L F / O T H E R
ing is more important than my own, that the death of the other is more im-
portant than my own death, that the Other comes before me, that the Other 
counts before I do, that the values of the Other are imposed before mine. In 
the future there is what might happen to me. And then there’s also my death.13
Similarly, Irigaray argues that the feminine is an alterity that one 
must think of outside of the patriarchal order of identity, or sameness. 
For Levinas, the Other arises in relation to others. This relation is prior 
to ontology and is a relation of ethical responsibility. It is a practical rela-
tion of one, to an other. It is a kind of moral proximity. The Other, is a 
“nudity”. True nudity is the face (of the Other). “The face of the Other 
comes to us from the exterior. The face is by itself and not in reference 
to a system.”14 The Other is the infinite in me, to the extent that he/she 
brings about a rupture in the self as an entity identical with itself. The 
self even poses itself for the other rather than for itself.
For Levinas, it is the encounter with the other, a face-to-face en-
counter that leads me to the formation of my own self. This ethical 
relationship with the Other, is possible because of language. Language 
enables links to be made between people. Language can be the exis tence 
of alterity. It cannot be reduced to a system of representation or to an 
order of the Same. Language is an extended epiphany. “It is the aston-
ishment of the Other speaking in me which enables me to become a 
self in language”.15
“I exists only in relation to you. Language takes place between people. … 
Words cross the borders of our bodies in two directions, outside in and in-
side out, and therefore the minimal requirement for a living language is two 
people.”16
The question that one must raise here and that Irigaray has tackled 
in her work is: How can one escape the clutches of ideology, and pa-
triarchal imposition that has taken hold of language? Even in its very 
structure?
The body is relational, I am a subject and an object, my body is an 
event, I can effect change through the technicity of my body.
Spinoza describes affect as what accompanies a change of state from 
a higher or lower bodily experience. They are the powers of existence 
that are immediately relational. The relation is the interval. Whitehead, 
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called this the non-sensuous perception: where the relation between the 
knower and the known is not stable. This is the affective tone: the total 
vastness of feeling that is unbounded. Every element in the world begins 
with affect. The affect unlike the emotion is what you cannot say. The 
feelings of the relevance of things precede our attending to something. 
The event has an affective tone to the objects because it cannot exist 
without the objects. So a person can be an object as well as a subject. 
Whitehead does not concern himself with the traditional concept of the 
subject/object relation. These two terms are relative terms. All modes 
of existence are trans-individual and collective. The pre-individual is 
an affective force of becoming and is collective in germ. For example: 
a flower (object) has a concern (apprehends) for the sun (object). Here 
the subject is ‘flowering’. So that ‘activity’, replaces substance. There is 
no immobility, everything is an activity and has a duration.17
So that the chair is a subject, as much as we are, and has a concern: 
“sit-ability.” But also like us has a multitude of possibilities of concern. 
This is a philosophy of activity, where the process is the focus. White-
head maintains that reality consists in process and the unit of becom-
ing is an “actual occasion”. Such being the case our ordinary language 
will prove inadequate for representing the dynamism involved in the 
Whiteheadian logic. For Instance, I cannot say that I understand the 
proposition: “The book is black.” unless I put it in the following form: 
The book which is here, at this moment, “blacks me”.18 It is obvious that 
the term “blacks” is intended to establish the fact of relatedness between 
the book and me in a dynamic manner. The nature of our language is 
helpless. (Whitehead has made the remarkable observation of the inad-
equacy of our language for metaphysical manipulation.)19
For Whitehead, value and fact are inseparable. Feeling and reality are 
to be equally considered in order that a philosophy can claim compre-
hensiveness and be adequate. Similarly, propositions are matters of fact 
and lures of feeling. They may be felt under many attributes (subjective 
forms) such as consciousness, emotion, purpose, but feeling them does 
not even usually involve consciousness. Whitehead writes that “con-
sciousness presupposes experience and not experience consciousness.”20 
The feelers are the subjects of the proposition. In the Whiteheadian phi-
losophy of organism, an event is a process, a relation is a prehension, 
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and the essence of an event is to prehend. In this philosophy the body 
is regarded as a site, an event: the body as relational. We need to look 
at the technicity of the body, and its potentiality. Every event generates 
a quality of ‘ness’. Everything is prehensions. Physical prehensions are 
leftovers of an event. 21
Following in Whitehead’s footsteps, we need to become artists of 
occasions. The body is an unstable event, an eternal object with pure 
potentialities. It is a site of production. The body is a technicity. The 
question arises here: If we are all multitudes of multiplicity, how about 
trying to mobilise these multiplicities? This could be the beginning of a 
different kind of politics, and an alternative site of change, in precogni-
tion, pre the I. There is a quality of experience that involves the intensity 
of our lives. We need to pay attention to the qualitative nature of our 
lives. How can we take action? Affect change? What are the conditions 
that allow for the sensation of more? Where can this happen?
Alfredo Jaar and the Tabouli Performer both use their artwork as po-
tential sites for the activation of the body, in terms of affect, and change.
The body plays an active role in defining who we are,  
the historical body, action-intuition, through art
Alfredo Jaar and the Tabouli Performer are two artists who have pro-
duced work that deal with the issues of subjectivity, otherness, and bodi-
ly proximity. Alfredo Jaar’s bodily presence (public intervention art) en-
ters a space as an observer. He uses time (duration) to construct some 
kind of understanding (memory) of the site. He looks specifically for 
some human event where the sense of otherness is implicated. Once he 
finds it he enters into the field of experience and begins to interact with 
it. His artwork is a kind of ethical gesture that uses art, language, silence, 
space, invisibility, and history to make an affect. His work delves into a 
feeling that is relational, temporal and ethical.22
Jaar’s work is fundamentally about the human condition in a contex-
tual framework. Before creating his art, he delves deep into the histori-
cal and social conditions of the space he is working in. Nishida in his 
notion of the expressive or historical body recognises the importance of 
embodiment for human interaction and communication. The body is 
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not primarily a physical object and product of the natural world, but a 
historical subject and co-creator of the world. Insofar as the many his-
torical bodies of the one world differ from each another, they too form 
a “discontinuous continuity”.
Nishida was fond of calling this type of unity, which holds together 
differences without sublating them, a “self-identity of absolute contra-
dictories”23 Nishida terms it as ‘action-intuition’. Both artist and work 
are formed mutually and are reflected in one another. Nishida described 
it in terms of the place or topos wherein intuiting entails acting and act-
ing intuiting, and wherein the difference between internal and external 
collapses. Performative intuition is operative in praxis or political-social 
action as well, insofar as it grasps the world as including the self. Nishida 
emphasized that action-intuition is a bodily achievement, the perfor-
mance of an embodied individual who in turn is formed by the world; 
again, both body and world must be conceived as historical. While 
“action-intuition” pertains to the dialectical way the individual histori-
cal body forms and is formed by the world, the way the world forms is 
described by the phrase “from the created to the creating”.24
Partial-Limited-Specific-Post Subject/Object-but Object-ive
The moral is simple: only partial perspective promises objective vision. All 
Western cultural narratives about objectivity are allegories of the ideologies 
governing the relations of what we call mind and body, distance and respon-
sibility. Feminist objectivity is about limited location and situated knowledge, 
not about transcendence and splitting of subject and object. It allows us to 
become answerable for what we learn how to see.25
One method for artists to challenge fixed assumptions could be to 
create alternative representations of different experiences and identities 
by emphasizing different conceptions of womanhood in art. If identi-
ties can be reconstructed and negotiated, essentialized identities will be 
challenged. In light of this theory, art can be seen as a product of one’s 
social world and one’s social situated-ness.26 Different subjectivities can 
be sought out and analyzed to understand identities. Positioned insight 
can be a productive base for impacting culture when artwork is con-
textualized in the artist’s network. 27 This could lead to an embodied 
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partiality, namely, a quest to embody knowledge and meanings in an 
individual. In order to make knowledge claims, analysts have to value 
the partiality of their own claims on their subjects. Haraway provides a 
metaphor of “vision” in order. Particulars are partial perspectives offered 
by artists and their works.
This form of efficacy is not about universalism or transcendence but 
acknowledges that women artists are situated actors in societies and in 
art worlds.28
Jaber uses the work that I have done under the pseudonym of “The 
Tabouli Performer” to elucidate Haraway’s concept of ‘situated knowl-
edge’ and vice versa. She writes: “Haj-Ismail has the audacity to use her 
body in her performances. She uses her surroundings, her situatedness 
whether she is in Jeddah, Beirut, or Qatar to write about who she is and 
what she does into her performances. She is still Roula, but she is pan-
ning her roles on a wide screen for her audience to indulge in her dif-
ferent performance roles. Strathern suggests that to think about agency 
as the “subject in subject/ object relations” means that we can apply this 
idea regardless of “whether the subject is a person acting ‘subjectively’ 
or whether ‘causes’ lie in systems or social forces.”29
Laura Marks in her book The Skin of the Film, appeals to the work of 
Middle Eastern filmmakers to visually express her concept of the haptic. 
One of those films is I wet my hands etched and surveyed vessels marked 
eyed inside. Laura Marks describes the film as one that appeals to an em-
bodied memory by bringing vision as close as possible to the image: by 
converting vision to touch. Vision is brought close to the body and into 
contact with other sense perceptions, by making vision multi-sensory. 
This is done in part by refusing to make the images accessible to vision, 
so that the viewer must resort to other senses, such as touch, in order to 
perceive the images. An example from the film, are the shots of bomb-
pocked walls, where the camera treats them like bodies, caressing the 
buildings, searching the corners of shutters and stone latticed windows 
like folds of skin.30
In her essay titled “Signs of the Times: Deleuze, Pierce and the Docu-
mentary Image”, Marks uses Deleuze’s cinematographic philosophy and 
the Bergsonian impact on his philosophy to claim that affection images 
like the ones in I Wet My Hands Etched and Surveyed Eyes Marked Inside, 
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refer explicitly to a relationship between the ‘body’ of the image and the 
body of the viewer. Affection images ask to be felt, and in being felt they 
often are actualised in movement.31 The images might ask to be read, but 
only by the whole body, as a bodily contemplation.
The affection images in Wet My Hands Etched and Surveyed Eyes 
Marked Inside, such as, the long nailed fingers caressing the Caesarean 
scar, invite a bodily response–a shudder, perhaps-but they do not ex-
tend into movement. Rather they are followed by an irrational cut (to 
the windows, themselves like scars) that invites continued, embodied, 
contemplation. Thus the affection-image is what Deleuze calls the cer-
emonial body. It offers a time-image that is both experienced in the body 
and invites a direct experience of time.32
Starting Early-Let my body take me to a place of  
knowing-Embodied Education and Inquiry.
The impossible pedagogy is only possible in the concrete. It is perfectly 
cited in this quote: ‘get a life before you get a theory’33
How can our conception of the body, and its proximity to being, 
and knowledge translate into the everyday? Outside of philosophy and 
outside of art?
Within the daily business of ‘bringing up’ the next generation, the 
school as an educational institution can play a profound role. Is the pos-
sibility of a bodily proximity possible within an impossible pedagogy 
and an embodied education?
As an educator and student I have been involved within the teaching 
of children for the past 19 years. Throughout this period the philosophy 
of education and pedagogical methods have changed but not dramati-
cally. I am privileged to teach in a private institution to the privileged 
few where we are provided with ample resources, thorough training 
and somewhat decent wages. The students we teach come from wealthy 
families. Their lives are highly structured, where even extracurricular ac-
tivities and hobbies are within a structure of lessons, competitions, and 
are always heavily guided. Furthermore they are often taken care of by 
‘nannies’ where they acquire the art of ‘learned-helplessness’.
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When I was introduced to the International Baccalaureate for Pri-
mary Years, I found my calling as an educator. The program was phi-
losophy-based, conceptually loaded and inquiry was the preferred ap-
proach to learning. The students are encouraged to inquire into what 
is meaningful to them and to strive to become internationally minded 
individuals who fit a profile of a committed, caring individual who is 
not afraid to take action in order to make the world a better place.
Furthermore, the teacher is a learner alongside the students and not 
an all-knowing subject! This is reminiscent of Heidegger’s understand-
ing of the role of the teacher as a facilitator and similarly to the student, 
is a member of the community of learners.34 “IB learners strive to be: In-
quirers, Knowledgeable, Thinkers, Communicators, Principled, Open-
minded, Caring, Risk-takers, Balanced, and Reflective.”35
In this program, free and open inquiries are valued as much as struc-
tured and guided inquiry. The bottom line of any unit we teach is al-
ways conceptual understanding, with primary focus on self-reflection.
These themes promote an awareness of the human condition and an un-
derstanding that there is a commonality of human experience. The students 
explore this common ground collaboratively, from the multiple perspectives 
of their individual experiences and backgrounds.36
Furthermore, differentiating instruction with our students is encour-
aged as different students learn in different ways including kinaestheti-
cally (by bodily ‘doing’).37 “Students are making connections between 
life in school, life at home and life in the world.”38
At the Age of Breath conference, held in Portoroz, Slovenia in May, 
2010, Tomaž Grušovnik presented a paper titled ‘Embodied Education 
For Environmental Ethics’. He outlines the fact that we are living in en-
vironmental denial. We refuse to acknowledge the problem of environ-
mental deterioration because it would be a denial of our own identity. 
He goes on to say: “If we are to get people to act we need an embodied, 
experiential education to engage people.”39 My learning engagements 
with my students and others teachers in my school came to mind when 
I heard this.
Although Grušovnik focuses on environmental ethics when he talks 
about embodied education, he also outlines that an embodied educa-
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tion first and foremost allows the possibility of overcoming the denial 
of a new identity. 40
Through these experiences the child develops a dynamic relation-
ship with her own body in the process of a learning environment. To 
use one’s body in order to interact with objects, nature, and others, the 
child will learn to trust his/her own body. This trust in oneself as a body 
could lead to a confidence to act. Fred Isseks in his book, Media Cour-
age: Impossible Pedagogy in an Artificial Community, critiques the typical 
American High School. He writes it is a place that places emphasis on 
individualism, competitiveness, authoritarianism, alienation and moral 
indoctrination.41 What if we were to insert the term ‘chora’ here in its 
feminine understanding into the existing school spirit? What would be 
the outcome?
Isseks describes the outcome as the “birthing place of understanding 
and creativity, more receptive, winnowing, nurturing, passive, expec-
tant … .” 42 For Isseks, within the cracks in the facades, in the corridors, 
and between the bricks there is the (im)possibility of a Paideia that en-
tertains a chora i.e. a school spirit. Finally, Isseks concludes his book 
with the question: “Why struggle to realise an impossible Paideia when 
it is … impossible?” He answers: “The goal of the impossible Paiedia is 
not impossible. It is not the creation of a community, nor is it absolute 
self-discovery. Rather it is a process of unfolding and opening”.43 Schir-
macher expresses this when he says: “the post-modern decision is about 
becoming a player rather than a spectator”.44
Isseks writes: the impossible Paideia is about coming of age, of par-
ticipating openly in an open community.
The aim is to help students see the connections between themselves and 
their surroundings. the hope is that these connections will evoke a more en-
gaged sense of community … . The other hope is that students will come to 
better appreciate their corner of the earth, both physical and virtual.45
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Back to basics-breathe in breathe out- Looking out,  
by looking in-Self Affection
The dilemma that we will always face is the imposition of ideology 
and its hegemonic grip on all that we are and all that we do. Is it pos-
sible to speak and be heard outside ideology? Within the school envi-
ronment, within the art world, within the freedom square? In my view, 
Irigaray’s ‘looking-in’ is one potential possibility. “Sexual difference is 
an immediate natural given and it is a real and irreducible component 
of the universal. The whole of human kind is composed of women and 
men and of nothing else.”46
For Irigaray, bodily proximity to an-other is only possible if one first 
forms a relationship with his/her own self. She calls this self-affection 
and it begins with the premise we are men and women first and fore-
most with two different bodies. She goes on to say: “Without sexual 
difference, there would be no life on Earth. It is the manifestation of 
and the condition for the production and reproduction of life. Air and 
sexual difference may be the two dimensions vital for/to life”.47 Men 
and Women comprise two different bodies and at least two ways of 
being, knowing, speaking, spiritualising “There are always at least two 
worlds.”48
In a lecture presented at the Age of Breath conference, Irigaray de-
scribes self-affection as: the real dwelling to which we must always return 
with a view to faithfulness to ourselves and our inability to welcome 
the other as different. Dwelling within one’s own self affection, open-
ing oneself requires us to return our original ‘home’ to a natural human 
identity.49 Two universals: women and men. Self Affection helps us to 
grow and meet with the other without losing oneself and annihilating 
the other. “The woman would not have to quit her body … . Her task 
would be, rather, to make divine this world-as body, as cosmos, as rela-
tions with others”.50 “The human real is formed by two subjects, each 
one irreducible to the other”.51 We can now move towards an encoun-
ter with an other without being consumed by him/her. We both have 
something to say, feel, offer. “I enter another space in which the field of 
attraction and orientation no longer obeys a single focus. I am no longer, 
in some way, the center of the world or the center of the unique world, 
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even if this world has been inhabited before me. Desire attracts me to 
the other and tries to attract the other towards me.
There is a possibility of an ethical relationship in what Irigaray calls 
the age of breath: “our epoch has to return to an awareness and to cul-
tivation of the breath before and beyond any representation and dis-
course.”52 Breathing is the first autonomous gesture. Without a culti-
vation of breathing women and men cannot reach a human relation. 
Maternity is the invisible sharing of breath and soul.53
This epoch is the age of breath, an age where the body, silence and 
listening are paramount in establishing a possibility of an ethical gesture 
between two.
Regarding the body, Irigaray writes: “I am thinking of certain tradi-
tions of yoga that I know something of, cultures where the body is cul-
tivated as body … . In these traditions, the body is cultivated to become 
both more spiritual and more carnal at the same time”.54 That is to say, 
we need to cultivate a sensory perception, and in my perception of the 
other I need to be careful not to appropriate the other. I can never per-
ceive the other completely. I approach the other as an embodied subject. 
Perception must maintain duality. We have to remain two in bodies if 
our aim is for a shared world.
In silence, “Relations between two different subjectivities cannot be 
set up starting from a shared common meaning, but rather from a si-
lence which each one agrees to respect in order to let the other be.”55 
His silence is what we offer to each other as world of welcome. It is a 
place where the other can exist and be. Finally, listening to the other is 
a double listening: to the language we already dwell in as well as to the 
language of the other. The listening takes place in the conjunction be-
tween where we can approach one another.
“How can we be formed?” Irigaray states: “The we comes from the 
two. Women and men will have to be granted a new identity, a natural 
and spiritual one, and not hobble along one foot in pure nature (repro-
duction), the other in an abstract culture, if we is to be formed … . Be-
ing we means being at least two, autonomous, different.”56
“The aim of education is to create citizens fit to govern in freedom”.57
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What is the aim of revolution? What is the aim of freedom? 
Libya-an ideological paradise-our bodies ensure our exclusion
On October 29th, 2011, in his first public speech, after the so-called 
success of the Libyan revolution, the head of the interim government, 
Mr. Mustafa Abdel-Jalil, cleared the way for unrestricted polygamy in 
a Muslim country where it has been limited and rare for decades … . 
“Shariah allows polygamy,” he said. 58
FREEDOM in capital letters has come to Libya and with it the right 
to Polygamy. Is that the Freedom that the Western allied forces were 
funding and supporting? How can Libyan women enter this realm of 
Freedom if their bodies are denied access? What bodily freedom have 
they gained/lost?
As Jean Luc Nancy wrote about anger being the first political emo-
tion. Mr. Abdel Jalil your words have made me angry. But more so they 
have made me very happy.
I am happy because you have reminded me of what I was about to 
forget. Dizzy from the excitement of revolution and freedom I almost 
forgot who you are? What you represent, what ideology do you propa-
gate and dwell in? What language do you speak? What gives you the 
right to speak on behalf of the Libyan women about their bodies?
It is now time for Libyan women to have their say, and you have 
made this possible. So thank you again Mr. Abdel-Jalil. You have pro-
vided the urgency for the possibility of change.
To remain faithful to herself, to turn back to herself, within herself, to be 
born again free, animated by her own breath, her own words, her own gestures: 
this corresponds to the most decisive conquest for women. And to speak of 
woman’s liberation, women’s liberation, without such a course, such autono-
my, is not possible.59
Is this the advice that Irigaray would give Libyan women in their 
quest for freedom?
* Roula Haj-Ismail is currently pursuing a Ph.D. in Media and Communications at the Eu-
ropean Graduate School, Saas-Fee, Switzerland. She teaches at the International College, Beirut, 
Lebanon.
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T a d a s h i  O g a w a *
“Listening not to me but to the Logos it is wise to agree that all things are 
one.” Heraclitus, Fragment 50 (Diels-Kranz).
To Dean Komel with a lot of memories in Kyoto, Ljubljana and Koper
I am from the land of the tragic earthquake on March 11, 2011. For 
Professor Dean Komel’s efforts in arranging this trip to Slovenia, I am 
very grateful, but at the same time, I am full of sorrow thinking of my 
friends in Tokyo and Sendai who have experienced this tragic catastro-
phe. The preparations for this trip to Slovenia took place long before 
the earthquake. Considering all that has occurred since this visit was 
proposed and the current circumstances in which I stand is an example 
of relation-thinking; it is the means by which the distant comes near. 
This relation-thinking is the theme of my talk today. I always think that 
the philosophical thinking is universal and not regional. As you know, 
there are always two movements in philosophy. On the one hand, there 
is the Euro-centric efficiency in the Hegel worldview or the Euro-centric 
finality of Husserl, who – in the interpretation of Klaus Held – insisted 
on the Europeanization of mankind. On the other hand, I would like 
to insist on the simultaneous happening of Europeanization and de-
Europeanization in the world. That is the happening of the relation.
In this article I would like to talk about my confrontation with Eu-
ropean philosophy. If a Japanese philosopher speaks of confrontation, 
then you will expect that I will give prominence to the historical tra-
dition of Japanese or East-Asian thought. But this is not the direction 
I want to take the discussion. My aim lies in a higher dimension. It is 
the global dimension of philosophy and thinking. Philosophy is, as I 
am convinced, an international and common spiritual activity of hu-
man being. Although philosophy is originally from archaic Greece, there 
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were at the same time great thinkers in India and China considering the 
relation of humans and the world, nature and the cosmos. Regarding 
methodology and terminology there were certainly great differences, but 
it is clear that at the level of questions, the matters about which they 
wondered—these were the same: the relation of Humans and Nature, 
Mankind and the Cosmos.
My aim in this article is firstly to elucidate the possibility of Global 
philosophy explicitly and secondly to explicate the relation of Global phi-
losophy to the embodied existence of mankind. This discussion will be 
an attempt at a fundamental synthesis of two directions in philosophy: 
world philosophy as objective sense and existential philosophy as sub-
jective sense, coming together through the viewpoint of the body-living 
flesh. Roughly said, the point of connection is my existential human 
l iving body-flesh. If this synthesis can be achieved, on the fundamental 
basis of my existence, I can think about the possibility of Global philoso-
phy. But first, I must explain what I mean by the technical terms: ‘body’ 
and ‘flesh’. I understand ‘body’ as a three-dimensional thing and ‘flesh’ 
as my subjective experience bound to the body. This subjective feeling 
is nothing other than my inner perception of my flesh. Otherwise put, 
it means “instinctively sensing and noticing”. Hermann Schmitz calls it 
“Spüren”. Plato and Aristotle explain the difference as that between the 
σωμα, soma and εμψυχον ον, empsychon on. The dimension of the living 
flesh is all things intuitively and directly perceived in the human living 
flesh.
1.
Is philosophy regional or global? My answer to this question is that 
philosophy is global. I have two reasons for this answer: first from a his-
torical perspective and second from a systematic and factical-sachlich 
way of thinking. It is a historical fact that the concept of philosophy was 
founded by the ancient Greeks, especially by pre-Socratic philosophers 
such as Heraclitus, Parmenides, and post-Socratic philosophers such as 
Plato. Olof Gigon, a respected scholar of ancient Greek philosophy, once 
said that Heraclitus based his philosophical thinking on three principles 
of Greek culture, namely the Homeric epos (epic), Ionian natural sci-
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ence and the monotheism professed by Xenophanes. This movement of 
philosophy spread throughout the whole human world. Philosophy is 
an attitude of human being for the world, the thinking of the relation 
between Ego and world, as I will explain later.
To elucidate the concept of philosophy, I would like to gain a vantage 
point from the view of structural linguistics. The word philosophy is a 
kind of linguistic expression, a term or at any rate a literal sign. It has, 
as a sign, dual sides: signans and signatum. Signans is a series of voicings, 
letters, and phonemes. This signans brings the side of concept, signatum, 
with itself. Signatum is the concept of the word, the essential meaning 
of the signans.
Philosophy is a word, a linguistic element. As signans, philosophy is 
a series of letters or phonemes, “p-h-i-l-o-s-o-p-h-y” which means ac-
cording to its Greek etymology “love of wisdom” or “being friendly with 
knowledge”. What are we to make of these expressions? Once again in 
terms of structural linguistics, philosophy as signans is a historical notion 
developing since its origin in Hellenic culture meaning the logos of hu-
man being and nature (world) at the fundamental dimension. The Greek 
expression logos (λογος) means “relation” in English. “Relation-thinking” 
is the signatum of the concept of philosophy. Relation-thinking, however, 
between the Ego and the world is also found in India, China, Mesopota-
mia and also in the culture of the American Indians. The eminent English 
anthropologist, Radcliffe-Brown stated that the main thought of Hera-
clitus will be found in the traditional myths of American Indians. (The 
Comparative Method in Social Anthropology, Huxley Memorial Lecture 
for 1951.) They also think of logos as the coincidence of oppositions.
In the human world, intellectuals think of the relation between the 
Ego and the World, birth and death, the beginning and the end, the 
mode of my being in the world. Especially in the socio-ethical dimen-
sion concerning the relation of the Ego and others, Jesus Christ said to 
his disciples: “Treat others exactly as you would like to have them treat 
you.” (Luke, 6–31) When a disciple asked Confucius to give a word that 
one could live by unto death he answered: shu in Chinese, jyo in Japa-
nese. Jyo means originally that one sees one’s counterparts as oneself. 
Jyo means therefore to treat others with warmth and with friendliness. 
Confucius crystallized his thought in the following expressions: “Do 
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not treat others in ways that you would not want to be treated.” Con-
fucius and Jesus Christ say the same thing, but in different ways; Jesus 
expressed his thought positively and Confucius negatively. In ethics this 
maxim is called the Golden Rule, because this is the basic rule in human 
society, and abiding by this rule renders human beings as incorruptible 
as gold. The so-called Golden Rule is supposed to be in every human cul-
ture and society. It is related to the fundamental humanity of mankind.
What then is the Buddhistic Golden Rule? It is expressed by the dog-
ma of Jiri-Rita in Japanese, Atma-Hita—-Para-Hita in Sanskrit. Ji-ri 
(Atma-Hita) is self-benefit, and Ri-ta (Para-Hita) is the good for others. 
The spirit of Buddhism is this principle, self-benefit means at the same 
time the good for others. There is a relation of the self and others. My 
main point in this talk should now be obvious: the simultaneous hap-
pening of relation. This type of thinking is none other than Buddhism. 
There are several elements of relation-thinking in this religion, for ex-
ample, the thinking of Engi and Shoki. The en of Engi means that all 
things happen by direct or indirect causality, each is a condition of the 
other. Gi means happening, occurrence. The East is the co-relate of the 
West. Men only have meaning if there are also women. In Buddhism 
such relations are interpreted engi. It means the occurrence through the 
relation of two elements. Engi does not mean simple relative difference, 
but rather the structural relation of two elements in the wholeness: sim-
ultaneity. Engi is not simply a relation standing between the terms; it 
also subtends the relation and allows the relation to happen. The sho of 
Shoki means the true essence, the truth. Ki means the occurrence, the 
happening. Heidegger will express it das Ereignis. It is nothing other 
than the occurrence of the true self. In Buddhism, too, it is clear that 
the good for me means the benefit of others. With this thinking, it is 
clear that egocentrism, or selfishness, is not good and well to evaluate. 
The ideal human relation is, according to Buddhism, this simultaneous 
happening of self-benefit and the good for others.
What, then, are the concrete forms of relation that philosophers 
think about? As formerly mentioned, there are many kinds of relations 
in philosophy, the relation between the Ego and the world (the episte-
mological attitude in Husserl), the I and thou (social-phenomenologi-
cal attitude based on the intersubjectivity), and the living flesh and the 
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body (new phenomenological cosmology in my interpretation of Plato’s 
Timaeus and Philebos or “System der Philosophie” of H. Schmitz), and 
finally between birth and death (as in Heidegger’s Daseinsanalytik). You 
could increase this list with many examples and cases of the relational 
structure like parts and whole (as in Husserls 3rd Logical Investigation), 
love and hate (in Scheler’s and Schmitz’ phenomenology) and so on.
In this context I will mention that perhaps the most important dis-
cipline in philosophy, “ontology” is not universal and global. “Ontol-
ogy” is originally expressed as a technical term for the observation of 
statements like “it is”, “to be”, “beings” and so on. Indeed ontology is a 
very important technical term in the European philosophical tradition 
since Parmenides, the forefather of ontology. He stated, “being is and 
not-being is not” (χρη το λεγειν τε νοειν τ’ εον εμεναι εστι γαρ ειναι, μηδεν 
δε ουκ εστιν. Fragment, B6) Obviously this word “to be” is common in 
the Indo-European languages, Sanskrit (asmi), Greek (ειμι, εσμι), Latin 
(esse, est), English, German (Sein, ist) and French (être, est) and so on.
But in other cultures, we can find languages with no equivalent term 
for “is” or “being” or “to be”. The verb “to be” means simultaneously the 
existence of something and the predication. In the first case, you will say, 
the desk is in my hotel room. In the second, the desk is small. But in 
Chinese as well as in other languages, there is nothing that corresponds 
to the onto-logical signification of “is”. In Japanese, however, you will 
find the correspondence. “To be” corresponds in Japanese to “ari, are, 
araware”. Ari means existence and predicative function, are “to be born”, 
araware means to appear. Paradoxically the Japanese verb, ari is almost 
the same as what Heidegger says “to be”, namely Sein, means. Because 
of this difference of meaning in Chinese and the coincidence of mean-
ing in Japanese, we can say that the onto-logical meaning of “being” is 
neither universal nor particularly European. Therefore, we might have 
to dispose of the term “ontology”, if my thesis that philosophy obtains 
only when it is global is right. At the very least, we have to look further 
than ontology to find a truly global philosophical concern.
In my view, that concern is relation, or logos, which I understand as 
structure. The thinking of relation, or logos, is the core of philosophy. 
Philosophy is the thinking of “between”, namely: relation, logos, struc-
ture. The theme “thinking of the relation” transcends the binding nexus 
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to the cultural sphere. Transcendence is possible because of the insight 
into the identical structures in every culture, which is based on carrying 
out the re-thinking of the re-analysis of the most fundamental matters. It 
is not based on the correspondence of similarities. To count the similari-
ties in every culture is not philosophical thinking, but nothing other than 
taxonomy which is a species of empirical research. Empirical research will 
count the facts and enlarge the stock of factual knowledge. The act of 
counting facts has nothing to do with philosophical evidence. It is jux-
taposition of facts. What then is philosophically worthy in a philosophi-
cal method that elucidates and observes the identity in the difference?
As a Husserlian scholar, I would like to emphasize that every philo-
sophical truth must be based on a rigorous method and not on con-
tingent happenings. “To emphasize” or “to place the emphasis on” is 
etymologically derived from a special kind of insight: to let something 
appear well (εμφασις–εμφαινειν). This method is therefore the process 
by which the essential relation or structure becomes clear. What then is 
this method of elucidation in concrete terms? It is, as I think, the meth-
od of free variation which Husserl established. I can grasp the essential 
structure of something through the steps of going-through it in possible 
permutations. At the beginning I must see a factual thing as a starting 
point of free variation; then proceed with the variations. Variant (a) will 
produce variant (b) on the basis of insight into the similarity of both 
variants. The production of variant (b) means that I have insight into 
the identity between both. As I think, the prediction or assumption that 
there must be an essential structure between two variants is a necessary 
presupposition. This presupposition sees beforehand the orientation and 
production of the free variation. This foresight is decisively important. 
This insight is the activity of seeing through (noein: νοειν). This noein, 
direct intuition into the unity of difference is, I will say with Heraclitus, 
logos. Logos and nous are co-primordial.
I have once co-edited a volume of the American philosophical jour-
nal “The Monist” on the topic of “Cultural Universals”. According to 
my thesis on the Husserlian method of free variation as the intuition of 
essence, there are three stages:
(1) I begin with some thing: For example a table, given in perception 
or imagination. I then allow this example to vary in my mind along 
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all conceivable dimensions, but always in such a way that it remains a 
table. Such variation is a potentially endless open process. Its openness 
is shown in the fact that the real or imagined example that is taken as 
starting point is chosen arbitrarily.
(2) Through all the differences that are yielded by the performance of 
variation there will be some invariance—there will be an overlapping, 
or “coupling”, as Husserl calls it. The progression of variants converges 
around what is common in all the variants and there is generated there-
by a unity which binds them together. Starting with a particular table 
which we see, and going through a series of other tables which we also 
see or merely imagine, we eventually arrive at the eidos “table” as “this 
here necessarily common structure”. If we started a new process of vary-
ing with a new example of a table, we should discover that the two pro-
cesses merge into one as far as their result is concerned, that the variants 
occurring in either are those of one common eidos.
(3) The identity of the overlapping moments is then grasped by active 
intuition. This identity is the eidos. In grasping it, intuitions which come 
from the empirical level of what is spatio-temporally defined begin to 
transcend this dimension and take in what is ideal.
Husserl’s phenomenology has many, different moments and moti-
vations. His philosophical method is, as I interpret it, originally and 
essentially almost the same throughout his life, although he allowed a 
historical and genetic aspect of the essential intuition in his later stage 
of life. This thesis was constantly alluded to in his posthumous works 
such as the “Krisis”. It is very similar to the eidos-theory of Plato. Then 
what is the so-called Platonism in Husserl? That is this doctrine of eidos, 
essence or the identical entity which he saw in everything. This eidos, 
this identity is “everywhere and nowhere” as essence. It is the synthesis 
of the individual and the universal, namely the genos which I would like 
to express with the term “structure”.
Plato nurtured philosophical thinking from three traditions, namely 
poetry (Homer and Hesiodos), natural science (Thales and the Ionian 
school) and monotheism (Xenophanes and Parmenides). In this genetic 
and historical sense, philosophy was originally bound to the regional 
tradition of philosophy. This regionalism insisted that Europe, espe-
cially Greece, is the homeland of philosophy. But I must inquire: Is 
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philosophy totally a European happening as Nietzsche or Heidegger 
insisted? I will not agree with this attitude of Nietzsche or Heidegger, 
although Nietzsche and Heidegger are for postmodern people now the 
most popular and authoritative thinkers. Therefore you may ask why I 
differ from the prevailing view.
My argument for this position is as follows: As mentioned previ-
ously, the essence of philosophy is relation-thinking. The problem of 
relation-thinking is, however, in every culture, that is to say it is global. 
Philosophy is a global event. The transcendence of one’s own culture is 
for the culture itself a kind of self-negation. Asia was as matter of fact 
Europeanized. The Euro-centrism of Europe must deny itself and tran-
scends to the global dimension which I name de-Europeanization. Par-
allel to these phenomena, as matter of facts, there is the simultaneous 
happening of de-Europeanization and Europeanization. This encounter 
and crossover of two movements is what Max Scheler called “Ausgleich”.
The progression of “Ausgleich” in human society is the fate of man-
kind. In the 20th and now 21st century mankind has arrived at a very com-
plicated stage in human history. That step is characterized as the simul-
taneous existence of differences and identity. For example, in his lecture 
“Der Mensch im Zeitalter des Ausgleichs”, given at the beginning of the 
20th century, Scheler predicted that the contradiction between elites and 
democracy will be nullified, women will be like men, the opposition of 
Marxism and Capitalism will be neutralized, and the difference between 
the West and the East will be overcome. These phenomena will be found 
in every cultural sphere of Mankind. This neutralization and overcoming 
of every difference is Ausgleich. We can understand it as “re-conciliation”.
The new tendency and spirit of re-conciliation between every contra-
diction is, as I hope, now able to be positively postulated. Now in this 
new age of 21st century mankind should come to the global dimension 
of philosophy.
2.
From this point of view, e.g. from the global philosophy, how can 
I understand the property of my existence, or my “Jemeinigkeit” in the 
sense of Martin Heidegger? My proper existence cannot be exchanged 
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with another person, let alone with others. The truth of my proper exis-
tence is what I am living in every moment, now and here in the world. 
This notion of my proper existence in the sense of Martin Heidegger is 
understandable only through the way of focusing on the living flesh or 
my living body. What then is the I? The ego possessing my viewpoint 
in the world is existential. My viewpoint is defined as Here-Now-Indi-
vidual. This definition: Here-Now-Individuality shows that my living 
flesh is situated in the world as a viewpoint. This point is not a geomet-
ric point, but it has the thickness of my bodily functions, for example, 
the use of my eye, arm and so on. My eyes are embedded in my living 
flesh. The eyes without a body are impossible. We cannot imagine the 
eyes without the body in which the eyes are embedded. The eyes which 
are not embedded in the living flesh could not see anything. And on 
the other hand, in Japan we will say: if the mind were not here in living 
flesh then one cannot see anything.
My point of view is, however, for the observation of the world noth-
ing but the narrow and compact point. My living flesh at the starting 
point of the worldview means therefore a compact and narrow point. 
Imagine how your living flesh would cringe if you happened upon an 
escaped tiger. Due to shock and anxiety, your perceptual and conscious 
field would deflate into a narrow and focused view of the impending 
danger.
On the other hand, imagine that you are lying on the gentle slope 
of a hill under the spring sunshine, then your living flesh will relax and 
expand into the outer world. You would like to breathe in the spring 
breeze; your spirit and living flesh will be greater and lighter in the en-
vironment, floating to the utmost horizon. Not only your conscious-
ness but also your living flesh itself will become identical with the whole 
world.
There are two extremes in the modes of appearance of living flesh: 
contraction and expansion, or more exactly contracting and expand-
ing. It is a movement of two directions, widening from me to the outer 
world and on the other hand, narrowing from the outer environment 
to my viewpoint.
If you breathe air into your body, then you will be expanded. But 
simultaneously you have some tension of the stomach muscles and you 
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are, as a whole spirit, at the same time fore-shortened and narrowed to 
a point. To inhale and to exhale is the act by which human beings con-
tinue to live in this world. You must take another breath in order to live 
another moment. As I said previously, the flesh is not the same as the 
three dimensional body but a movement of spirit or air—the “Breath” 
of life. The ancient Greeks called this pneuma, and the same thing is ex-
pressed in Chinese by the word qi and in Japanese by the word ki. (cf. 
my book, Grund und Grenze des Bewusstseins, Würzburg 2001, p. 107 ff.) 
In this paper, I will use the English word “Breath” with a capital “B“ to 
express the sense of the ancient Greek word pneuma, the Chinese-Jap-
anese sense of qi-ki and my own idea of the living-flesh. I have chosen 
to use this English word rather than Latinate possibilities such as effla-
tion, perflation, sufflation, etc. because the Old English root combines 
both directions of contraction and expansion, while the words based 
on “flare” tend to express only one direction and also tend to have very 
materialistic, medical meanings. For the opposite reason, Latinate words 
based on “spirare” such as respiration, inspiration, expiration, etc. are 
weighted too much on the side of the soul.
What is the essence of this qi-ki? It is not something purely material, 
nor something pure spiritual. It is something material to the extent that 
a breath has the force to flutter the flame of a candle. At the same time, 
it is something spiritual and ideal because it is the force of life pushing 
on from one moment to the next. This movement of Breath belongs to 
the whole world and makes the unity of the world. The essence of this 
pure experience of the world is “atmosphere.” The atmosphere which 
I experience is always directly above the difference of spirituality and 
materiality. This atmosphere is the Breath, qi-ki that fills the world. You 
can live because of this Breath, on the ground of this spirit.
When you breathe in, you will be unified with the outer world 
through the breathing. When you breathe out, the Breath is moved 
from the inside of your body into the outer environment. This move-
ment shows the direction of air. It is from the body to the outer world. 
What does this direction mean? The direction is the neutralization of the 
opposition of the compact and expansive point of view, the narrowing 
and widening of the inner and outer world. The difference of inner and 
outer would be neutralized by the act of breathing. It is the synthesis of 
173
G L O B A L  P H I L O S O P H Y  F R O M  T H E  V I E W P O I N T  O F  L I V I N G  F L E S H
the flesh and the outer environment. You will feel in the flesh brightness 
and a loosening of restraints. The direction of the Breath, this movement 
of Breath from my flesh to the outer world is the synthesising direction 
of the inner and outer world. This synthesis is nothing other than the 
neutralisation of binary oppositions of outer and inner world.
You can now understand the wide sense of my concept “Flesh”. My 
own flesh and blood is not the body, not the three dimensional thing, 
but it is a movement of Breath, because it is the spirit which can be un-
derstood as the true sense of synthesis of the inner and outer world; The 
Breath is qi or the spirit of every body. Jesus said, “The wind blows where 
it wills, and you hear the voice of it, but you do not know, whence it 
comes and or whither it goes; so it is with everyone who is born of the 
Spirit.” (John, 3–8) The Spirit and the Breath is the same word: pneuma. 
The spirit is the Breath. And everyone is an existence of Breath qua 
Spirit, or in ancient Greek pneuma, πνευμα, the movement of “expand-
ing and contracting”. Everybody is the ek-sistence from Breath which 
is ek-sistence into Breath. Everyone is the ek-sistence from Breath into 
Breath. Everybody is transition from the Breath and spirit into the 
Breath and spirit. Therefore the Japanese people think in the theory of 
Shintoism, for example in the book of Hayashi Razan’s “Shinto-Denju”, 
that humans are both before birth and after the death a spiritual god. 
Only while humans are alive do they think of death, but death is not 
the end of life, but rather the beginning of another life. (cf. my book, 
Grund und Grenze des Bewusstseins, Würzburg 2001, p. 107 ff.)
Relation-thinking is structural thinking. It focuses on the logos as re-
lation of the opposition of the inner and outer world, parts and whole, 
ego and world, ego and the others, and life and not-life. What then is 
the ego? The ego possesses my viewpoint to the world. And this view-
point is possible only in the systematic relation with others.
If it is argued that my emphasis on relation and logos is a species of 
logo-centrism, then I would reply that I do not use these words in the 
sense criticised by Derrida. This criticism is mainly directed at a histori-
cal tradition from Heraclitus to Hegel that puts structure at the center 
of European philosophy. But we must proceed from “the things them-
selves” that is, not how things stand within a particular tradition but 
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how they stand before all humanity. My proposal of a Global philosophy 
draws on both European and non-European philosophy.
Global philosophy stands on both the logos, ratio and structural 
thinking of Western thinking and the Japanese understanding of “ri”. 
And as mentioned above, this same thinking can be found in American 
Indian culture as well as the Chinese notion of Yin-qi and Yang-qi. The 
cultural invariance in all these expressions is: “the unity of contradic-
tion”, or in other words, the fact that two things, no matter how dif-
ferent, nonetheless exist in unity. Derrida rightly criticises the West-
ern onto-logical tendency to brush aside difference in its rush to unity 
through a superficial equivalence or equivocation, but even in this tra-
dition, things are not always so simplistic. Goethe once sang about the 
leaf of a gingko tree in this way:
“Dieses Baums Blatt, der von Osten
Meinem Garten anvertraut,
gibt geheimen Sinn zu kosten,
Wie’s den Wissenden erbaut.
Ist es ein lebendiges Wesen,
das in sich selbst getrennt?
Sind es zwei, die sich erlesen,
Dass man sie als eines kennt?
Solche Fragen zu erwidern,
Fand ich wohl den rechten Sinn:
Fühlst Du nicht an meinen Liedern,
Dass ich eins und doppelt bin?”
To overcome logo-centrism Derrida must presuppose the logos-
structure of language. It is impossible for him to oppose this in any 
other way than by speaking and writing in language. For his thought 
to be thinking at all, he has to allow the ratio of language to have some 
sway, and this can be seen first of all in Derrida’s attempt to discuss 
the matter with another. Moreover, Derrida does not reach out to any 
random other, but his remarks are pointedly directed to a specific com-
munity—philosophers, who are most mindful of the logos or structure 
of language.
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Contra Derrida we can say, the criticism of the so-called logo-cen-
trism of European philosophy has no object, then philosophical think-
ing is always logo-centric and we have no other way than to deal with 
logos, structure, language and dialogue. We have to put a simple but 
definite question: What enables us to philosophize with each other? 
What is the condition of the possibility of philosophical thinking? It is 
language, conversation and dialogue among ourselves. Language is al-
ways the presupposition of thinking and persuading.
What is then the origin of philosophical thinking? It is the disciple-
teacher relation. And the medium of this relation is language and the 
energy that sets this relation to work is structure.
The dialogue of teacher and disciples is the presupposed condition of 
the possibility of philosophy. Therefore it is not an accident that the first 
recordings of the thoughts of Socrates, Confucius and Mencius appear 
in the form of dialogues. In this sense, both European and Eastern phi-
losophy is, if I can call the latter philosophy, logo-centric, or structural 
thinking. And as I have already remarked, the primary topic of these 
earliest and universal discussions is the unity of contradictions.
In this sense, Kitaro Nishida, the founder of the Kyoto school of 
Japanese philosophy, expressed the essence of the life as the “self-identity 
of absolute contradictions”. It is Heraclitus who insisted that existent 
things are brought into harmony by the clash of opposing currents. He 
said, he had no teacher and he declared that he inquired into himself 
and learned everything from himself and above all in the medium of 
language. His influence is so strong among the Stoic philosophers that it 
came to define the separation of the common nature and human nature 
through the Stoic philosophers. It is perhaps the origin of the subject-
object separation.
The beginning of philosophical thinking is the dialogue of teacher 
with disciples. Without language this thinking is impossible. The me-
dium of the relation of teacher-disciples is possible by and through lan-
guage. Language is the medium of this relation. The medium as lan-
guage enables the structure of teacher-disciples. That Derrida is regarded 
as an important philosopher owes to the fidelity with which his disciples 
promote his ideas. His unique standing as an individual depends on his 
diffusion through the coherent voices of his disciples.
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What is then the ego? The ego possesses my viewpoint in the world. 
It is the ek-sistence transcendence to the world. My viewpoint to the 
world is defined as here-now-individual which you can understand in 
the sense of the “Jemeinigkeit” of Martin Heidegger. My living body, 
my living flesh and blood is the starting point of my understanding of 
this world. Without this flesh which I perceive directly in my body I 
cannot exist in this world. From the window of my study I can see the 
three trees outside of the house. It means these trees could appear from 
another side quite differently. My viewpoint is lived and experienced 
originally by me.
My question now is: How can I reconstitute the sense of world 
for everyone? In which sense can our world be reconstituted from the 
Breath-flesh (Fuh-tei) of everyone? The world appearance could be 
gained by singing. Whether solo or choral, singing implicates three ele-
ments: breathing, voice and the sense of song. Every song has original 
meaning. Singing together is being with each other in the same song. 
You must express voice through sending Breath and getting the Breath.
What is breathing? As I mentioned above it is the movement of 
Breath between the inside and outside of the body, and this is the oc-
currence of qi in the world. My body occupies the absolute place “here”. 
This absolute place means not a point like a geometric point but has 
endless depth and breadth in the world. Out of the viewpoint of qi the 
every individual body is identical with the whole wide world. The whole 
wide world signifies the expanse of my flesh. The body as flesh swells and 
flows to the ends of the world. Body-states appear in the awareness of 
powers in the body: the awareness of hunger, vigor, fatigue or languor.
The founder of the phenomenological movement, Edmund Husserl, 
was always grasped by two motivations. On the one hand, he sought 
new ideas, and on the other hand, he interpreted his new creative ideas 
in terms of his perennial scheme of thinking. Therefore we must always 
interpret the Husserlian texts with two attitudes, namely “with Husserl” 
and at the same time “against Husserl”. This was the maxim of Ludwig 
Landgrebe, one of his best disciples.
The phenomenological concept of the body in the Husserlian sense 
lies in the consciousness of the spontaneity: I-move-myself. But the 
phenomenology of qi and global phenomenology elucidates the fun-
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damental base of this spontaneous body concept. At the base of the 
spontaneous body, there is also passivity. The passiveness of the body 
means the direct influence of the contact of inner and outer world. It 
is the relation of my flesh-body and the world. This relation is noth-
ing but the appearance of qi and atmosphere which is the most passive 
and deep dimension of the body and the world. The same idea can be 
found in Plato’s Timaeus. Expiration and inspiration, the movement of 
Breath, the pneuma between the world and me appears as the deepest 
dimension of physis.
Atmosphere shows itself as the pre-predicative and even evident logos 
of world. I think Hermann Ammann provides an excellent descriptive 
analysis of the relation of logos and mood. In the dark, children will sing 
loudly because the sound of their own singing voice dispels the atmos-
phere or the mood of solitude. By singing a song or whistling which is 
nothing but the activity of breath and qi one escapes his own solitude. 
The song is a language. The unity of atmosphere with language, that is, 
the pre-logical logos of world is elucidated by him as choral language.
For example, consider this situation: A group of men are waiting for 
a train while a gale howls around them. The delay of the train infects 
them with irritation. One man’s grumbling is implicitly understood by 
the others, while another man voices his complaints explicitly. Both the 
linguistic utterances and the general atmosphere are experienced inter-
subjectively as an internal language form that Ammann calls “choral lan-
guage”. (Hermann Ammann, Die menschliche Rede, 1925, Wissenschaft-
liche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 1974, p.171 ff.) Hermann Ammann was 
a philosopher of language at Freiburg and a colleague of Husserl, who 
wrote a contribution to Husserl’s Festschrift.
This choral language will be accepted and strengthened in the real 
chorus of music. You can imagine that the above mentioned choral lan-
guage on the platform would be much more impressive if the people 
on the platform were to voice their criticisms by singing a song. This 
imagined chorus is nothing but a part of an opera. People sing at the 
same time with emphasis a lot meaningful songs. In everyday life, it 
happens quite often. I recently attended the funeral ceremony of one of 
my friends. The Catholic priest, along with other friends and relatives, 
sang songs together. This phenomenon of singing together was impres-
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sive. Not long ago, I saw a documentary on Japanese television about 
the Slovenian capital Ljubljana. This show was all the more impressive 
and sympathetic when a student choral group sang the national anthem. 
This tragic land which was always ruled over by foreigners, Romans, Ital-
ians and Austrians was, as you know, set free after the war of independ-
ence with Yugoslav National Army in 1991. Therefore I listened to the 
students singing the national anthem with keen interest.
How did this student chorus enhance the atmosphere of solidarity! 
The members of the chorus sang in the unity of the spirit and for the 
unity of the group, and this created an atmosphere of spiritual unity.
What kind of the atmosphere is decisive for the genesis of choral 
unity? The voice and the Breath, the breathing-out and breathing-in, in 
any event, the movement of Breath is possible as inspiration and expira-
tion. You and I sing, you and I both are singing together, we both have 
the same inspiration and expiration in the same time and in the same 
place and situation. At the same moment we sing together the same 
melody and music. We have the song and the singing in common. And 
the subject of the song symbolizes the unity of the nation and state. You 
and I, we sing together in the same situation. And you and I are the 
members of the same state and nation. To sing together is the making 
of one “Flesh” with each other. As bodies you and I are separate, but 
in the spirit we are the same. We breathe the same Breath and sing the 
same song, the national anthem.
How will the experience of “One Flesh” be generated out of many 
voices? Everybody is separated in a geometric sense, but they are the 
same and “One Flesh” in the spirit. This spirit is nothing other than the 
pneuma, the Breath. Everybody expresses his/her voice and expiration 
from his/her geometric body. The spirit, however, is mixed with each 
other in the same situation.
Otsu-Hieidaira, Sept. and Oct. 2011.
* Tadashi Ogawa is Professor Emeritus at Kyoto University, where he was Professor of Phi-
losophy in the Graduate School of Human and Environmental Studies and the Graduate School 
of Global Environmental Studies. Now, President of Coshien University, Takanazuka, Japan.
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Note: I first met the most important postmodern philosopher in 
1991, when he accepted my invitation to hold a lecture at the New 
School for Social Research in New York. That both of us work primar-
ily in phenomenology, and that Nietzsche and Heidegger strongly in-
fluenced our work, certainly contributed to a rapid deepening of our 
relationship. But more importantly, Lyotard was an extraordinarily ge-
nial and generous soul. Despite his immense workload of teaching du-
ties all over the world and his numerous publications, he took the time 
for a conversation with a younger philosopher. What is more, his feel-
ings of friendship motivated him to active support of my plans for an 
interdisciplinary doctoral program, one that conceives of media and 
communications in a philosophical and thus novel way. Lyotard was a 
member of the first American Council of the European Graduate School 
and was supposed to teach in Saas-Fee as well. His untimely death pre-
vented this, but his thinking continues to inspire us (see http://www.egs.
edu/jeanfrancoislyotard.html). The following excerpts, which appear for 
the first time in the Festschrift in honor of the phenomenologist Paolo 
Knill, another friend, are taken from a conversation held on April 22, 
1992 at Yale University, where Lyotard spent a semester as the Henry 
Luce Scholar at the Whitney Humanities Center. The discussion took 
place in English, a foreign language for both of us, and Lyotard never got 
the opportunity to edit the transcript. Video and tape recordings were 
made, and Lyotard expressly authorized me to change the wording to 
ensure that our philosophical points would prevail over any inadequa-
cies in the language we used in the discussion. It goes without saying 
that under these circumstances, I assume responsibility for the entire 
182
P O L I G R A F I
text. My paper “Homo Generator: The Challenge of Gene Technology” 
(1985) was the first of several publications that presented interim reports 
on my work that built upon Ereignis Technik: Heidegger and the Ques-
tion of Technology (1980) and Technik und Gelassenheit (1983). After 20 
years, the book Homo Generator: Ethics for an Artificial Life will appear 
in 2002, perhaps still too early.
Schirmacher: My phenomenological demonstration that the human 
being is first and foremost Homo generator can be all too easily mis-
understood. Even the explanatory subtitle “Ethics for an Artificial Life” 
runs the danger of being drawn into the ideologically charged contro-
versy around the natural and the artificial. The last thing I am trying 
to do is replace with virtual worlds the unfolding nature of the human 
and the environment! And the question of what ethics means demands 
immediate, if provisional, clarification; otherwise one would run astray 
in the search for some moral imperative, a “should,” for value systems 
or for natural law. Let us begin with artificiality. To this notion, whose 
usage today is limited to the sense of the fabrication and imitation, I 
give back its most important connotation: the proximity to art and 
autopoiesis. Artificiality is not a normed framework, not Heidegger’s 
Gestell, but points to the autopoietic praxis of art as its fundamental 
trait and includes within its scope surprise and fulfillment. Artificiality 
in this “founded” sense (Husserl) is charged with determining the con-
stitution of the human life-world, whose nature has always been and is 
completely engendered by us. As Homo generator we generate worlds 
with materials whose “what” is given but whose “how” we must invent. 
In the pre-technological age this generating of worlds was ascribed to 
the gods; at the climax of global mechanization, to the shamans of sci-
ence; and it is only now, in the encroaching post-technological epoch, 
that the immense world-engendering powers of Homo generator be-
come evident. This creation is by no means purely cerebral; neither is it 
limited to the realm of perception, but concerns the whole person and 
embraces embodiment and communal action as well. An artificial life 
is led as the art of life, by a person who exists authentically, whose ethic 
is anthropologically characterized by openness. Since the founding of 
the modern age by Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, this prospect has 
inspired daring projects in the most diverse minds. I mention here only 
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Hegel, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Bataille, Heidegger, Sar-
tre, Arendt, Foucault, Lacan, Levinas, and Deleuze.
My ethics for an artificial life lays the trace (Derrida) of a non-meta-
physical existence, for Homo generator becomes capable of a life af-
ter post-modernity within the scope of the post-technological world, 
which is separated from the technological age by an abyss encountered 
by Kierkegaard’s leap. Nevertheless, it is not the object of such theses to 
rehabilitate the obsolete notion of a universal philosophy. Rather, they 
have survived the postmodern criticism, which has made any reliance 
on authorities impossible and has destroyed the idea of a unified world-
view. Yet the indisputedly systematic extrication from the postmodern 
condition takes place via a postmodern decision, which—like my basic 
phenomenology of the post-technological world—does not propose a 
new being, a new history nor even a completely different world view. 
Rather, the situation can be viewed thus: the leap is imperceptible, the 
post-technological horizon goes unnoticed, and the ethical fulfillment 
behind our backs is barely noticeable. The seismographically recorded 
derangement is minimal, a turning-away from the mundane normality 
of the postmodern world toward an equally self-evident affirmation of 
artificial life. From the standpoint of cultural criticism, this affirmation 
obviously invites suspicion. But its beginnings can be observed in the 
first generation that grows up within the scope of the post-technologi-
cal horizon and does not even notice, for it knows nothing else. When 
all technologies are simply available without having been asked for, the 
time of self-enjoying hedonists (Deleuze) and “media monads” (Schir-
macher) has arrived. With the irresistible spread of western technologies, 
the leap to artificial life has become unavoidable for non-western cul-
tures as well, even if the speed and the intensity of this process may vary 
greatly. That anthropologically, we are the “artificial beings by nature” 
(Helmuth Plessner), unabashedly “eccentric” and anthropomorphic at 
once, precludes our development in the image of a cybernetic machine. 
While information technology and genetic technology are two of the 
most striking means to the active development of humanity and to the 
ethical realization of the art of life, the cyborg myth (Donna Haraway) 
must not be narrated metaphysically. For it is by no means a matter of 
bringing together the human and the machine, of engendering a hu-
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man-machine symbiosis, because the technologies themselves are always 
already our existential, autopoeitically authored acts, in which each ex-
istence itself is at stake. Robots as “mind children” (Hans Moravec) are 
unambiguously anthropomorphic, and therefore such questions that try 
to pass themselves off as ontological are in fact meaningless: “Is a cyborg 
a human or a machine?” “Does artificial intelligence represent the next 
stage of evolution?”
Lyotard: It is certainly possible to describe the human being as an 
artifact, for everything in the world is manufactured and therefore arti-
ficial. One could even view each living cell as a technical system in this 
sense: it is an open and complex system, always capable of generating 
energy and converting it into activity. Such a description, in the manner 
of system theory, is given preference in the natural and social sciences, 
and this is by no means accidental. From the smallest systems all the way 
up to the galaxies, one has a hypothesis at hand that enables one to un-
derstand everything, including the human being. Instrumental ration-
ality and causal thinking are elegantly avoided in the process, for these 
systems are not means to some purpose and therefore not instrumental 
(but rather possess instrumentaria of their own). The human system has 
produced computers and related information systems in order to satisfy 
a need—for informational knowledge—that previously lurked in the 
dark, thereby improving the quality of its own—human—activity. This 
novel knowledge then engenders a new kind of energy and transforms 
it energetically. When we, justifiably, view things in this way, then the 
whole world, including the human world, is artificial. Our idea of the 
cosmos, too, is necessarily implicated, for we cannot know what the 
cosmos-in-itself is. The concept of artificiality provides us with a good 
understanding of so-called reality as well as a practical, successful way 
of dealing with it.
Schirmacher: But would this interpretation of artificiality not deny 
its origin, which I find in the self-conception and in the capriciousness 
of the human being? [Bekäme nicht die Energie das Subjekt der Ent-
wicklung …] Would not energy become the subject of development, 
and would we not become sub specie aeternatatis a mere subsystem? 
What must be clarified above all is the extent to which any system the-
ory is dependent upon the notion of given laws and conditions, whereas 
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my idea of artificiality emphasizes the art of a fulfilling life, which must 
always generate its own context. Can Homo generator be a system?
Lyotard: In my view, neither the universal system nor the marginal 
system is subject to laws or determined by rules, and all the less so when 
we begin to consider complex systems. Extreme flexibility and funda-
mental indeterminacy characterize these systems, to which, as we are 
now beginning to understand, our brain belongs. Physical systems of all 
orders of magnitude obviously belong to this group of complex systems. 
Physicists maintain this curious differentiation between determined and 
undetermined loci, in the latter of which chance prevails. The human 
being is extraordinarily complex, the most complex life system we know, 
and this is so for the very reason that we possess the capacity for lan-
guage, and in language have a symbolic system at our disposal. That 
in the realm of language we find ourselves at a locus of indeterminacy, 
explains sufficiently why and how we experience our existence as open, 
why we must always first determine things, why we need our imagina-
tion, but also how our sense of responsibility came about. At the same 
time, it can be shown that the notion of systems having white spaces 
and abysses, loci that are not already determined, is by no means one 
that leads us astray.
Schirmacher: An open anthropology along those lines is what I have 
in mind, such as has been developed in Germany by Plessner, Ador-
no, and Ulrich Sonnemann and in France by Bataille, Lacan, Foucault, 
Deleuze, and Kristeva. But given your description, how could the charge 
of objectivism be refuted?
Lyotard: Every notion of objectivity or reality [… itself …] [sic] when 
the question of reality has to be posed each time anew by scientists. Is 
this chair real? What would “the reality of the chair” mean in micro-
physics? Not even our senses can answer this question any longer in the 
virtual world. The results of our perceptual activity are objects we form 
in an artificial manner with the help of our filters. Space and time, too, 
are formed in such a way as to make them useful—a human being, a 
cell, a butterfly, each mode of being manufactures its own reality (for 
the non-human world we naturally only assume this).
Schirmacher: In the natural sciences and to a certain extent in the so-
cial sciences as well there seems to be at least a reality substitute: what is 
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real is what I can calculate. This quantitative model of the world, which 
the use of computers has made dominant in society, is nevertheless in-
strumental, not artificial. In artificial life, only what my life [causes to 
be fulfilled; gelingen läßt] can count as real. A functioning information 
technology may well be a part of this, one that does not subject me to 
surveillance and coercion, but which supports my openness and pre-
pares the adventure of everyday life. Yet it seems to me that all informa-
tion which presupposes that something can be defined and depicted in 
numbers is capable only in extremely rare cases, if at all, of accounting 
for essential characteristics of a life. Essential action and thought aims 
at the ambiguous, the dark, the open, the exalted, and can never be cap-
tured by a halftone screen [raster].
Lyotard: Doesn’t this mean that you are clinging to the anthropologi-
cal notion of an existence of one’s own? You turn against a relativistic 
arbitrariness and likewise criticize the idea of an objective existence. On 
the one hand you think in a postmodern way, on the other hand your 
objections to my system-description could be an indication that you 
take up an existential position between subjectivism and objectivism 
which is close to that of the early Heidegger and Sartre as well.
Schirmacher: Not consciously at any rate! My fundamental phenom-
enology of the human being in the post-technological world has from 
its very starting point extricated itself from the dualisms of subjectivity 
vs. objectivity, and centrism vs. decentrism: whoever directs his gaze at 
the human being, and accepts oneself as evidence, finds no native trace 
of such dualisms whatsoever. Authentic human living is anthropomor-
phic living—one who so lives knows of no other world beyond the hu-
man horizon and can experience no phenomenon in any way other than 
in relation to himself. But the human being in his mortality in no way 
sees himself as the determining center, for fallibility, weakness, and un-
certainty are fundamental human characteristics. Nor is human natal-
ity any indicator of fecund subjectivity, seeing as each birth is attended 
by innumerable other phenomena that we “generate”—i.e. reap, urge 
onward, and liberate—in the sense of an ethics of fulfillment. Homo 
generator follows an “economy of extravagance” (Bataille), in which the 
self satisfies [complies with] the silence of language as well as the over-
exuberance of activity that laughs in the face of death. From Heidegger’s 
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projected model of “Being and Time,” what remains in the post-tech-
nological world is Sartre’s existential model, but this model, too, has 
changed radically. What once, as the “series of our deeds” was supposed 
to determine the essence of the human, neither possesses the inner con-
sistency that would render it capable of generating a series nor can it be 
limited to our deeds: a “reflexive apathy” (Jacques Poulain) denies itself 
to a consensus community devoted to whatever cause. To exist anthro-
pomorphically is for Homo generator nothing for which it must fight: 
in the face of the alienated versions of the anthropomorphic, from the 
gods to the notion of scientific objectivity, he remains calm [gelassen]. 
There is no bogeyman [scapegoat, Feindbild], nothing against which an 
ego itself would have to be constituted, but communication is in and 
of itself [von sich her] the platonic dialogue of the soul with itself, and 
the human being develops as a finite event [Ereignis] in the sense of the 
late Heidegger.
Lyotard: Thank you for this detailed representation, which allows me 
to pose a further question in reference to your concept of Homo genera-
tor: what do you mean by “generate?” One could very easily understand 
this process in the sense of system theory, and then Homo generator 
would succumb to the criticism to which you subjected the concept of 
system. Homo generator would be an abstraction, a species among oth-
er living species, and no one would be able to know or see this Homo.
Schirmacher: Homo generator is an open [determination, Bestim-
mung], a concept only now beginning to unfold, that might well be 
interrupted, to begin anew, and then perhaps double back. There exists 
no Homo yet, but rather he is a self-fulfilling prophecy. He generates 
himself in his most important technologies, once simply in breathing, 
sleeping, gathering food, procreating, fighting; today in solar technology 
as well, in genetic technology [biotechnology], and in the media. There 
exists for us the force, the power, and the opportunity to generate—that 
alone is what is referred to by the concept “Homo generator.”
Lyotard: But perhaps the will to power, as in Nietzsche’s Ecce Homo, 
is too strong as well?
Schirmacher: Nietzsche had the mentality of an artist, who creates 
his own aesthetic Olympus, and his will to power refers back to its en-
genderer, and is will to will, as Heidegger correctly saw it. Nevertheless, 
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I do not share Nietzsche’s optimism, for perhaps only a pessimist has the 
right to be optimistic, if you will allow this remark from the president 
of the International Schopenhauer Society. Even if Nietzsche, as hardly 
another philosopher did, precisely analyzed cultural nihilism as the ideo-
logical end of metaphysics, as a cultural critic he remains anthropocen-
tric. How does he know all that, and does he not overestimate the scope 
of his insights? My Homo generator is a single, unmistakable person, 
not a species. I myself exist not being-in-the-world in Heidegger’s sense, 
but am being-for-the-world (Deleuze).
Lyotard: Very well, if you withdraw to the position of being a per-
son, there are theoretically no problems: it is ethically accepted that 
the concept of person necessarily implies freedom, and responsibility as 
well, whose objects one can choose for oneself. But are you not afraid of 
making things too easy for yourself? Isn’t “person” a concept that every 
ethics presupposes?
Schirmacher: It’s not as simple as all that, for in the traditional un-
derstanding the freedom of the person is always limited, if perhaps only 
voluntarily, as in Nietzsche’s aristocratic ethics. There is a difference be-
tween “freedom from” and “freedom to”, and every society absolutely 
wants to regulate the latter (Isaiah Berlin). But even if one were to follow 
de Sade, and see oneself as being allowed, even morally compelled, to 
do what one is able to do, one would still remain unfree in the sense of 
Homo generator. Does my life achieve fulfillment? This is the only ethi-
cal question. Freedom is a secondary concern, for I must first find out 
how my life is to achieve fulfillment; i.e. is in the strict sense ethical. This 
is the most difficult task for Homo generator, for the war technology 
of metaphysics and all institutions established by it, from the family to 
the courts of law, intentionally confuse the ethical sense, which for this 
reason only small children exhibit in a completely unselfconscious way. 
The non-negotiable claims to justice, fulfillment, and proportion in a 
personal ethic of fulfillment are feared as asocial just as persistence, pru-
dence, composure [tranquility, Gelassenheit] and generosity are lauded 
as modes of the worlds of ethics. Simply perceiving whether my life is 
achieving fulfillment, and avoiding error in this judgment [not deceiv-
ing myself in the process], is the hard work that you mentioned in the 
postmodern context of justice. It is easy for anyone to maintain that he 
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has lived his life, but such a language game does not do justice to itself: 
for we cannot deny that we are for but a few moments certain of having 
truly and fully lived.
Lyotard: Very well, but what does it actually mean to live one’s own 
life? Would this refer to something beyond? Something that is more 
than mere existence, more than a being-here-and-nowhere-else? Is some-
thing realized with this life?
Schirmacher: No, there is no transcendent measure, only a self-ex-
amination, which of course we always already carry out in the form of 
a self-evaluation. In puberty and later as a midlife crisis, this exhibits 
itself in an often spectacular manner. But this evaluation remains far 
too limited to personal circumstances, social and professional success, 
or one’s own health and is therefore unduly personalized. My total life, 
24 hours a day, in its [with-ness?, Mitsein], in my environment, must 
be evaluated without any preconceived opinions: one can no more ex-
clude the computer I work at than the dreams and wishes that no one 
knows but me. The decisive difference from tradition, however, is that 
this evaluation can never be undertaken from without, and no one can 
ever tell another whether he has lived or not. The condescension of ethi-
cal theories that believe they can judge my fulfillment or lack thereof 
because I myself am supposedly incapable of doing so is nothing but 
the relic of a defunct paternalism. Homo generator generates his own 
self-confidence too!
Lyotard: But then do there exist immanent criteria for a life that 
achieves fulfillment, when one rejects as you do the judgment of others? 
Could health be an example of such a criterion? But then how would 
things stand with Antonin Artaud, who lived on the brink of insanity, 
ruined his health, and in the end couldn’t even sleep?
Schirmacher: When the balance between body and mind, as Spino-
za conceived it, is disturbed, it becomes difficult to speak of a fulfilled 
life, of course. “Health is not everything, but without it everything is 
nothing,” Schopenhauer emphasizes, and that society profits vampire-
like from the failure of certain individuals, should likewise inspire in us 
a healthy distrust of romanticized suffering. Vincent van Gogh created 
great art and thereby contributed a bit to the fulfillment of other lives, 
but he destroyed himself in the process. But only van Gogh himself can 
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pass such judgment (and perhaps he did just that between his states of 
intoxication)!
Lyotard: We have the ability to perceive in occurrences the event 
[Ereignis] (Heidegger) that affects us and at the same time expresses 
[pronounces] us. And we are receptive indeed, since in the strange first 
years of our lives we were called upon […] without at the same time 
being in a position to be able to control events. This means in an exact 
sense to remember our childhood, and this process is likely the source 
of that to which you refer as generating. Someone like van Gogh is not 
trying merely to express something of course, but is bearing witness for 
the dark thing that he himself is. But can one say this of the computer, 
which will always be something that was never born?
Schirmacher: Beware of a misleading ontologization! What is correct 
is solely that the computer does not belong to the class of human beings 
created through birth, but is a cerebral creation [Kopfgeburt] that grows 
up cybernetically. What we have here are not two modes of existence, 
but only our existence—in another form. On the other hand, I would 
like to emphasize here your reference to early childhood, Lacan’s pre-
mirror phase [Vor-Spiegelstadium], for this formative experience prior 
to any word-language evidently insures that no conscious criticism can 
interrupt the flow of generating. As ashamed as we are of living in an 
intuitively childlike manner, no education of conformist enlightenment 
is able to keep us from trusting our own feelings more than theories. 
What I call responsible answers to no authority but is feedback from 
the ego itself, and the words are used only to mislead. Therefore, the 
ethics for an artificial life in its very beginnings breaks with the discur-
sive world. It shows no consideration to the language community with 
its language regulations, but acquires a feeling for what actions mean 
in the context of the event [Ereignis]. Intuitive knowledge, character-
ized by Spinoza as the authentic human knowledge, is in small children 
as overwhelming as it is taken for granted. Thus, we have all at one 
time been artificial beings, each for himself and without any intention, 
at once powerless [unconscious/ohnmächtig] and creative, the gods of 
our own worlds, world-designing [world-creating] monads. Since the 
mirror phase [Spiegelstadium] it has been drummed into our heads 
that this I-myself identity is merely an ideal ego, an early-childhood 
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omnipotence fantasy, which does not accord with the given reality. As 
true as this may have been, it has never quite convinced us, as the last-
ing success of advertising demonstrates, and in the post-technological 
world, reality is yesterday’s news and it need not concern us any longer. 
Whatever the nature of the world’s given circumstances may have been, 
that have forced us into the struggle for survival and thus into denying 
our own ego [the ego itself ], Homo generator will refuse to accept any 
of the former constants. As the artificial ones of nature we will become 
like the true children (Goethe) and will produce worlds without being 
purpose-oriented or wanting to reign over them.
Lyotard: That sounds good. But aren’t you being a bit too naively 
trustful as regards feelings? Aren’t feelings the very things that are hard to 
grasp, and are we not in general incapable of understanding them? The 
so-called feelings are surely powerful, but they can also adversely affect 
the so-called person. We ought to be able to answer for our feelings, but 
in truth we don’t know what they mean. We continue to learn through-
out our lives, but often enough we die without figuring out what feel-
ings mean. Therefore I doubt whether this opacity of feelings can form 
a good basis for responsibility; the opposite seems to be true: feelings are 
things that withdraw, hide, disappear. Neither am I very trustful of that 
to which Lacan refers as “the thing,” something that is here and that is 
witnessed by us, but of whose meaning and just how it has become the 
source of generating we haven’t a clue.
Schirmacher: Could it be perhaps that the difficulty lies in your nev-
er having changed your traditional viewpoint? You are still trying to 
understand the other instead of paying attention to the ego itself, as it 
transpires [ereignet] in feelings. Not how I feel about someone or some-
thing is what I should pay attention to, but what this feeling contributes 
ethically, i.e. toward the fulfillment of my life.
Lyotard: So how is it with your feelings? As event [Ereignis]? Some-
thing or someone awakens a feeling within you, and that kindles in you 
the expression or the transference of your own feeling, over which you 
have no control?
Schirmacher: I don’t want to control the feeling, more like set it free. 
The best feelings simply happen and if they were instrumentalized they 
would just go to ruin.
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Lyotard: Very well, but the alternative to a good feeling is not neces-
sarily instrumentalization. The question is, for example, what is the best 
way to deal with a small child, and what is a good way to be spoken to 
by one about feelings?
Schirmacher: Because he cannot resist the child, the adult learns so 
much that is new. For Levinas this was the core of an asymmetrical eth-
ics: the other gives you an order you cannot resist.
Lyotard: But at the same time Levinas had a very strong sense for 
the law as well.
Schirmacher: I know, but that’s something I lack completely.
Lyotard: The law is not only respectful with regard to the others, it 
must also be taken over from oneself in a particular way. This way can-
not be reduced to general tolerance; the law regards as very dangerous a 
world where everything is allowed. That is why it is our duty to forbid 
the child something, for sometimes this is necessary in its own interest. 
A curious situation results: on the one hand the necessity of having no 
law, to be blind to law, for we of course do not possess this law nor are 
we capable of formulating it. But on the other hand we can have the 
feeling that there is a law there and that to instrumentalize someone, 
a child for example, violates the law. By this I want to say that we are 
inconsistent, and that it is therefore impossible to bring about a bal-
ance and to have a complete, fulfilled, and happy life. It seems more to 
be the case that we are compiled or generated by something that is in a 
certain sense intolerable. Even van Gogh was not very happy, even if he 
was capable of generating a reality for his work. He spent his life in ter-
rible fear, and yet he seems to me to present a good example that Homo 
generator—and generating itself—is a work of unavoidable suffering.
My second comment has to do with how it takes us human beings 
two to three years before we are capable of communicating in the tra-
ditional way. That doesn’t mean that during this period we are mere 
objects, rather that we are spoken to and influenced by a multitude 
of words, conversations, acts of tenderness, feelings, movements, and 
gestures. Things and contraptions influence us as well, good machines 
included, long before we can respond to them appropriately, with the 
aid of language.
Schirmacher: But this will not essentially change in the future either!
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Lyotard: That’s correct, things will continue this way in life. But 
we know nothing at all of the consequences this will have. It shows 
once again how completely contradictory our feelings and our ways of 
thinking can be. Therefore it seems to me that the child is not some-
thing that simply grows up, almost unconsciously, and allows us to be 
addressed through it by the event [Ereignis]. What happens? Nothing. 
One needn’t manufacture things in a tragic way; the tragedy of life does 
not exist by necessity. But I cannot agree with the notion that we live 
our lives. On the contrary, we are incapable of living our lives, and this 
is our honor, exactly this, that we are not capable of doing so.
Schirmacher: I don’t agree with that.
Lyotard: I am sure you agree.
Schirmacher: I agree about the suffering, and also that the concept 
of balance has to be recast. Balance has as little to do with the new-age 
yin-yang mishmash as it does with well-rounded cheerfulness or a har-
mony between body and mind. Balance is the model [Entwurf ] for a 
struggle whose outcome will always remain uncertain.
Lyotard: But doesn’t one need a yardstick [Maß] for that? Shouldn’t 
you have to be able to count?
Schirmacher: Perhaps one needs proportion, but in Goethe’s sense, 
who says to the moment “Do tarry, you are so beautiful,” and yet fears 
this very tarrying. It is the hope for eternal happiness, the [Nu] of the 
mystic, and therefore a hope that never fulfills itself. The yardstick 
[Maß] is given through absence, life is lived by means of its inability to 
be lived. In this I agree with you indeed, but not with the dualistic un-
dertone that neglects the third standpoint (and the [Geviert]). It is my 
honor to deny myself to the positively lived life, but also to death and 
unnecessary suffering. Consciously I will fail, but behind my back I will 
just as inevitably achieve fulfillment. Such fulfillment entails necessary 
suffering, the rupture and the parting, but protects it within the inat-
tentive and the unfamiliar. Homo generator is not the maker, neither 
the confident nor the timid one, for as Homo faber we would remain 
obligated to our planning, to the system of knowledge. An open hori-
zon, appropriate to generating-as-transpiring [ereignen], proclaims the 
multiplicity of artificial life.
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Lyotard: If you remain wary of an ideology oriented toward Epi-
cureus or Goethe, I will allow you that the event [Ereignis] always de-
pends on the individual: an occurrence becomes an event because a feel-
ing perceives it as an event. As long as computers are not permeable to 
[feelings?], they hinder the event for people.
Schirmacher: That is why the computer society we have today is only 
a caricature of the inchoate artificial life, for the very reason that total 
certainty [Sicherheit] is valued over open perception, insensitivity over 
feeling. But this is already being broken open from within: that the en-
tirety of programs are non-rationally controlled, that the interaction of 
the electronic network-world cannot be predicted, are promising signs.
Lyotard: But doesn’t the concept of a life of one’s own remain suspi-
cious? André Malraux, about whom I wrote a biography, maintained a 
very critical position against this concept. My so-called own life consists 
of course only of events into which I have inscribed myself, which I—of-
ten quite literally—ascribed to myself. Whether love, family, profession, 
politics—what in all that is my life, is due to the ability to sign with 
my name and my body (my hand) whatever I have chosen in terms of 
events. He who signs is always right!
Schirmacher: Just like the Soviet Encyclopedia (may it rest in peace), 
which bore a different handwriting after every party congress.
Lyotard: A very good example!
Schirmacher: That is why my ethics for an artificial life has to do 
only superficially with self-realization, ego identity, or social success. 
For no one can really know whether his life will achieve fulfillment, 
and all the less can one make any reliable pronouncements about the 
fulfillment achieved by one’s fellows. One cannot recognize the good 
life by its fruits any more than one can recognize the motives that have 
prompted us to action; neither observance of the laws nor the freedom 
of “live as you want to live” are helpful when it comes to self-evaluation 
[assigning a value to oneself ]. No therapy can teach me how to recog-
nize my event! Homo generator extricates himself from the alternative 
between cosmocentric and anthropocentric, and in the interstitial life 
of feelings escapes the ideological struggle between survival and death. 
Feeling, intuition, care, justice, deconstruction are indicators of a life 
behind our backs, the imperceptible perception of which must become 
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more perceptible for the further development of artificial life. It is there-
fore not enough for Homo generator to become conscious of his ab-
solute responsibility for the created worlds, if he wants to be able to 
answer them ethically. Homo generator does not have to wait for the 
post-technological age to generate his answer, but rather this answer 
has kept us alive (in an artificial life), without it having been necessary 
to approach it with mere cryptic allusions. Doesn’t it seem as though it 
were time to look for Plato’s daimon, Leibnitz’s monad, Hegel’s abso-
lute idea, Kierkegaard’s seducer, Nietzsche’s superman, Adorno’s natural 
beauty [Naturschöne] and Heidegger’s event [Ereignis] in their worlds? 
For these are figures—as tottering and unsteady as they might be—of a 
life fulfilling itself, and their worlds are therefore in and of themselves 
worlds of ethics. We know practically nothing about these worlds of 
ethics (or only—as Schopenhauer specified—in the form of Nothing); 
yet Homo generator generates these worlds continually and lives in all 
of them, [wie von selbst], always already. One actually ought to remain 
silent about all of this, for word-language does not allow us to say what 
has to be said.
Lyotard: Yes, because all words express a certain ideology.
Schirmacher: I am quite painfully conscious of that, and even poetic 
language can only occasionally flee what Heidegger termed the age of 
ideology. Nevertheless, there is no need to resort to apocalyptic visions 
here: a fundamental phenomenology of the post-technological world 
gives cause to speculate that Heidegger’s [turnaround; Kehre] for future 
generations is in many ways already (generated) reality. Metaphysics has 
come to its conclusion in modern technology and has at the same time 
made itself obsolete: images and concepts are entwined with the media 
and tell without inhibition about everyday and imagined praxis, but no 
longer put themselves in the place of a life that achieves fulfillment. Get 
a life before you get a theory! No theory will be able to or will want to 
try to catch up to the fact that Homo generator lives in the worlds of 
ethics, since philosophy of course—as Hegel already recognized—is on 
principle an after-the-fact thought, when the forms of life have become 
old. But reflection [Nach-Denken] too has its genuine world; its honor 
is open deliberation, and its strength lies in its subversive resistance to 
ideologies, which otherwise inevitably develop into prescriptions.
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Lyotard: I value your philosophical work that has led to Homo gen-
erator—for the critical debate of the postmodern in the context of our 
times it appears to me to be of decisive significance.
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“Homo Generator in the Postmodern Discussion: From a Conversation with Jean-François 
Lyotard.” In: Poiesis: A Journal of the Arts & Communication 7: 86–99. ISSN 1492–4986/2005.
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L e n a r t  Š k o f
I n t r o d u c t i o n
My aim in this presentation is to establish a platform for an ethics of 
otherness, ethics of breath/life, an ethics as a place for the future con-
versation of (mild) gestures – such as compassion, forbearance and care. 
While we all know and recognize radically the need of others (includ-
ing animal others, and, in a way, even nature) to take in and give out 
breath, at each and every moment, we still reside in our life-worlds, in 
the grip of most elemental fears of losing the ground beneath our feet, 
constantly protecting ourselves and taking more than we possibly need 
(of ourselves, of nature) for ourselves, and causing others to suffocate by 
not getting their food of life – air. We always realize too late that there 
was a life. Already for Marx it was clear that “alle Naturkräfte aus- und 
einatmende Mensch” is an aspect of humanity that has been radically 
forgotten in the course of history.1 But why do we keep forgetting air in 
philosophy? Luce Irigaray once wrote: “I breathe, therefore I am.”2 Why 
are then we still evading this phenomenon, perhaps the only one that 
could bring us closer to our own becoming as ethical beings, towards a 
new form of mutual conversation, a conversation of humanity perhaps, 
as also implied in this becoming? It is from our bodies, impregnated as 
they are by the air we breathe, that we can perceive another being in 
pain, a being living at the edge of their body-self, a body of which “arith-
metic of breathing” (J. Butler) is dangerously threatened. This economy 
is sacred because it is related to the question of forming a community, 
looking thus at something that is bigger than we are, and yet, something 
that is only possible within and for ourselves. My analyses in this short 
presenatation are based on the so called ‘sacred economy of breath’, in-
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formed both by Indian philosophy (prana) as well as by French femi-
nist philosopher Luce Irigaray (Between East and West, “The Age of the 
Breath”).
1. Breath as intercultural phenomenon
Breath is arguably the most prominent anthropological constant for 
human beings of the world, carrying rich epistemological and ethical 
implications. Different macrocosmic and microcosmic designations for 
wind/breath (or wind/spirit) in the history of religions and philosophies 
(mana, orenda, ka, ruah, prana, atman, aer, psyche, pneuma, anima, spiri-
tus, ik’, ki/qi etc.) point to a common physico-anthropological phenom-
enon of life and, more importantly, to our common physiological roots, 
which are not conceived as a substance of human nature but as a primal 
phenomenon prior to any philosophical or metaphysical theory. Accord-
ing to Tadashi Ogawa, ‘breath’ has an intercultural potential, for “all 
humanity is aware of this phenomenon.”3 Be it ‘qi/ki’ as ‘breath/expira-
tion/inspiration,’ ‘pneuma’ or ‘prana’ etc., they all point to our human, 
common and communal relatedness. But to take this argument as the 
“old metaphysical idea concerning the relation between microcosmos 
and macrocosmos (…) is not correct.”4 As a phenomenological phe-
nomenon, breath is related to the coexistence of world and I (Ogawa re-
lates it to Heidegger’s “mood” [Stimmung], Schmitz’s “Atmosphere” and 
K. Held’s “Fundamental Mood” [Grundstimmung]), thus overcoming 
the dualist-substantialist thought: “[T]hese phenomena preceding all 
other moments of the lifeworld (…) make it possible for human beings 
to be in the world.”5 Apart from its implications for phenomenology, 
breath as a primal cosmological-biological phenomenon also precedes 
all ethical (and social/political) reflection: as we will see t is ‘breath’ that 
provides the human community with its first and primal experience and 
act of communication (both in the pragmatic sense), i.e. of the being-in-
the-world(-with-others) mode.
But I would first like to discuss the role of breath (prana) in Indian 
thought. It is in Indian Vedic thought, approximately four centuries 
before the Samkhya-Yoga system (i.e. between 900–700), that we find 
the most ancient elaborations of the concepts of cosmic wind/breath 
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outside the Semitic area. Indian concept of prana (etymologically from 
*an, ‘to breathe’; later in Indian philosophy replaced by atman) is both 
the original cosmological as well as an epistemological concept. We find 
references to wind and breath in the Samhitas (the oldest parts of Ve-
dic collections), but the most ancient testimony and elaboration for the 
so-called 'Wind-Breath Teaching' ('Wind-Atem-Lehre')6 we can find in 
the philosophy of nature of Jaiminiya upanishad brahmana 3.2.2. and 4 
(JUB). The teaching is an example of a typical Vedic macro-microcos-
mic analogy between the macrocosmic Wind (vayu) and microcosmic 
breath (prana). From the cosmological point of view, the wind is the 
only 'complete' deity since all other deities/gods/elements/phenomena 
(sun, moon, stars, fire, day, night, waters etc.) return to him during the 
enigmatic stillness of the night, while he never stops blowing. But at 
the most abstract level, it is the difference between the perishable (day, 
night… ) and imperishable or ‘eternal’ (Wind) that had led to the so-
called Wind-Breath Teaching, and later to the concepts of atman and 
brahman in Indian thought. In an epistemological sense, breath in (wo)
man is the most important of the five vital powers (breathing, thinking, 
speech, sight, hearing) since it is only breath that is present during deep 
sleep. Of course, in the moment of death, breath returns to its macro-
cosmic eternal origin, the Wind. In an idiosyncratic Vedic plural all five 
vital powers are called pranas (i.e. ‘breaths’; this marks the very begin-
ning of Indian epistemology) – after the first of them, breath. Breathing 
as the most important vital power is thus equated with life itself and 
later with person's self (atman). Finally, as a term for life, prana is the 
essence of a living body. It is from this natural constellation that we can 
search for new (inter)subjective modes of thinking/feeling in the process 
where ethics of breath will enable us to think beyond (post)metaphysi-
cal ethical modes, based on reason and/or justice, even compassion as 
a virtue.
2. Towards the epistemology of breath
In his Essays on Radical Empiricism William James, departing from 
his philosophic predecessors and paving the way also for the rise of phe-
nomenology in Europe,7 gives an epistemological prominence to the 
202
P O L I G R A F I
universal and anti-metaphysical (and anti-representational) phenom-
enon of breath:
I cannot help that, however, for I, too, have my intuitions and must obey 
them. Let the case be what it may in others, I am as confident as I am of any-
thing that, in myself, the stream of thinking (which I recognize emphatically 
as a phenomenon) is only a careless name for what, when scrutinized, reveals 
itself to consist chiefly of the stream of my breathing. The ‘I think’ which Kant 
said must be able to accompany all my objects, is the ‘I breathe’ which actually 
does accompany them. There are other internal facts besides breathing (intra-
cephalic muscular adjustments, etc., of which I have said a word in my larger 
Psychology), and these increase the assets of ‘consciousness,’ so far as the latter 
is subject to immediate perception; but breath, which was ever the original of 
‘spirit,’ breath moving outwards, between the glottis and the nostrils, is, I am 
persuaded, the essence out of which philosophers have constructed the entity 
known to them as consciousness. That entity is fictitious, while thoughts in the 
concrete are fully real. But thoughts in the concrete are made of the same stuff as 
things are.8
As a pragmatist, I find James’ contention to be one of the key features 
in the long process of dethroning Kantian and related philosophical ar-
guments from the past. It can serve our goal to develop an embodied 
ethics of breath and philosophy of religion, the latter being based on 
breath’s closest cosmological kin – the spirit. Recently, one of the leading 
American pragmatist scholars, Richard Shusterman, has critically point-
ed to the above James’ elaboration on breath in his Body Consciousness.9 
Shusterman finds James’ argument as “not convincing” – moreover, he is 
convinced that James “seems to confuse the question of how conscious-
ness is felt with the questions of how and whether consciousness exists. 
That we feel something through our breathing movements does not 
mean that this something is essentially no more than such movements”. 
Shusterman thus takes James’ definition of breath as the essence of con-
sciousness as an “exaggeration”.10 Given Shusterman’s appreciation of 
Eastern (Indian) philosophy and different mind-body techniques (yoga, 
Zen), this stubborn insistence on technical details (‘did James decide 
to limit the breath of thought to exhalation?’ etc.) strikes one as odd. 
While on the one hand he is willing to grant breath (as understood by 
James) a certain, if limited, value (for example, breathing contributes 
“to sharpening consciousness so that one can perceive and think more 
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clearly and deeply” for Shusterman)11 he does not realize its full episte-
mologico-ethical significance. But the stream of our breathing deserves a 
more sensible approach. One of my goals is thus to open the new episte-
mological plane for an ethical elaboration of breath as a spiritual gesture.
3. Ethics of breath: A dialogue with Luce Irigaray
Let me begin this concluding part with an excerpt from Judith But-
ler’s Frames of War:
What I sense is that the ultimate source of these poems from Guantanamo 
is the simple, almost primeval, arithmetic of breathing in and out. The origin 
of life and the origin of language and the origin of poetry are all there, in the 
first breath, each breath as if it were our first, the anima, the spirit, what we 
inspire, what we expire, what separates us from extinction, minute after min-
ute, what keeps us alive as we inhale and exhale the universe.12
There is a task still to come and to be realized: namely, being attuned 
to the process of a new spiritual transformation of humanity in order to 
become enlightened enough to be able to hear the voices of the other, to 
discern the signs and gestures inviting us to begin a dialogue with her or 
him, or with the Nature in one of her beautiful incarnations. And last 
but not least, it is a task to respond to the call of the other person, or a 
nonhuman animal and their breathing in an ethical way. For to breathe 
is to be alive and to feel the living around us. Let me cite from Irigaray’s 
essay “The Age of the Breath”:
Miming the living, the diabolic does not breathe, or does not breathe 
any longer. It takes away air from the others, from the world. It suffo-
cates with its sterile repetitions, its presumptuous imitations, with its 
wishes deprived of respect for life.13
I think the introduction of a breath into the ethics and philosophy or 
theology in general is perhaps one of the most important events in con-
temporary thought. ‚Breath‘, as William James has observed, was ever 
the original of ‚spirit‘. But it was a classical tradition from Plato to He-
gel, even Heidegger, that has repressed and obscured this essential link 
and transformed it to a metaphysical thought that suffocated the world 
of the other, and of the Nature. It is one of Irigaray‘s greatest merits to 
bring the cultivation of breath to the forefront of philosophical analyses, 
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also in a dialogue with Yoga, an ancient Indian wisdom of ethical and 
spiritual respiration.
We all live in a global civilization where a certain plenitude is govern-
ing our lives. It is not a spiritual plenitude but rather a mass of voices, 
gestures and signs that allows us Westerners to posses various goods and 
to live our lives, but also constantly to produce our lifeworlds where 
there is no more space for a silence, where we take a deep breath only 
to egoistically accomplish our new tasks; and consequently, to impose 
them to others, including other cultures. A truly intercultural dialogue 
cannot begin on this ground.
Before we proceed to the ethics of breath, in order to understand the 
relation between macrocosm and microcosm, it is necessary to introduce 
the middle term, namely mesocosm (expressed in a ritual as a third term 
of the triangle structure the ritual-the cosmic realities-the human body/
person in the Vedic-Upanishadic context). I also propose to imagine a 
possible contemporary ethical term for the mesocosm: a gesture.14 For 
to approach breath in an ethical sense we need to imagine and construct 
new ethical plane. In his analysis of ancient Vedic texts Michael Wit-
zel pledges for the reconstruction of this term. As already mentioned, 
within the Vedic magical interpretation of the world, we face different 
analogies or magical ‘identifications’ between the macrocosmic and mi-
crocosmic realities or gods (for example Sun-eye, Wind-breath, Earth-
body, Waters-semen, Fire-speech etc.). This is a thought using different 
obvious (such as between Sun and the eye or Wind and breath) or some 
more hidden and esoteric, (between Moon and mind) ‘mystic’ links/
correlations and equivalents/identities. There exists a nexus (bandhu, 
upanishad) between two single entities in the Vedas. In my opinion, it 
is crucial to understand these ancient magical correlations between the 
human and 'divine' realms to accomplish our task, i.e. to be able to for-
mulate an outline for a contemporary embodied ethics as a new econo-
my of our intersubjective-'mesocosmic' rituals, i.e. of emobodied ethical 
gestures, based on breath as vital power. Only this way gestures will have 
the potential to connect the intersubjective realms of our existence.
I would finally like to turn to Luce Irigaray's philosophy and eth-
ics of breath. In Sharing the World Luce Irigaray wrote that it is “to her, 
as living nature, that I have to abandon myself in order to preserve my 
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own life”. For Irigaray, we have “to seek help in nature”15 in order to be 
able to survive. Our past and our future meet in one single moment of 
a new sensitivity for our breath and life, two key phenomena to which 
we need to pay attention in our times. But how is body related to this 
economy of ethical gestures? What is an ethical gesture springing from 
the embedded and embodied life of an individual, man or woman? A 
gesture, like the ancient rituals, is now a presence of a touch, a word, or 
thought in the space of proximity – within the mesocosm. Here there 
is presence of us and nature. For Irigaray, this proximity is explained as 
a “communion with the real presence of the living”. Furthermore, with 
'being in nature' I bear the other(s) within me. This is the [e]mbody-
ing, for a moment, an unlimited life in order to make him present to 
me, with me. Which is not without the mystery, the enthusiasm and 
the reserve, but also the risk, that inspire such a human, and more than 
human, gesture. We were, we are, two.16
In Between East and West, a text encapsulating her idiosyncratic rela-
tion to Indian religions, we can read that the first and last gesture of both 
natural and spiritual life is to breathe (by oneself ).17 Elsewhere Irigaray 
explains how important the role of the mother/woman is in this process:
The divine appropriate to women, the feminine divine, is first of all 
related to the breath. To cultivate the divine in herself, the woman, in 
my opinion, has to attend to her own breathing, her own breath, more 
even than to love … Becoming divine is accomplished through a con-
tinuous passage from nature to grace, a passage that everyone must real-
ize by oneself, alone … The feminine breath seems at once more linked 
with the life of the universe and more interior. It seems to unite the sub-
tlest real of the cosmos with the deepest spiritual real of the soul. Which 
inspires a woman appears to remain joined with the universe’s breath, 
related to the wind, to the cosmic breathing … In this way, the woman 
can welcome the other in her soul.18
Woman shares her breath preeminently by keeping it ‘inside’. By a 
‘feminine economy of the breath’ she is keeping (and cultivating) breath 
inside the body and sheltering in herself the first seed of nature, the 
Warmth or Love, which is the eternal longing in Nature for Spirit (in Iri-
garay this is the spiritualization of the body, or nature). The first breath 
of the world we share, both in nature (macrocosm) and in woman (mi-
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crocosm) is at the same time the possibility of a space-between, inter-
subjective or intercorporeal (in the widest sense of the term) space/plane 
of gestures (mesocosm) where our lives coexist in a community beyond 
all differences (culture, sex, age, even species). A bodily-spiritual gesture 
of keeping and sharing the breath is an ethical gesture of respecting the 
life of the universe, for Irigaray.
In “Ethical Gestures toward the Other”, Irigaray explains in a new 
context the key feature of the third phase of her work, namely ethical 
gestures. According to the human body, the first autonomous gesture is 
breath, air being the very first food of life. In Genesis, it is said that God 
breathed into his nostrils the breath of life (Gen 2.7).19 For Irigaray, to be-
come spiritual it is necessary to transform this vital breath “into a more 
subtle breath” (of loving, etc.) which corresponds to our transformation 
of natural life into a spiritual life.20 I find the most important element in 
Irigaray‘s third phase of the work in the incipient relation with the other 
as a woman – a relation based in her respect for life. There is yet another 
element present in Irigaray: silence. It is “the laying out of a space-time 
that must remain virgin in order for a meeting to happen. It is openness 
that nothing occupies or preoccupies – no language, no values, no pre-
established truth”.21 Silence is a threshold still (or again) to be revealed 
to us. I understand it as a substratum of a ‚mesocosm‘, a pure gesture 
of a deserted intercorporeal space-between still to be inhabited by us.22
I have already argued that the mesocosm is a space-between (for the 
intercorporeality) and that it could be understood as a place (like the 
ancient rituals, for example) of a mysterious transition from pure gesture 
to the first ethical gesture of (wo)man. The economy of ethical gestures, 
and later the way to the embodied ethics, has its origin in the macro/
microcosmic awakening of life that comes to us as breath or is breathed 
into us. This is then the origin of any embodied ethics, claiming to en-
ter into the intercorporeal realm of humans (and the living nature) via 
gestures.
* Lenart Škof is Associate Professor of Philosophy and Religion at the University of Primor-
ska, Koper, Slovenia.
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A N I M A L S …
I n  t h e  f u l l n e s s  o f  o u r  n o n i d e n t i t i e s …
S t e p h e n  D a v i d  R o s s *
I come to speak not of the animals.
Whence do I come, and toward what?
To whom do I speak, and in what voice?
If not the animals, then of which?
If the animals do not speak, what do they say?
In what gathering do we come together?
I come to speak with you from two well known places. Let me re-
mind you of them.
First:
We no longer derive man from “the spirit” or “the deity”; we have placed 
him back among the animals…. Man is by no means the crown of creation: 
every living being stands beside him on the same level of perfection. And even 
this is saying too much: relatively speaking, man is the most bungled of all the 
animals, the sickliest, and not one has strayed more dangerously from its in-
stincts. But for all that, he is of course the most interesting. (Nietzsche, A, 580)
To which I might ask, why of course, why not perhaps?
Second:
The moral question is thus not, nor has it ever been: should one eat or 
not eat, eat this and not that, the living or the nonliving, man or animal, but 
since one must eat in any case … how for goodness’ sake should one eat well? 
… “One must eat well [il faut bien manger]” does not mean above all taking 
in and grasping in itself, but learning and giving to eat, learning-to-give-the- 
other-to-eat. … It is a rule offering infinite hospitality. …1 (Derrida, EW, 
282-3)
To which I might ask, what hospitality for chick or calf, what do we 
give, what do they learn? And what makes it infinite except our pre-
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sumption? What could make it infinite but our forbearance? And if we 
withdrew from sacrificing animals so readily to our digestion, might the 
next step be to withdraw from sacrificing each other to our goodness?
More of this later.
We who believe in evolution—and which of us animals today does 
not, perhaps even those who would deny it?—have returned human-
ity to the animals, to nature. Human beings together with animals and 
plants compose living nature, where every species has achieved the same 
degree of perfection from the standpoint of evolutionary fitness. We 
may be capable of killing other animals, and of inventing new species 
of plants, but that capacity might be a defect in being—if such a thing 
could be said to be.
As for eating—I am a committed vegetarian—we cannot choose not 
to eat, that would be to choose not to live or be, and we cannot limit 
eating to grasping and chewing, but may include all the ways in which 
we give and receive, in the proximities of our shared being in the world 
together—I mean, beings, worlds, singularities, and participations. Let 
us think of these as defining what we mean by proximities. And let us 
note that when we are together with animals, when we approach the ani-
mals and the others with the task of learning-to-give-to-them through 
the mouth (not to mention other orifices, not to forget infinite hospital-
ity), we are speaking of the endless ways of expressing and responding 
that constitute hospitality.
Let me begin again with some hypothetical yet tangible examples:
You are sitting on the sofa in your living room, your three-year-old son in your 
lap, together with your 12-year-old cat, your dog beside you. You feel the warmth of 
each of their bodies touching yours and touching each other, and you are aware of 
your humanity in the bodies touching. You are watching Animal Planet, an episode 
about jaguars living and hunting. It seems to you that the animals are present in 
your room, though you know that that is possible only in virtue of exceptional 
camera technology. You know you are safe, and you feel that you are closer to such 
animals than you have ever been before. While you are watching you become aware 
that your cat has pounced on moths drifting into the room.
You take your five-year-old daughter to the zoo and stop at the jaguar exhibit. 
The jaguar is pacing like a crazy person, back and forth, round and round. You are 
about 60 feet away, and cannot get closer. You wonder what it would be like to be 
the jaguar in such a cage. And you think you know.
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You are walking through the forest, aware of the singing of the birds, the move-
ments of small animals, your family at your side. An outing together, you say to 
each other, let’s go for a walk in the woods. You are lucky to live near a forest that 
is kept as wild as possible except for a few dirt paths. The coyotes have come back 
and deer are visible at certain hours of the day.
You are standing on a precipice looking out over rice fields below in Bali. In the 
darkness you can see the stars before you and up into the sky. In the darkness you can 
see the stars before you and below, all the way down. The stars below are moving. 
The entire world is full of moving stars. You realize that the lights below are fireflies.
Many of these are familiar experiences, though the last may no longer 
be familiar to city dwellers. I offer them to call attention to what might 
be strange about them. Let me begin with the second.
In his novel, Elizabeth Costello, J.M. Coetzee presents a famous older 
woman author who has written a novel on Molly Bloom regarded as 
comparable if not superior to James Joyce’s Ulysses. Already a remarkable 
suggestion. She is invited to speak throughout the world on any topic 
she chooses. Although her hosts would like her to speak on literature, 
she chooses to speak on the treatment of animals on factory farms, com-
paring it with the treatment of Jews in German concentration camps. 
The dinners that celebrate her present a difficult social relation. What 
shall they eat? What shall they discuss? Who will be offended?
Lest we pass by too easily, let me note the bodily elements of this pic-
ture: animals in cages, in their odiferous presence; animals screaming at 
slaughter; blood, skin, intestines, and bone; human beings confined to 
barracks, fed sickening rations, sickened by work, cold, unfitting clothes 
and shoes, suffused with indifferent hatreds and brutalities. One might 
speculate that the corporealities and the brutalities here have much in 
common, in contrast to my first and second examples, in which the 
warmth and love that define the best that human life can experience are 
profoundly corporeal. This is to say that despite a world of traditions in 
which the highest joys that humans can know involve diminishing the 
tangible weight of physical experiences, those same traditions and lives 
know that the fullness of being for humans and animals, if not plants 
and other wonderful things, is unmistakably corporeal. I would say that 
this is a lesson we may learn from Darwin and evolutionary biology. We 
may learn it, but many would refuse it.
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One of Elizabeth Costello’s themes—offensive to some—is that 
rational discourses such as science and philosophy are incapable of 
addressing issues of extreme suffering and evil. Concentration camps 
and factory farming are too intense for abstract reason to address. 
Reason has no monopoly on ethical compassion, and indeed is a human 
invention for human purposes.
Might it not be that the phenomenon we are examining here is, rather 
than the flowering of a faculty that allows access to the secrets of the universe, 
the specialism of a rather narrow self-regenerating intellectual tradition whose 
forte is reasoning, in the same way that the forte of chess players is playing 
chess, which for its own motives it tries to install at the centre of the universe? 
(Coetzee, EC, 69)
A second theme, in close proximity to the first, is that literature, es-
pecially poetry, can express the inner being of strange and unfamiliar 
things, for example, wild animals and dead people.
Here is that jaguar again, twice, in the eyes and voice of a poet:
The jaguar
[skipping the beginning]
By the bang of blood in the brain deaf the ear—He spins from the bars, 
but there’s no cage to him
More than to the visionary his cell:
His stride is wildernesses of freedom:
The world rolls under the long thrust of his heel. Over the cage floor the 
horizons come.
–Ted Hughes
Second glance at a jaguar
Skinful of bowls he bowls them,
The hip going in and out of joint, dropping the spine with the urgency of 
his hurry
Like a cat going along under thrown stones, under cover,
Glancing sideways, running
Under his spine….
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At every stride he has to turn a corner
In himself and correct it. His head
Is like the worn down stump of another whole jaguar, His body is just 
the engine shoving it forward,
Lifting the air up and shoving on under,
The weight of his fangs hanging the mouth open,
Bottom jaw combing the ground.
–Ted Hughes (quoted from Mulhall, WA, 111-2)
Here is a magician-philosopher’s poetic expression of our third ex-
perience:
Caught up in a mass of abstractions, our attention hypnotized by a host 
of human-made technologies that only reflect us back to ourselves, it is all 
too easy for us to forget our carnal inherence in a more-than-human matrix 
of sensations and sensibilities. Our bodies have formed themselves in deli-
cate reciprocity with the manifold textures, sounds, and shapes of an animate 
earth—our eyes have evolved in subtle interaction with other eyes, as our ears 
are attuned by their very structure to the howling of wolves and the honk-
ing of geese. To shut ourselves off from these other voices, to continue by our 
lifestyles to condemn these other sensibilities to the oblivion of extinction, is 
to rob our own senses of their integrity, and to rob our minds of their coher-
ence. We are human only in contact, and conviviality, with what is not hu-
man. (Abram, SS, 22)
Ultimately, to acknowledge the life of the body, and to affirm our solidarity 
with this physical form, is to acknowledge our existence as one of the earth’s 
animals, and so to remember and rejuvenate the organic basis of our thoughts 
and our intelligence. (47)
Ultimately, then, it is not the human body alone but rather the whole of 
the sensuous world that provides the deep structure of language. As we our-
selves dwell and move within language, so, ultimately, do the other animals and 
animate things of the world; if we do not notice them there, it is only because 
language has forgotten its expressive depths. “Language is a life, is our life and 
the life of the things… .” It is no more true that we speak than that the things, 
and the animate world itself, speak within us. (87)
And the fourth:
Between the constellations below and the constellations above drifted 
countless fireflies, their lights flickering like the stars, some drifting up to join 
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the clusters of stars overhead, others, like graceful meteors, slipping down from 
above to join the constellations underfoot, and all these paths of light upward 
and downward were mirrored, as well, in the still surface of the paddies. I felt 
myself at times falling through space, at other moments floating and drifting. 
I simply could not dispel the profound vertigo and giddiness; the paths of 
the fireflies, and their reflections in the water’s surface, held me in a sustained 
trance. Even after I crawled back to my hut and shut the door on this whirl-
ing world, I felt that now the little room in which I lay was itself floating free 
of the earth. (4)
Elizabeth Costello’s description of this being-in-our-body is presented 
in relation to a bat—the bat made famous in Thomas Nagel’s sugges-
tion that we cannot imagine ourselves as a bat. Our finite beings in our 
finite bodies make it impossible for us to imagine being so other: sens-
ing, hearing, living like a bat; sensing, smelling, being a dog; perhaps 
unable to imagine being my lover whose body is so intimately close to 
me. All bodies, perhaps, are intimate and other. The other who I love, 
whose otherness I may or may not imagine, is other in the proximity of 
our bodies, same and other bodies. Tout autre est tout autre. (Derrida, 
GD, 68)
Elizabeth Costello confronts us with two different suggestions, if you 
will, concerning being in a body, always in different bodies, human and 
bat: that poets can so imagine, and that what they imagine is bat being, 
bats and jaguars full of being in their bodies, a notion she expands on 
without attribution, drawing from Spinoza’s beatitudo: unbounded joy.
To be a living bat is to be full of being; being fully a bat is like being fully 
human, which is also to be full of being. Bat being in the first case; human be-
ing in the second, maybe; but those are secondary considerations. To be full 
of being is to live as a body-soul. One name for the experience of full being 
is joy. (EC, 77)
By bodying forth the jaguar, Hughes shows us that we too can embody 
animals—by the process called poetic invention that mingles breath and sense 
in a way that no one has explained and no one ever will. He shows us how to 
bring the living body into being within ourselves. When we read the jaguar 
poem, when we recollect it afterwards in tranquillity, we are for a brief while 
the jaguar. He ripples within us, he takes over our body, he is us. (97-8)
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The particular horror of the camps, the horror that convinces us that what 
went on there was a crime against humanity, is not that despite a humanity 
shared with their victims, the killers treated them like lice. That is too abstract. 
The horror is that the killers refused to think themselves into the place of their 
victims, as did everyone else. They said, “It is they in those cattle cars rattling 
past.” They did not say, “How would it be if it were I in that cattle car?” They 
did not say, “It is I who am in that cattle car.” They said, “It must be the dead 
who are being burned today, making the air stink and falling in ash on my 
cabbages.” They did not say, “How would it be if I were burning?” They did 
not say, “I am burning, I am falling in ash.” (79)
I share some of Nagel’s misgivings as to whether our imagination is 
capable of identifying with the auditory world of a bat or any other crea-
ture that lives by echolocation; I am struck by how different is the world 
of a dog who lives primarily by smell. This awe—yes awe—I feel is not 
to denigrate the bat or dog but to the contrary, to celebrate their other-
ness, the otherness of their worlds. We share worlds together, in some 
sense we share the same worlds together, and yet here are two beings 
whose worlds are wonderfully different. One of these animals is capable 
of sharing our human worlds more fully than many other people. Dogs 
are famous for reading the minds and souls of humans by reading their 
bodies, however they do that.
All this might be to say that I do not accept Heidegger’s insistence 
that animals are poor in world.2 Poor perhaps in ways that certain hu-
mans are poor in human worlds, but astonishingly rich in animal worlds, 
in ways that human beings can only dimly imagine.
I have misgivings about the reach of our imaginations in certain en-
deavors, yet I wish to celebrate our imaginations as Elizabeth Costello 
asks us to. Imagination—not only human, perhaps—is limited yet un-
bounded. We cannot imagine just anything, yet we cannot suppose that 
anything is beyond imagining. That peculiar paradox of imagining is the 
key to literature and art, if not to what makes us human. Except that 
we must not suppose that we know that such imagining is restricted to 
humans.
But this is not what interests me here. I am interested in another sto-
ry present in what Elizabeth Costello says. What is it to be full of being? 
And can we imagine fullness of being in another human or animal, even 
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a plant or stone, without denigration—in her words, without implying 
that such others, with less fullness or a different fullness, are ours to use 
in any way whatever.3
I have intimated that this fullness of being is corporeal, we live in 
our bodies, and bodily living is the fullness of being. The limits of phi-
losophy, then, and of any other mode of thought as such, is given by 
the abstractions such thought imposes on us—very strong, overwhelm-
ing in philosophy. The greatness and weakness of philosophy lie in the 
power of its abstractions.
Fullness of being, then, is the abundance of being in a body. Bod-
ies are proximate, relational, embedded, and entangled. Embodiment 
is relationality. Indeed, bodies are so embedded and entangled that we 
are constantly surprised by what emerges from such bodily relations. I 
would call that process of emergence evolution. In Spinoza’s words, “we 
do not know what bodies can do.” (E, Pt. 3, P2, Sch.)
This surprise does not entail miscomprehension or distance alone, 
for we are frequently surprised even more by how intimate and affec-
tive other bodies are. Fullness of being, then, is inherently strange and 
unfamiliar, in the midst of kinship and love.
This disparition pervades the physical world. I say this aware that 
Enlightenment thought has made the science of physics the model of 
clarity and certainty. More of this later. Here I want to call attention 
to the pervasiveness of what cannot be said (in philosophy or science) 
without difficulty (in Cora Diamond’s words), what cannot be under-
stood, because it is itself, inherently, difficult to understand, difficult 
to be (Diamond, DRDP). In other words, what we may learn from the 
proximities and intimacies of animals (and others, including those we 
love) is the strange difficulty of being. Being in a body is strange and 
difficult. Being as a body also. Being a mind, a soul, a being fully pres-
ent in a body that is present somehow to itself, and thereby present to 
others, is inconceivably strange.
I am suggesting that this strangeness pervades the world. I am sug-
gesting that all that we take to be beings as such are present strangely 
and difficultly to themselves. Every identity is nonidentical with itself, 
and present to itself nonidentically. I call this betraying. It is the ongo-
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ing condition of the enchantment of the world, beyond accounting. 
More of this later.
Returning to fullness and denigration:
Fullness of being is being in a body, embedded and entangled with 
other bodies. In this way, the denigration of other bodies is interrupted 
by the ways in which these other bodies are me, ways in which I am en-
tangled among them.
John Donne said this several centuries ago in Europe: no one is an 
island, entire to itself. Buddhism describes it as emptiness, sunyata, with-
out complete and separate self identity. Western individuality promotes 
a myth of self ownership in the context of a capitalist world of labor 
and consumption in which individuals are as they produce and as they 
consume. If we add the presence of others—individual bodies betrayed 
in who they are by others, other bodies and other things, historical and 
relational—the picture expands to make identity impossible in itself, 
nonidentical with itself.
The fullness of being is its nonidentity with itself. Every being betrays 
itself, and betrays the others; every identity is nonidentical with itself, is 
what it is in virtue of others. We are embedded in the being of others, 
as they are embedded in ours. In our bodies we are full of other bodies, 
however strange and difficult this may be.
To denigrate an other—animal, human, and others—is to denigrate 
ourselves. Each of us is so embodied, so embedded, entangled among 
others in our bodies, that we are what and who we are in virtue of what 
and who they are. We can elevate ourselves only by diminishing the full-
ness of our own identities.
This means that the fullness of my being is embodied in the fullness 
of yours. What I might gain in elevation I lose in the resulting attenu-
ation of our shared being.4
Here is a well-known example:5
Levinas uses the Kantian expression “friend of man” in order to designate 
the dog that is capable of transcendence. It is a question of the dogs of Egypt, 
which are thunderstruck at the moment of the “death of the firstborn,” when 
“Israel is about to be released from the house of bondage.” You will hear how 
the dog, which is still in lack and privation, as Heidegger will decidedly say, 
“without,” still lacking the logos and ethics, “with neither ethics nor logos,” in 
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Levinas’s words, sees itself convoked, in its very silence, as a witness, simply as 
witness to the humanity of man. This mute witness is there merely to attest to 
the dignity (Würde) of man. (Derrida, ATTIA, 116-7)
No one is more corporeal than Levinas, no one more ethical. And yet 
he cannot think himself into the being of an animal, neither in general 
nor in the particular case of Bobby, the famous dog whose presence in 
the camp was to acknowledge the humanity of the prisoners.
The dignity of man is said to elevate humanity above all other crea-
tures and things in the world. Yet this Kantian claim, no matter how 
elevated, carries with it a profound destitution of being. Certain traits 
and not others define the dignity of man—not to mention how long 
and in what ways dignity has been withheld from women.
What would it mean if we granted dignity to all things—not rights 
but dignity, self identity and self realization, with the proviso that not 
only the being but the identity and the realization are nonidentical with 
themselves? This is to say that the fullness of their being means to me 
as a body that I can never realize the fullness of my being except in re-
lation to them, through their fullness; and not in any predetermined 
way. The fullness of being opens onto the difficulty of being nonidenti-
cal with oneself.
This can be said in the language of bodies and animality—first 
Levinas again:
But is not the diachrony of the inspiration and expiration separated by the 
instant that belongs to an animality? Would animality be the openness upon 
the beyond essence? But perhaps animality is only the soul’s still being too 
short of breath. In human breathing, in its everyday equality, perhaps we have 
to already hear the breathlessness of an inspiration that paralyzes essence, that 
transpierces it with an inspiration by the other, an inspiration that is already 
expiration, that “rends the soul”! It is the longest breath there is, spirit. Is man 
not the living being capable of the longest breath in inspiration, without a 
stopping point, and in expiration, without return? (Levinas, OB, 181-2)
Let us think within a certain European tradition of this conjunction 
of inspiration, transcendence, and breath as spirit, together with dignity, 
subjectivity, and humanity. The key term in this passage is animality, 
first as the corporeality of humanity—but not its inspiration—second 
as the brutality of the natural world—or, what may be the same thing 
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again, its indifference. Nature is red in tooth and claw. Evil belongs to hu-
manity alone. No creature is as destructive as human beings. We are higher 
than our animality.
Except, as Nietzsche says, we are our animality. We are our bodies. 
Bodies are us. In all their transcendence. The miracle of humans is the 
miracle of bodies.6 And the miracle of bodies is not only human.
It seems that we are always asked to take sides where there are no 
sides. The side of humanity, the side of animals, the side of goodness, 
the side of death. We must know, we must believe, we must take a stand. 
As if these existed except in the subjunctive. Each of them nonidenti-
cal with itself.
Here, in the name of taking sides, Derrida has something remarkable 
to say. On the sides, then, of life and death—let us call this the fullness 
of living.
Hélène Cixous took sides “for life.” This is not an obvious thing to do, un-
like what one might imagine. The side [parti] is also a wager [pari], an act of 
faith. What does it mean to wager one’s life on life? What will the choice of 
life have meant for her? Not a “life-choice,” but the side of life against death, 
for life without death, beyond a death whose test and threat are none the less 
endured, in mourning even in the life blood and breath, in the soul of writ-
ing. (Derrida, HCL, xiii)
The fullness of living takes place in the subjunctive.
As for me, I keep forever reminding her each time, on my side, that we die 
in the end, too quickly. And I always have to begin again.
For she—because she loves to live—does not believe me. She, on her side, 
knows well that one dies in the end, too quickly; she knows it and writes about 
it better than anyone, she has the knowledge of it but she believes none of it. 
She does not believe, she knows; she is the one who knows and who tries, but 
she believes none of it. (2)
On one side, this beginning leads toward the subjunctive mood of 
believing: would that I (or we) might believe—a mood that teeters on 
the edge of the deepest abyss (if there be such). On another side, this 
beginning leads toward enchanting, a term, like betraying, that plunges 
into the abyss without fear of dying. If that be possible.
By enchanting I mean to evoke Max Weber’s suggestion a century 
ago that the world has become disenchanted, that we believe (but not 
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in the subjunctive) that we can account for all things by rationality and 
calculation (Weber, SV, 155). Might the fullness of being be enchanting, 
in the subjunctive, full of unaccountable things?
Derrida—jd—insists that hc’s writing is en-chanting, that literature 
can be en-chanting, in the face of dying, on the side of living, if that be 
possible, if that be not the impossible. Or unbelievable. Always in the 
subjunctive.
How would the mighty powers of this unbelievable belief in the impossible 
watch over what is called so glibly the fiction of a so-called literary event, over 
all that complies with the modality of a certain “as if ”? And as each art enter-
tains a different experience of fiction and therefore of belief, one may wonder 
what happens to believing and to the “would that I might believe” when arts 
graft, haunt, and mingle with one another. … When one hears a piece of mu-
sic, if one can hear it, for instance a song [chant], an “enchanting chant [en-
chant],” as is said in a text about magical enchantment, a hymn or incantation 
of which we will have more to say, then one believes or one no longer needs 
to believe in the same way as someone who would only hear the words of a 
narrative (whether fictional or not). What happens then, as far as belief and 
the impossible are concerned, when the song of the enchanting chant [chant 
de l’enchant] can no longer be dissociated from the whole body of words and 
from what still presents itself as the literality of literature? When literature be-
comes an enchanting chant? (Derrida, HC, 4-5)
I might ask—perhaps—why literature (alone?) can become an en-
chanting chant. What would it mean to insist or to deny this?—that it 
can, that only it can. Perhaps as if it might. And why not music?
What happens when anything, literature or music, philosophy or 
poem, becomes enchanting? I responded in detail to this question else-
where.7 Enchanting expresses what is unaccountable, miraculous, with-
out a name. Neither the name of a god for what is beyond accounting, 
nor the name of a science for what is perhaps not beyond. The noni-
dentity of every identity with itself. Enchanting is betraying. Bodies are 
enchanting. Whatever is enchanting is bodies, bodies are full of being, 
embodied and embedded and entangled among themselves, always as if 
perhaps beyond themselves.
In hc’s name, jd says the following:
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As I accumulate the false steps and false starts to begin with, I will say at 
least that not only do I no longer know which side I am on and from which 
side I am about to speak (neither from hers nor from mine), not only do I no 
longer know what a side is (for example, as they say, the side of life or the side 
of death), but above all I do not know whom I name or call when I say “she” 
or “her.” How to speak of her? How not to do so? How to avoid her? (21)
In the name of animals, he says something similar:
The deconstruction that matters to me here should also promote itself in 
the name of another history, another concept of history, and of the history of 
the human as well as that of reason. An immense history, a macro- and mi-
crohistory. [The history, but also something much more, that is—] The sim-
plisticness, misunderstanding, and violent disavowal that we are analyzing at 
present also seem to me to be betrayals of repressed human possibilities, of 
other powers of reason, of a more comprehensive logic of argument, of a more 
demanding responsibility concerning the power of questioning and response, 
concerning science as well, and, for example—but this is only an example—as 
regards the most open and critical forms of zoological or ethological knowl-
edge. (Derrida, ATTIA, 104)
As always I would emphasize the bodies.
I would bring the themes of enchanting, believing, and betraying to-
gether in the subjunctive form of a thesis: these may perhaps express the 
fullness of being in the proximities of bodies. The fullness of being in an-
imal bodies, and other bodies, can be expressed only subjunctively. The 
double meaning of might expresses the intensities and the subjunctivi-
ties of bodies in the abundance of being. Finally, then, the subjunctive 
forms in which bodies are embodied and embedded, the entanglements 
of bodies among themselves, are also expressed in the subjunctive. For 
example, believing includes brain cells and iron atoms and who knows 
what else? In the fullness of being we are not who we are except insofar 
as we are something else, and we are intimately entangled together. This 
enables us to cross over to them in imagination. It enables this crossing 
subjunctively.
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I believe who I am
I believe I know who I am
I believe I believe who I am
I may believe I may know who and what you are… who and what I 
am… who and what the world is that we share.
I come to conclusion with two other voices. First, Cora Diamond 
again:
What is expressed [in the poem from Ted Hughes] is the sense of a dif-
ficulty that pushes us beyond what we can think. To attempt to think it is to 
feel one’s thinking come unhinged. Our concepts, our ordinary life with our 
concepts, pass by this difficulty as if it were not there; the difficulty, if we try 
to see it, shoulders us out of life, is deadly chilling. (DRDP, 56)
[Yet] what is capable of astonishing one in its incomprehensibility, its not 
being fittable in with the world as one understands it, may be seen by others 
as unsurprising. (60)
Elizabeth Costello, in Coetzee’s first lecture, speaks of her own knowledge 
of death, in a passage which (in the present context) takes us to the “contra-
dictory permanent horrors” spoken of in Hughes’s poem. “For an instant at 
a time,” she says, “I know what it is like to be a corpse. The knowledge repels 
me. It fills me with terror; I shy away from it, refuse to entertain it.” She goes 
on to say that we all have such moments, and that the knowledge we then have 
is not abstract but embodied.
“For a moment we are that knowledge. We live the impossible: we live be-
yond our death, look back on it, yet look back as only a dead self can.” She goes 
on, making the contradiction explicit: “What I know is what a corpse cannot 
know: that it is extinct, that it knows nothing and will never know anything 
anymore. For an instant, before my whole structure of knowledge collapses in 
panic, I am alive inside that contradiction, dead and alive at the same time” 
(32). The awareness we each have of being a living body, being “alive to the 
world,” carries with it exposure to the bodily sense of vulnerability to death, 
sheer animal vulnerability, the vulnerability we share with them. This vulner-
ability is capable of panicking us. To be able to acknowledge it at all, let alone 
as shared, is wounding; but acknowledging it as shared with other animals, in 
the presence of what we do to them, is capable not only of panicking one but 
also of isolating one, as Elizabeth Costello is isolated. Is there any difficulty in 
seeing why we should not prefer to return to moral debate, in which the liv-
ingness and death of animals enter as facts that we treat as relevant in this or 
that way, not as presences that may unseat our reason? (71-2)
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I cannot repeat too often that the presences that may unseat our rea-
son are embedded bodies, that we—and others—who inhabit bodies ex-
perience difficulties of reality in virtue of living in our bodies with other 
bodies, that the fullness of being that we and animals and who knows 
what else experience and live may well be—even cows placidly chewing 
in the field—something of a difficulty that can only be subjunctively, 
because it is never just what it is.
I conclude with a different subjunctive, where the fullness of bodily 
language meets the fullness of love. The lips that speak are the lips that 
love, as if to believe that loving and speaking might be the same while 
always different, because of the bodily orifices they caress.
We are luminous. Neither one nor two. I’ve never known how to count. … 
An odd sort of two. And yet not one. Especially not one.
But how can I put “I love you” differently? I love you, my indifferent one? 
(Irigaray, WOLST, 207)
I love you: our two lips cannot separate to let just one word pass. (208)
How can I put I love you differently in the subjunctive? which is to 
say that love is never identical with itself.
Irigaray’s famous if not notorious words, so often taken in the de-
clarative—there are only men and women—cry out in the subjunctive. 
As does the universal.
I am, therefore, a political militant for the impossible, which is not to say 
a utopian. Rather, what I want is yet to be as the only possibility of a future. 
(ILTY, 10)
Without doubt, the most appropriate content for the universal is sexual 
difference. Indeed, this content is both real and universal. Sexual difference is 
an immediate natural given and it is a real and irreducible component of the 
universal. The whole of human kind is composed of women and men and of 
nothing else. The problem of race is, in fact, a secondary problem—except 
from a geographic point of view?—which means we cannot see the wood for 
the trees, and the same goes for other cultural diversities—religious, economic, 
and political ones.
Sexual difference probably represents the most universal question we can 
address. Our era is faced with the task of dealing with this issue, because, across 
the whole world, there are, there are only, men and women.
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The culture of this universal is yet to be. The individual has been consid-
ered as a particular without an adequate interpretation of the universal that is 
in her or him: woman or man. (47-8)
What kind of universal, what fullness of being, is waiting for us in the 
subjunctive? Other words and other holocausts, all subjunctive.
To each wounding separation, I would answer by refusing the holocaust 
while silently affirming, for myself and for the other, that the most intimate 
perception of the flesh escapes every sacrificial substitution, every assimilation 
into discourse, every surrender to the God. Scent or premonition between my 
self and the other, this memory of the flesh as the place of approach means 
ethical fidelity to incarnation. To destroy it is to risk the suppression of alter-
ity, both the God’s and the other’s. Thereby dissolving any possibility of access 
to transcendence. (ESD, 217)
Betray the subjunctive. Refuse the holocaust. Sacrifice sacrifice. En-
chant disenchantment.
* Stephen David Ross is Distinguished Research Professor of Philosophy, Interpretation, and 
Culture and Comparative Literature at Binghamton University, State University of New York, 
and Alfred North Whitehead Fellow at the European Graduate School, Saas-Fee, Switzerland.
227
L I V I N G  W I T H  T H E  A N I M A L S
N o t e s
1 The complete passage is as follows:
 The moral question is thus not, nor has it ever been: should one eat or not eat, eat this and 
not that, the living or the nonliving, man or animal, but since one must eat in any case and since 
it is and tastes good to eat, and since there’s no other definition of the good [du bien], how for 
goodness’ sake should one eat well [bien manger]? And what does this imply? What is eating? 
How is this metonymy of introjection to be regulated? And in what respect does the formulation 
of these questions in language give us still more food for thought? In what respect is the ques-
tion, if you will, still carnivorous? The infinitely metonymical question on the subject of “one 
must eat well” must be nourishing not only for me, for a “self,” which would thus eat badly; 
it must be shared, as you might put it, and not only in language. “One must eat well [il faut 
bien manger]” does not mean above all taking in and grasping in itself, but learning and giving 
to eat, learning-to-give-the-other-to-eat. One never eats entirely on one’s own: this constitutes 
the rule underlying the statement, “One must eat well.” It is a rule offering infinite hospitality. 
(Derrida, EW, 282-3)
2 Discussed at length in Derrida, OS, 11-2 and ATTIA, 144-5.
3 Spinoza’s words again, around whom all these words circulate. (Spinoza, E, Pt. 4, App. 
XXVI)
4 This is famously expressed in the master slave dialectic in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, 
but it is at the heart of domination. My world is diminished by what I do to diminish yours.
5 The dog, of course, is Bobby, from Levinas, ND.
6 See Whitehead, PR, 339.
7 See my E.
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S i g r i d  H a c k e n b e r g  y  A l m a n s a *
In Sanskrit the gesture of the hand—hasta mudrā1—calls forth the 
mystical and the rhapsodic, the divine and the earthly, demarcating in 
the surreptitious the “vanishing point”2 of “a secret knowledge”3 that, 
in the prospect of its disclosure, beckons die abendländische Philosophie4 
(occidental philosophy) towards a μετά φυσικά5 of the in-accessible and 
irreducible. The rising and setting of a gesture, invoking the twilight 
of an apparition, as Hegel refers to it in his philosophy of history6 and 
philosophy of right,7 here traverses sol oriens8 and sol occidens,9 its ges-
ture ascending and descending in a journey that is neither beginning 
nor ending.
That which is secreted or withheld, or, in Merleau-Ponty’s words, 
“what is from forever and nowhere,”10 hints at a wellspring, and a future 
hastening toward the horizon of a “vanishing point”11 alongside what 
appear to be “strange distance[s]”12 where gestures not only “visible” 
and “from elsewhere”13 ruminate upon the most luxurious as well as the 
barest of things.14 In “a language of coincidences”15 and “coherent illu-
sions,”16 that is, in the very language that promises a future to philoso-
phy, we find ourselves floating beneath, beside, and above that which 
is language itself—gesticulating, as in a trance, amongst the very irre-
ducible and most secret of things—wherein “with twilight closing in”17 
philosophy finds herself embraced in the darkness of three rising suns.
That which is unbound by Ocean and Sea, and due West of the 
land of Hiroshige,18 beckons sunrise Nihon にほん19 over many islands20 
where clouds hasten along silken paths beside plum gardens, sudden 
s howers, and clear weather after snow.21 Just as centuries past, palatial 
gestures beckoned Forbidden Cities due North, passaging 中国/中华 
China,22 in the manner of the surreptitious—glorious, meridian, and 
harmonious—evoking tranquility, profundity 文渊阁23 and celestial 
purity. Gestures hasten along shimmering edges and partitions, secret 
corridors and gateways of jade and coiled dragons24 conjuring entry-
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ways to silence, where imperial gesticulations and acts of resistance pass 
from hand to hand. Resonances, reverberations, and secret languages 
whispering Middle East, Prime Meridian, and Great Circle,25 gesturing 
toward Africa, cradle of civilization, amongst flowering cherry blossoms, 
lotus, hyacinth Ὑάκινθος, Hyakinthos,26 and Jasmine Revolutions. In the 
gliding gesture of jaguars traversing continents, centuries, and millen-
nia, along the Great Mongolian Steppe, decorated by feather grass, we 
discover a language on the point of no return, where Alea iacta est “the 
die has been cast”27 in every hand.
While hasta, meaning “hand” and mudrā, referring to a “seal,” “mark,” 
or “gesture,”28 in its mystical proclivity invokes Hindu and Buddhist 
spiritual practices, it may also be considered in saecularis29 as an abstract 
philosophical construct whose pretention revolves around the unoccu-
pied and the unfurnished, a purely imaginary concept, readily empty-
ing itself, positing nothingness, that is to say a nothingness which, in 
turn, signifies everything, but that is not to be confused with the “whole” 
and/or any particular notion of a “totality.” The secular and the sacred, 
nothingness and everything, the nothing and the every thing of nothing, 
East and West, South and North, latitude and longitude, meridian and 
cosmic constellations, masculine, feminine, and between, may therein 
be wit(h)ness30 to a μετά φυσικά in the plural that inadvertently trespasses 
the tangible and the intangible, crossing movements within stillness, 
infinitely assembling and disassembling themselves through gesture(s). 
An after beyond or otherwise “open to visions”31 wherein the “carnal ex-
perience”32 imbues emptiness as the very passage of an opaqueness no 
less transparent, and “all true,”33 in mudrās that presage attestation and 
testimonial, oracular in their designation.
Twisting and turning, ambling along the scenic paths of ancient Japa-
nese gardens die malerischen Pfaden der alten japanischen Gärten,34 past 
waterfalls and the splendid appearance of teahouses where h anging cop-
per lanterns sway gently in the midsummer breeze, the gesture of the 
hand hints at the perfunctory eloquence of a figuration invoking the 
spirit of contemplation, peace, and serenity. Mudrās referring to the lei-
surely, the unhurried, in celebration of the gradual—that which enunci-
ates itself through sheer indolence and languid pronouncement, whis-
pering elegance and grace.
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The secret gesture of the hand, in this instance, “a veritable touching 
of the touch,”35 fathoms each motion before the beginning, a beginning, 
that is, after an after, and, “by’m’by,”36 in “a language of life”37 welcoming 
joy38 and exaltation, notwithstanding sorrow, and by no means fearing 
death. To fathom a “vision other than our own,”39 which encompasses 
an infinite number of names, or, no name40 otherthanourown,41 let us say, 
that is intimately stranger42 and “has no name in any philosophy,”43 may 
be glimpsed, if only momentarily, through gestures hastening toward 
secret portals that beckon the “inexhaustible.”44
Gestures of the hand between borders of any and every kind, in this 
sense, may propose a μετά φυσικά that neither belongs nor repels, be-
tween, within, beyond, before, behind, above, and beneath an esoteric 
and exoteric delineation, that is, at the margins of its very delimitation, 
fostering a μετά φυσικά of another sort, a μετά φυσικά that proposes a 
trespassing of borders and margins, without limits,45 in keeping,46 an 
ungrounding of twilight, so to speak, passaging emptiness, and habit, a 
threshold invoked through mystical gesture—by the mere wave of the 
hand—mirages gesticulated amongst passages, labyrinthine in charac-
ter—μετά φυσικά as an act of birth47—wherein the falcon Circe Κίρκη 
Kírkē,48 the Owl of Menerwā,49 and the Swan of Saraswathi50 may co-
incide. Gestures that, in turn, engage Nature and the Divine in the 
pronouncement of a philosophia perennis51 and sāṃdhyābhāṣā (twilight 
language),52 a μετά φυσικά maneuvering somewhere or nowhere between 
the secularsacred, pending upon “extralinguistic figures,”53 a passage into, 
before, after, and beyond taking place in multiple modalities and times, 
even beside time.
We have to imagine a gesture “[s]ans domicile fixe”54 that travels else-
where referring to Rioja (La Rioja) and rice cakes (mochi, idli, or puto),55 
酒 saké56 and bread. A nomadism of the hand bedeviled with prophe-
cies betraying any notion of a particular address, softening borders like 
rroma, rromani57 gypsies carrying the future in the passage of an echo 
through the cadence of an ancient song. Evocations that mesmerize 
and enrapture and may be wit(h)nessed58 at the horizon of a sparse and 
barely visible landscape, in the rumbling of a future, a voice, a garrison, 
a prison, a demonstration and act of resistance, or simply in the gesture 
of the preparation of a meal, telling jokes, or entering the ocean on a 
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hot summer day. Gestures that enumerate the propensity of the hand to-
wards multiple inflections revealing a μετά φυσικά that revels in its ability 
to transform, transgress, and alter itself through silken layers of geologic 
time, prior to that which calls human time. Unfathomable gestures that 
beckon that which is prior to the mystical, in a roving that transcends 
our notion of finitude and infinity, an un-imaginable secret time that 
belongs to no one, not even to Nature or the Divine, or to the word.
Untranslatable hands, impregnated with mysteries remaining under 
cover: “ ‘You must not tell anyone,’ ”59 the secret of the nameless no 
name hand.60
We may therein consider a metá physiká61 of the hand gesturing to-
ward intuition, mysticism, and nothingness, confounding reason as 
such, motioning towards an otherwise and beyond, through the ampli-
fication of illusions, phantoms, and whispers, whose impermanence, 
alluding to discord and dissent, in a prefiguration of the an-archical,62 
remain malleable, ungathering itself/themselves on the borders and mar-
gins of multiple concepts and bodies where, too, that which ungath-
ers itselfthemselves in the sea of unknowing, gestures toward a horizon 
beholden to secrets. In a hermeneutical evocation that is in the figura-
tion of a breath or whisper, sonorous gestures engender numerous ca-
dences, pertaining to the notion of concurrence, and “simultaneous [un]
narration[s],”63 infinite in sense. In a collusion of “compresence”64 and 
“interpresence,”65 an ungathering, in the Hegelian sense as “opposed de-
terminations,”66 or “contradiction” and “antinomy,”67 at once composed 
and de-composed, within “coincidentia oppsitorium” (coincidences of op-
posites),68 allowing for a beyond which unfastening marginality mean-
ders upon principles which infinitely gather and ungather themselves in 
the emptiness of every nothing that is readily emptying everything. In 
an inverted figuration of prophecy, remaining forever secret, the hand 
enters beyond arrangement and disarrangement. Polyphonic, contra-
puntal, and indefinite in its arrangement, the gesture of the hand refers 
to an excess of tonalities and the promise of insoluble contradictions 
that make its multiple invocations possible.
There is anything but clarity here, or let us say, the hidden is yet to 
be considered as another figuration pertaining to prophecy. In disar-
rangement, secrets flitter everywhere and nowhere that is elsewhere. And 
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yet, the gesture is closest to its promised forbearance when listening to 
anyone’s silence. 
Black hands rummaging against a tender sky, the blackest hands 
(Malcolm’s), the finest, roughest, most beautiful hands, spiraling, spin-
ning, ingesting language as if it were another form of sustenance or 
noise to be buried or celebrated alongside the sweet scent of honeysuck-
le. Hands gesturing, politicking elsewhere like distant memories. The 
else and the where once again falling into disarrangement. Like rivers 
somewhere, some time, some place, in some room, in 1964. We are in 
Detroit and it is April. Malcolm X raises his voice: “We need […] a-do-
it-yourself philosophy, a do-it-right-now philosophy, a it’s-already-too-late 
philosophy. […] Black Nationalism is a self-help philosophy. […] This is a 
philosophy that eliminates the necessity for division and argument. ‘Cause 
if you’re black you should be thinking black, and if you are black and you 
not thinking black at this late date, well, I’m sorry for you’ [applause].”69 
We are in this instance referring to that which withstands. A hand that 
belies confusion, inheriting the tongue of lucidity, the roaring river of 
life whose elegance sanctions its prowess.
Sitting side by side in the quiet, indefinite gestures that linger, ca-
ress, and trespass the silent and the secret in “hands […] heavy with 
poems”70—scattered amongst ashes, beckoning “long years that flow as 
rivers flow, / when the sky is warm and a cool breeze plays / over the sur-
faces, creating patterns that announce / all that is beautiful […]”71 “1. All 
for nothing / 2. and nothing at all”72 (Keyson)—gesturing light, dark-
ness, wind, and silence “[a]t the [very] moment when daylight fades, 
[and] when silence invades an increasingly pure sky […],”73 where the 
secret that is beholden to every thing and no thing “moves from the un-
known to the unknown” and mere apparitions meander upon the fur-
tive (Bataille).74
A hand, we may state, that not only casts the secret but invokes it 
as that which is “of another order,”75 that which always lives “further 
on,”76 beckoning a state of diffuseness,77 its flowing and stasis a gesture of 
transformation, a slipping away78 “elsewhere.”79 A gesture thus spoken, 
as it were, a listening, where “everything […] gives itself to others.”80 It 
is as if the hand transgressed itself through the exhilaration of another. 
Its fingers cascading in gestures of laughter, disillusionment, hunger, and 
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exile. Phantom fingers that adhere to the breath of the living and the 
departed: “I’ll be there wherever that is”81 that is death. The descent of 
time, the fury of the hand grasping and retrieving, then letting go, hands 
brimming with consolation, and bidding farewell, farewell my love, may 
you experience safe passage through the rivers that herald death, farewell 
beloved, farewell to the hand that is life.
A rhythmic intonation motioning toward a μετά φυσικά of the (an) 
otherhand, and/or handedness—inclining toward the flight of the hand, 
such as handed fins, fingers, feathers, whiskers, claws, and jaws, a hand-
like paw, pawing, treading lightly, beckoning the gestures of wolves (ca-
nis lupus82) across tundra, forest, and desert, where birds of paradise—
paradisaeidae83—spread their wings in magnificent gestures of flight, 
while a humanhand signals peace, and the swaying of vitellina tristis84 
accompany the passage of blue whales: Kingdom: Animalia; Phylum: 
Chordata; Class: Mammalia; Order: Cetacea85; Suborder: Mysticeti86; 
Family: Balaenopteridae; Genus: Balaenoptera; Species: musculus87—
their flickering tails rising and sinking, plunging into deepest ocean, 
majestic torsos beholden to multiple eternities and incandescent futures. 
Gestures such as these, passaging the dominion of the immanent and 
the transcendent, heaven and earth, root and branch—entail a touching, 
caressing, flexing, stretching, curling, vociferating, and crossing of soma 
sōmatikos88 and psychē.89 Gestures therein embellished through the twist-
ing, winding, and rotating of fingers or plumage, the bending of each 
extremity toward the force of a silence, the phantasmatic in this instance 
invoking a somatic gesture toward an apparition, unfolding the furthest 
point of its destiny. The hand taking placelessness, proceeding, going on, 
descendent and antecedent to itself herself his him them theirs selflessness, 
place(lessness) and/or body, humananimal, material and immaterial, be-
yond self, in “an excess of all identifications to/of self,”90 through another 
before, gesturing toward an impending alterity of the hand—hūmānus,91 
animalis meaning “having breath”92—belonging to the kingdom Plan-
tae,93 Animalia, homo sapiens, homo generator,94 hūmānaf, hūmānusm,95 
naturalanddivine, or Natural Divine, that is, artificial in kind,96 entreat-
ing goddesses and gods deva devi dea deus97—in the manner of a visi-
tation, non-hiarchical, and “an-archical”98 in delineation. A fluidity of 
the body that in turn gestures toward an architecture of nonaffirmation, 
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contentment, pleasure, and bliss, fostering the secret that is living itself. 
A rotation or revolution of the hand, in effect, that calls forth infinite 
instances or gesticulations, be they esoteric, exoteric, ethical, ecologi-
cal, aesthetic, political, or erotic, opening the semblance of an interval 
or interlude wherein micro and macrocosm, the telluric and the celes-
tial, finitude and infinity, gather upon pairidaeza99 and/or utopia in the 
delineation of an imparity and divergence that is “in accord with […] 
nature” (kata phusin)100 and “by nature” (phusei).101
The contortion of the hand, “the surface of an inexhaustible depth,”102 
may be said, to draw the immeasurable through the hypnoticus103 (hyp-
notic) as a somniferous gesture, a quietness or silence, in the rhapso-
dic swaying of the hand surreptitiously engaging the senses, calling to 
mind, for example, the meditation of whirling dervishes, encircling the 
terrestrial and celestial in a sumptuous engagement of the visceral and 
residual, through the semblance of a recurrence and repetition. 104 In-
voking alterity in the figuration of a hand that wanders toward the un 
anticipated, through the passage of an intimation to un likeness and un 
alikeness, a falling into, out or upward105 motion that inclines toward 
another order.
That which in Sufi ritual or ceremony gestures upon “samā” (listen-
ing)106 and“dhikr” (remembrance, pronouncement, and invocation),107 
evoking a “Proximity to God,”108 also calls forth a μετά φυσικά of the 
immemorial, anterior, and anteanus (ancient)109 beginning(s)(lessness) 
to which Levinas repeatedly refers in Otherwise than Being or Beyond Es-
sence, just as it calls forth the mystical within a secular proposition in the 
invocation of nothing(ness) nichts, de rien, res.110 A nothing meandering 
towards nothing(ness) nič, nada, niks111 in a, that is, of a future l’avenir112 
already bereits113 passed bestanden114 and that has never jamais115 been pre-
sent116 Gegenwart.117 That is to say, casting the divine upon Alterity, in 
the cultivation of strangeness etwas Seltsames,118 the gesture of the handed 
gaze, motion, or, sonority, in the figuration of an undisclosed language ma-
neuvers on the very periphery of the sacred and profane, nothing and 
everything, fostering a μετά φυσικά of infinite possible meanings and 
interpretations, wherein, in Levinasian consideration, the (im)possible 
becomes possible.119
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The hand gesturing nothingness invokes the fullness of emptiness. 
The hand as a “coiling (enroulement) up of experience,” in Merleau-
Ponty’s designation, dreaming “of an impossible labor of experience on 
experience,”120 here maneuvers through vanishing territories, undergo-
ing, as it were, an act of deterritorialization,121 and strangeness, a for-
eignness of sorts. Crowded with undue apparitions, however benign in 
figuration, the hand, thus gestures toward an extreme disarticulation of 
its content, ungathering itself in the corpus of an exteriority where tran-
scendence enfolds upon immanence as its principle.122
That which endures perdure123 and lingers s’attarde124 also withdraws 
retir,125 esretira.126 The embellished gesture of the hand therein engages 
its evanescence, fostering an intemperate and/or extravagant ornamen-
tation, in measure and improvisation, as it surpasses its own figuration, 
in the reflection of a recurrence and repetition that neither repeats nor 
recurs, in the semblance of an ornamentation that is “without any com-
mon time”127 or delineation. It is thus that the recondite ritual of the 
hand, in a semblance of a disclosure or confession, and, in utter stillness, 
exceeds the very motion of its gesture, in the figuration of a gate, trace, 
pat, or stroke as it arranges itself in position, casting melodic rhythms 
of supposition through the incurring movement of silence, and still-
ness. The hand, paw, or wing, engendering a form of concentration in 
the semblance of a diversion and distraction, invokes a spatial deliver-
ance which enters upon the hand as if it were a face, a blind eye inces-
santly engaging that which, in Levinasian terms, predates the ethical in 
an intensification of the body as the hand that empties its bread to the 
mouth of an-other that is the very ungathering of the figurability that 
is giving.128
That which precedes itself and faulters upon the “ ‘pre-originary’ or 
the ‘ pre-liminary’ ”129 is of “ a sphere enveloped and sealed against the 
other.”130 Yet, strangely, it is also a gesture that escapes both revelation 
and creation, taking the form of an indefinite evasion.131 That is to say, 
it is exemplary in its contradiction, “[i]n a space common to all” and 
yet pertaining to “the most secret region.”132
In a gesture that is accented toward disarticulation, the argot of the 
hand displaces herself engendering a disruption of linear time, which 
we may refer to as alltime or notime, an unoccupied time, or “dead-
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time,”133 wherein soma and psyche tend to an imaginary and/or mystical 
plane, to an “other side”134 fostering nonactioninaction by the stroke of 
the hand. A form of handedness, its fingers in the guise of a contortion, 
the entire body in banishment, expatriate, in exile, outcast to another 
utopia “without locality or temporality,”135 while forming itself of a par-
ticular bodily region that persists in the enactment of itself to another. 
The rhythmic somatic gestures accede to an exterior interiority that ac-
costs the unknown as a gesture of the “unsayable,”136 effervescent in its 
delineation. A kind of shimmering that navigates upon the somatic and 
the psychic as a superfluous figuration, an invisible delineation mark-
ing the sheer audacity of a disregarded and discarded language. We are 
here referring to a gesticulation, in a delineation of a random occur-
rence, a mystical enumeration and/or practice that takes place “behind 
our backs”137 in the semblance of an “invisible ethics”138 (Schirmacher).
Encircling the numinous gesture in an infinite accumulation of ran-
dom formation(s), folding upon an incommensurable ratio, withhold-
ing its form or limitation, hands may therein unfold themselves at the 
margins of flight, welcoming that which remains surreptitious and irre-
ducible in a passaging that perpetually folds upon another, mysteriously 
escaping the light in the shadow of an arc; a handedness in this sense 
refers to a left or right-handed practice, in Tantric ritual the so-called 
“right-hand path” (dakṣiṇacāra) and “left-hand path” (vāmācāra).139 
Dakṣiṇa in Sanskrit meaning “south, southern,”140 “[f ]acing the rising 
sun towards east,”141 also meaning “able, dexterous, clever,”142 and vāma 
meaning left,143 or vāmā gesturing toward that which ungathers itself 
as “woman.”144 Fingers and hands of the right and left-handed variety 
invoking the powers of immortality, and ambrosial cocktails, “bever-
age of the gods”145 and goddesses, fingers slipping and sliding across 
“milk, curds, ghee, honey, and molasses,”146 and/or “excrement, marrow 
or flesh,147 semen, blood, and urine.”148 Hands gesticulating toward that 
which is “to smear” and “to do with flowers”149 alongside gestures related 
to offerings and gifts, incurring “reverence, honour, and adoration.”150 
Gendered hands inclining towards the masculine and the feminine, in 
right-handed and left-handed mudrās, representing the masculine “as-
pect of method and skillful means,” alongside the feminine “aspect of 
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wisdom or emptiness,”151 respectively. Their association likewise symbol-
ized in sexual meeting, in “the union [of ] form and emptiness.”152
In The Feminine and the Sacred, Kristeva and Clément repeatedly re-
fer to the sacred as a passage or threshold “eclipsing time and space” and 
passing “in a boundlessness without rule or reservation,”153 demarcating 
“the space between […] life and death, body and corpse,”154 in an alli-
ance of gestures “where the human sinks into animality and nothing-
ness,” and the sacred meandering across bodily thresholds evokes “the 
absolute of spirituality,” where soma and psyche engage the very edges of 
consciousness and beyond, in “journeys to the opposite limit.”155 Herein, 
we may fathom gestures of the hand infinite in their manifestation and 
evocation, adorning the bodily through the intemperance of snakes, her-
alding the unspeakable. Such a passage delineates prophesies of the se-
cret and the “everywhere, always”156 alongside vanishing points157 heark-
ening nowhere. It meanders not only upon the hypnotic, but also the 
telepathic.158
A metá physiká that passages “form and emptiness,” beside the secular 
and the sacred, that is at the very threshold, hands, wings, fingers, skin, 
and root, ocean and wind intertwined, that is to say, in an emptiness 
embraced by every thing and nothing. A metá physiká (un)bound by 
lotus flowers, petals flourishing in golden, white, blue, and black con-
tours,159 harbouring fire, “vital fluids, evening twilight, [and] summer 
season[s].”160 Seasons decorated with the promise of one thousand and 
one blossoms opening and closing alongside the trajectory of the sun.161
We may likewise refer to the sorcerer’s hand “from a watchful dis-
tance / while we dream of lying”162 through the sacred that beckons 
love163 “to drink from a woman / who smells like love”164 via the bearing 
of a fragrance, the languid scent of sex, in an attestation to that which 
calls forth the divine and the earthly to a surreptitious meeting of the 
two. In transition and passage,165 hands revealing intricate designs, beck-
oning the proximity of the encounter, acknowledging the irreducible 
that is other wherein “love come[s] to pass between two freedoms.”166 
The fragrance of love therein remains unseen, as it narrows itself along 
the contours and margins of another where “the breadth of your palm 
narrows mine into flame.”167 Evocations, strangely hidden and barely 
visible remind us of the mysteries that remain in the semblance of ap-
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paritions, where hands gather themselves in syllables, forming sweep-
ing curves, summoning aromas passed, and still to come. Secrets, too, 
that remain along the tapering edges of romance: “She did what women 
do—she stripped the bed […]”168 and refer to the insatiable: “Are you 
hungry? he asked. Have you eaten?”169 She replies: “I do not know how to 
cry, love; I gape / at my hands pulling us from these rings […]”170 (Foster).
In turn, we may refer to the gaze of the hand, or handedness, as a 
prescient force, secret in its delineation, an unseeing hand, or, handed 
eye, no less prophetic, due to its blindness, in Merleau-Ponty’s considera-
tion, as “something that would be before it without restriction or condi-
tion,”171 that in its very blindness and/or incandescencelessness permits us 
“to bring ourselves wholly to the transparency of the imaginary, [and] 
think it without the support of any ground, in short withdraw to the 
bottom of nothingness.”172 A handedness that allows a crossing over to 
the other side, as it were, as Merleau-Ponty notes, a crossing “under my 
hands, under my eyes, up against my body”173 to the other. It is the hand 
that folds upon the inaudible and translucent, deaf, dumb, and blind; a 
mute hand attuned to the timbre of an infinitesimal gesture without as 
much as hearing a pin drop. Listening to that which is silence, exiled, 
and treading lightly, a blind eye gazing at the disarrangement that is si-
lence. A hand that assumes whichever form it aspires to, kaleidoscopic, 
motley, and chameleon in configuration. A gesture blinded by the si-
lence that invokes listening to the melody of another, as if silence, in 
relation to the proximity of a threshold, were a question of amplitude. 
A gesture of the hand that folds upon a measure of the anterior, a spatial 
threshold that enumerates the pronouncement from afar. In a hurry, the 
hand gathers itself: far and near, low and high, around the temperament 
of another’s secret, in a gesture beholding the unfamiliar and intimate-
lystranger174 as a blessing, as if it werethe body of innumerable frequen-
cies, incidences, and occurrences aspiring to an aisthētikós175 æ(s)thetic 
ascetic at once begetting chaos, interval, and measure.
Moreover, that which maneuvers in deferment in the unseeing gaze 
of the hand motions a blind eye to another, remaining “behind […], in 
depth, [and] in hiding”176 in the manner of a secret temporality or coun-
ter temporality, in Mary Daly’s words, “that is spatially as well as tempo-
rally expansive,”177 in reverberation of the flesh, a rhythm of the hand, 
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encompassing the immensity of the encounter as a traversal, fathom-
ing an “immense latent content […] elsewhere which announces and 
which […] conceals.”178 In an encounter that remains incomprehensible 
in its surreptitiousness, the movement of the hand as an encroachment, 
a flickering, or caress.179 An opening that remains furtive and secret in 
its encounter, “unthought.”180 A gesticulation that residues and exceeds 
its very gesture, the hand living itself; a hand gesture, to be considered 
as an ornamental practice, treating each wave of the hand as if it were a 
curious jewel, each extremity at once encompassing an entire universe 
宇宙 yuzhou (Mandarin Chinese: cosmos),181 and the barest of things.182 
Perhaps, as in Ettinger’s delineation, referring to “that something that 
will always remain secret: the passage as the midst.”183 A translucent pas-
sage writ through the residue of a feminine language that shelters the 
journey, even trespasses her(s). That which motions beyond the revealed 
into a dimension that is “transferred and etched without meaning, in 
secret,”184 and “forever enigmatic.”185
The hand, as if it were a gift, incurring “reverence,” manifests itself 
as an inexplicable alteration, a secret distance engendering “a language 
of coincidence, a manner of making the things themselves speak.”186 
Sensations, in their turn, that manifest “something living,”187 the hand 
as a sensory modality incurring a means of approaching a secret, forth-
coming but furtive, and therein beckoning “floating realities,”188 “from 
forever and nowhere,”189 in the manner of a “secret knowledge,”190 iri-
descent and diaphanous in quality. This play of the hand offers a respite 
from the world, a handedness carried in the figuration of a reverie, a 
sheltering, and an exile, or that which, in Merleau-Ponty’s consideration 
fosters “the retiring of oneself with the leaving of oneself.”191 In gestures 
where secrets are indefinitely nearing and withdrawing, it is as if the sur-
reptitious both diminishes and flourishes, ebbs and decays, in the distant 
proximity that is of the hand. It is like a tightening skin that sheds the 
moon, hands posturing, the skin forever.192
Where Bataille refers to a “slipping”193 and/or slippage and to “the 
silence that is no longer anything,” we may speak of the pristine si-
lences carved in the hand, secrets beholden to silence, dyes cast enu-
merating life and death, invoking the breath of stillness. Secrets of the 
hand, fingers, or tongues, therein beckon the silence of another keeping 
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their secret. Gathering upon the roses of Harpocrates194 and Tacita’s silent 
breath195 we may fathom the undisclosed in a metá physiká that engages 
the aroma of silence and stillness, in a place where we no longer recog-
nize the shape of our names.196 Gestures alluding to the hidden possi-
bilities, secret lives, and futures that have already passed, as silences slip 
between the crevices of another’s life, entering elsewhere. Secrets and si-
lences remain beside sleep, past the time where the hand gestures depar-
ture in the silence of an infinite greeting, drifting to stillness. This silence 
is of another’s (his) stillness, drifting between and beyond the echoes 
of time. Gestures such as these elucidate the obliqueness of the hand 
transforming itself into an infinite array of patterns. Invisible and divis-
ible—gestures, however quiet, tiresome, or invincible they may appear, 
gather into a silent language holding every possible secret beholden to 
an elsewhere, in a silence that falls asunder into a thousand pieces, and 
whose order remains indefinitely shuffled, expanding onto the hither 
side of another life.
We may thus fathom the hand as a traversal between earth and sky 
in the line of flight. Imagining a metá physiká of the golden gesture, we 
may on the one hand invoke Aristotle’s golden mean197—a movement 
toward balance, a tempering of extremes, the mean as a point of oppo-
sition between two vices,198 known also as the “extreme and mean ra-
tio”199—wherein the hand finds itself in pristine balance, the very tips of 
its fingers gesturing toward earth and sky, holding a meditative stance, 
achieving perfect harmony. While on the other hand, we may celebrate 
a somatic and psychic intemperance, the meridian, in this instance, per-
taining to a peculiar paradox and superfluity of the hand, facilitating 
formative change. We may therein refer to gestures “which can move 
us out of a fixed state,”200 in Daly’s words, as a means of “changing and 
transforming everything,”201 trespassing notions of perfect balance and 
oneness, and opening a secret passage through which “leina-a-ka-‘uhane 
[…] spirits [may] leap into the netherworld.”202
We propose a metá physiká “on the edge of the unconscious,”203 that 
is neither religion nor its contrary204: a metá physiká of reverie that in-
vokes a journey “to the opposite limit”205 of knowing, in a passage with-
out return. A gesture of the hand re-imagining the bodily where we may 
approach the sensuous in all its possible differences and resistances,206 
244
P O L I G R A F I
ungathering what we fold upon Nature, in a metá physiká residing “in 
that transition and that passage”207 where the hand prefigures the cross-
ing in an “exceptional” and “strange”208 fashion.
A metá physiká of the hand therein meanders alongside the borders 
of the sensible and non-sensible, the sensuous and subtle body, the hu-
manandanimal that crosses ideologies, territories, and borders. The sur-
reptitious, in this sense, “lives always further on,”209 yet precisely in the 
moment. The hand thus fosters a “space of reverie”210 in “the reabsorp-
tion of the sacred”211 in a metá physiká that is at once secretive and un-
derhanded. A kind of passage reminiscent of a threshold, a gesture of 
foretelling that beckons the celestial and earthbound.
It is of gestures that demand to be confused with the richest and the 
poorest of meanings, neither holding every thing or any thing in the 
gesticulation toward a language beckoning secrets.
* Sigrid Hackenberg y Almansa is Assistant Professor of Art and Philosophy at the European 
Graduate School, Saas-Fee, Switzerland, and an Independent Study Director at the Institute for 
Doctoral Studies in the Visual Arts, Portland, Maine.
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T H I N G S ,  T R A U M A  A N D 
F E M I N I N E  P R O X I M I T I E S 1
A n n e  M u l h a l l *
“Something comes to pass which does not belong as one’s own to the one 
or to the other. Something arrives which did not exist and that the bringing 
together of two worlds produces. What in this way occurs gives itself to each 
one inasmuch as he, or she, wants to welcome it, and to secure its memory. 
Not in order to keep it as a thing but as the mysterious legacy of an encounter 
which it is important to remember without simply appropriating it.”
Luce Irigaray, The Way of Love, p. 153.
As Lisa Baraitser notes, “From a psychoanalytic perspective it seems 
strange and slightly perverse to make a distinction between material ob-
jects and embodied subjects” (Baraitser, p. 130). The object, even when it 
appears to aggregate from a material thing rather than a person, ineluc-
tably slides back into the originary object, the maternal object, which 
the material thing covers over, “holds”, preserves. Baraitser, in her phe-
nomenology of motherhood, is interested in articulating a relationship 
with the thing that approaches something like Jane Bennett’s “agentic 
assemblage” (Bennett, p. 21) and the force within the object that em-
places it as an actant in symbiosis with other actants, both human and 
non-human. There must be, Baraiter believes, “elements of the external 
world that escape our projective impulses, that resist internalisation, 
that remain intact despite our need to relate them in fantasy as part of 
our internal world” (Baraitser, p. 133). Christopher Bollas has likewise 
expressed a desire –very different to Baraitser’s enquiry into maternal ob-
jects– to attend to the “thing-ness” of material objects, that in the object 
that resists a purely substitutive function but that, for Bollas, enables 
thought itself. He attempts to distinguish the “evocative processional 
potential” of the object in its “integrity” and “thing-ness” (Bollas, p. 79) 
from the maternal transformational object (although as a kind of reverie 
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in the material world, it unavoidably evokes just this) and the “nostalgic 
evocative object” (p. 80), instead extending Winnicott’s transitional ob-
ject “to argue that our encounter, engagement with, and sometimes our 
employment of, actual things is a way of thinking” (92), the effect of our 
everyday perambulatory free associating among the material objects we 
encounter on our capacity to think in a way that is distinct from “cogni-
tive thought” (p. 93). The difference that embodied difference makes in 
relation to the kinds of objects that we encounter, objects whose speci-
ficity and integrity Bollas argues have an effect on our psychic constitu-
tion, is elided in this analysis. While there can be, for psychoanalysis, 
no absolute distinction between our experience of material reality and 
our “mental life”, yet the direction of movement in this instance is from 
out-side to in-side: “the source of that psychic moment will be from the 
real and will carry the weight of the real with it down into the uncon-
scious” (p. 84). The precise quality of such perambulation is, however, 
effected by our ability to move freely among objects and, as Iris Marion 
Young elaborates in her phenomenology of female embodiment, the 
way in which the woman is positioned in space. The ease of movement 
that Bollas locates as one prerequisite for a plenitude of thought is, for 
many, constrained and restricted in particular ways that are inextrica-
ble from their situation within space, gender being, of course, one such 
qualifying structure that likewise structures the material reality that the 
subject takes as the ground of his perambulatory reverie. So, he notes 
of Emily Dickinson that her confinement to the space of the home had 
an impact on what he interprets as the degeneration of her capacity for 
thought; poetic form “decomposed in her intelligent hands as she lost 
the holding force of linear thinking and, as Helen Vendler illustrates, 
she moved around in increasingly crazed circles” (p. 84).
“I didn’t realise for a long time what the thing was that showed be-
hind, that dim sub-pattern, but now I am quite sure it is a woman” 
(Gilman, p. 1140). Written in the late nineteenth century, ‘The Yellow 
Wallpaper’ is the interior monologue of a woman confined, ostensibly 
to ‘cure’ her madness, to her bedroom-prison in the uppermost reaches 
of her husband’s house. Thus imprisoned, she becomes increasingly ob-
sessed by the wallpaper lining the room: by its confounding pattern, and 
by the women, indistinct yet perceptible, trapped beneath the pattern 
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which itself seems to hold them caged beneath the wallpaper, stuck so 
close to the walls that it seems impossible to find any rending purchase. 
In the end, having finally torn the paper from the walls, it is herself 
that she frees from incarceration beneath the “sub-pattern” : “I’ve got 
out at last… And I’ve pulled off most of the paper, so you can’t put me 
back!” (Gilman, p. 1144). The story speaks to the structural position-
ing of the woman within material and psychic space. Responding to 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of embodiment, Young shows how 
women’s “immanence” emerges from the specificities of this position-
ing. For Merleau-Ponty, space is constituted as such by the presence of 
the embodied subject. As with Bollas’ perambulatory reverie among 
objects, this generative capability of the embodied subject assumes the 
affordance of free movement. However, such fluid motility is impeded, 
Young argues, by the woman’s experience of herself as thing as well as 
subject. In the “modalities of feminine spatiality” (p. 40) that she elabo-
rates, this expresses itself in the “inhibition” (p. 41) of the woman’s con-
stitutive relation to space. “Feminine existence lives space as enclosed or 
confining, as having a dual structure, and the woman experiences herself 
as positioned in space” (Young, p. 40). To go further: she is positioned in 
space, and yet that positioning is ascribed to her as a quality intrinsic to 
her nature as woman. One mechanism for such attribution is suggested 
by Sara Ahmed’s extension of Heidegger’s apprehension of the object-
in-itself, which becomes perceptible when the object fails to do the work 
that it is intended for. As she explains, the failure of the object is in fact 
“the failure of the object to extend a body”; its “failure” is “not a prop-
erty of an object”, but it has repercussions for the object insofar as the 
“experience of this ‘non-extension’ might then lead to ‘the object’ being 
attributed with properties, qualities and values. … If this table does not 
work for me, I would ‘turn toward’ it a different way. I might then at-
tribute my failure to write to the table, such that it becomes the cause 
of the failure” (Ahmed pp. 49–50).
This attribution of blame for the subject’s inability to extend itself to 
the object that thereby becomes the “bad object” (Ahmed, p. 50) reso-
nates with Bracha L. Ettinger’s critique of the “mother-monster ready-
made”, the mother of primal phantasy–the “originary not-enough moth-
er’, ‘the abandoning mother’, ‘the devouring mother’” (Ettinger, 2006a, 
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p. 106)–a “ready-to-hand” figure, we might say, that psychoanalytic 
theory and practice has, for Ettinger, perpetuated in its failure to rec-
ognize the primal nature of these phantasies of maternal not-enough-
ness, attributing them instead to the “real” mother, the “mother-mon-
ster readymade”. Making a similar point, Jacqueline Rose has written 
of her unease with the tendency in the “British School” – the work of 
Christopher Bollas after Winnicott in particular – to “reassert early en-
vironment against fantasy, what is done to the infant against what the 
infant or patient projects on to her world” (Rose, p. 153). For Ettinger, 
this “disrealization caused maternity, feminine sexuality and most of all 
the daughter/mother relation a catastrophic damage”; the failure to rec-
ognize these primal phantasies “destroys mainly the mother/daughter 
relationship since it systematically rechannels hate toward the mother 
and destroys the daughter’s desire for identification with the parent of 
her own sex” (107). This situation is in stark contrast to that of the fa-
ther, where psychoanalysis has long recognized the distinction between 
the primal father of phantasy (“paternal seduction”) and the real father. 
This recognition of the primal father and “disrealization” of the primal 
mother comes at the cost of the maternal-feminine; “primal phantasies 
that organize male sexuality and paternal authority were more easily 
recognized, causing benefit to the symbolic organization of the subject 
according to parameters of maleness and masculinity. It is the primality 
of the not less prevalent phantasies, that tortured mainly daughters vis-
á-vis their mothers, that was disrecognized” (107). In Ettinger’s reading 
of Freud’s ‘The Uncanny’, repression itself inevitably causes anxiety to 
“stick” to what is repressed, so that when what is repressed returns, the 
anxiety that is intrinsic to the structure of repression itself reemerges. 
The “mother-monster readymade” is the figure to whom these anxieties 
without a cause are then attributed. So Ettinger argues that “Devouring 
and abandonment were mistakenly recognized by Freud as phenomena 
that are caused by something (rather than as primal). With Winnicott and 
Kohut (to mention just a few) these phenomena are already explained by 
real maternal failures, while in fact, being primal phantasies, they arise 
in the psyche and re-arise in transferential relationships in order to or-
ganize and give meaning to pain and anxiety brought about by human 
existence itself ” (108).
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In this essay, I want to explore this abjection and objectification of 
the maternal-feminine, a mortification that results from this attribution 
of qualities to the woman and mother that are misrecognised as intrinsic 
to her rather than as the effects of her positioning within material and 
psychic spaces. I am especially drawn to the interrelationship between 
the maternal-feminine and domestic space, most particularly the ob-
jects that populate and “clothe” that space. The novels and non-fiction 
w riting of the Irish writer Anne Enright involve a serious engagement 
with such subject-object traversals, seeking to unfold not only the im-
mobilization of the woman within the home – a position with specific 
juridical weight in the Irish case – but also the way in which Enright 
elucidates a spectral feminine stratum, one that resonates with Ettinger’s 
matrixial stratum, through the revelation and enigmatic articulation of 
a coinhabitation that is trangenerational and that undoes subject/object 
relations, while also registering the trauma of occlusion and non-recog-
nition that Ettinger’s work so comprehensively and enigmatically brings 
to our notice. As such, the transitivities between the ‘theoretical’ and the 
literary might point toward that which eludes conventional significa-
tion and representation, a maternal-feminine that survives its occlusion 
within a dominant phallic mode of seeing and being.
During her memoir of her pregnancy with her two children and their 
first two years of life, Enright describes what she thinks may be her first 
memory. She begins: “My earliest memory is of a pot stand. It is set into 
a corner with a cupboard on one side and, on the other, a shallow step. 
This is where my head begins. The step leads to another room, and far 
on the other side of the room, there is a white-haired woman sitting on 
a chair” (Enright 2005, p. 65). With her mother, Enright reconstructs 
the scene: the woman is her grandmother, and the pot stand was in 
her house by the sea, where the infant Enright stayed the first time her 
mother left her to bring her older brother to casualty with a broken leg. 
The thing – here, the pot stand – marks the severance of mother and 
child; it is where the narrator’s “head begins”, the separation from the 
mother that has engraved the material object and its surrounding scene 
as a screen memory. The object both obscures the originary event and 
is yet the object through which that event is preserved and made par-
tially accessible to re-emergence and reimagining. It is, in a sense, the 
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material object that enables the resonance within Enright of the origi-
nary separation from the mother into partial awareness. The pot stand 
is itself the “holder” of a “container,” and Enright dimly apprehends 
two pots positioned on its shelves. The structural contiguity of these 
material objects with the mother’s function as holder and container 
of the child makes this a particularly resonant image for the trauma of 
separation. The maternal function of containment is one that Enright 
returns to frequently in her work; it is explicitly described elsewhere in 
Making Babies, when she wryly connects this function of the mother 
to the woman as “old bag” – that “‘Mother’ thing… The container (the 
old bag, my dear, the old bag)” (2005, 57).2 Steven Connor alights on 
the bag as one of the “magical things” whose intricacies he unfolds in 
Paraphrenalia.3 A magical thing is “more than a mere thing. We can do 
whatever we like to things, but magical things are things that we allow 
and expect to do things back to us” (Connor, p. 4). Moreover, some 
things “interrupt” our sense of being in the carried forward by a time 
imagined as processional and throw us back, or afford a re-emergence 
of the past in the present: “such things inhabit space, but are a kind of 
temporizing with it. … things link us to our losses”; things can “haunt” 
us (p. 4). Bags are a particularly significant sort of thing for Connor, who 
connects this significance, of course, to parts of the mother’s body – to 
the mother’s breasts and to our experience of the womb; we are “carried, 
like bags, for long enough to come to know this intermediate condi-
tion [“living on the inside of another body”] intimately, and never to 
be able to forget it” (p. 16). Our attachment to bags resonates with the 
mother as “holding” environment: “holding things together, holding 
things up, and being ourselves held and held up, are so important to 
us” (p. 16). Enright’s narrative of this first memory travels forward to her 
daughter in the present: “At nine months, the baby puts her head into a 
pot and says, Aaah Aaah Aaah. She says it very gently and listens to the 
echo. She has discovered this all by herself ” (Enright 2005, p. 65). The 
pot here may signify the “passing on” of this holding function between 
generations of women; an ambivalent inheritance, “fixing” the woman 
and mother within her functionality as object for use by the subject in 
the manner that Connor’s reverie on the bag as substitute for the inter-
nalized maternal part-objects nostalgically describes. However, in the 
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transitivity in Enright’s account something else is suggested that is other, 
I think, than this intergenerational transmission of the maternal role. 
This transitivity is in part described by the temporal movement of the 
narrative and the transitivity between and within subject-positions that 
accompanies this, as the account weaves between past, present and fu-
ture, between Enright as infant, and her own infant daughter, between 
herself as mother, her own mother, and her grandmother. Although the 
material object – here, the pot stand – marks the beginning of the end 
of the dyad, from an Oedipal perspective, it is involved with a mode of 
connectedness as well as separation that persists despite the severance 
from the mother, an umbilical transconnectedness, after Luce Irigaray, 
that Enright intuits here in the transitivity between grandmother, moth-
er, daughter and the objects of domestic space (Irigaray 1993, p. 14). It is 
the transitivity of the material object here, in particular, that suggests a 
reaching toward something like Ettinger’s matrixial borderspace, as an 
interval in the subject-object distinctions in Enright’s narrative brings 
fleetingly into apprehension a submerged level of being wherein “traces” 
are shared between partial subjects and partial objects that transconnect 
beyond and before any phallic substitutive function.
Is there a connection here to what Iris Marion Young has called “the 
temporality of preservation”, a mode of temporality that may suggest 
an association with this spectral feminine (Young p. 143)? While Young 
locates the preservative in “time and history,” does this aspect of “dwell-
ing” also intimate something of the traversal between the transsubjects 
and transjects that Ettinger apprehends as matrixial (p. 141)? Follow-
ing Irigaray, Young retrieves the “preservative” as what is set aside in 
Heidegger’s adumbration of “building” and “dwelling” – as she says, 
“a curious abandonment” (Young, p. 125). These preservative rhythms 
are described by Young in terms of transgenerational connectivity and 
they find their pulse in the relations between bodies and things, a pro-
cess that Young describes as “sedimentation”: things become sedimented 
with meanings that accrete to the object through time, and “things and 
their arrangement bear witness to the sedimentation of lives lived” in the 
home (p. 140). She continues: “The history embodied in the meaningful 
things of the home is often intergenerational. Traditionally women are 
the primary preservers of family as well as individual histories. Women 
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trace the family line and keep safe the trinkets, china cups, jewelry, pins, 
and photos of the departed ancestors” (p. 141). As Susan Pollock says 
of her grandmother’s rolling pin in Sherry Turkle’s collection Evocative 
Objects, “the evocative object is transitional in the fullest sense of the 
word – it can bring together generations, anchor memory and feeling, 
and evoke attachments that have been long forgotten” (Turkle, p. 230). 
Is there something else here, however, something that elides the fixity 
suggested by “sedimentation”, evocative objects and transitional objects?
In ‘Time’, Enright wonders what object her daughter might dimly 
retain from the first time she left her – again, with her own mother, who 
she imagines from her baby’s perspective as a spectral “someone”, im-
plying a continuity with Enright’s own memory of her grandmother as 
an indistinct white-haired woman. She hopes that her daughter will re-
member the carpet in her parents’ house, the carpet Enright remembers 
from her own childhood. The carpet functions as one of Young’s sedi-
mented objects, those objects that are both themselves preservative and 
that resonate with the preservative aspect of dwelling associated with 
women and the feminine. It is also an evocative object such as Turkle 
describes: it is the container of memory and of transgenerational trans-
connection. But does this transitive quality have further resonances with 
something more difficult to articulate; is there in this infinite pulse of 
connection and separation between mother and daughter and between 
generations something of the matrixial where the object becomes trans-
ject? The preservative object of the cot – the layers of paint accumulated 
on its chipped surface the material manifestation of its ‘sedimented’ and 
transgenerational force–becomes in Enright’s account both expressive of 
the relations between the oedipal subjects of mother, father, and child 
while at the same time this transitive, transsubjective quality that enig-
matically and temporarily emerges and then fades comes into fleeting 
apprehension in and through the encounter between something sub-
merged yet present ‘beneath’ both the subject and the object:
“The baby sleeps in my cot now – the one my father made over forty years 
ago with some half-inch dowel … I sat beside it one night, feeding her, and I 
tried to remember what it was like to be inside: the view between the bars and 
the ripped wallpaper on the wall. Someone, over the years, had painted it a 
nursery blue, but I remembered a green colour, I could almost recall chewing 
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the cross bar at the top. … I saw, under a chip in the blue paint, the very g reen 
I ate as a child. A strong and distant emotion washed briefly over me and was 
gone.” (Enright 2005, pp. 69–70; my italics)
The house in which you grow up is, to use Sara Ahmed’s phrase, a 
“sticky object” (Ahmed 2003, pp. 44–46). The first home leaves its im-
print on me, shapes me; and I likewise shape that house in specific ways, 
leave my mark upon it. Home is traumatic as well as generative, carceral 
as well as sustaining. A romanticising nostalgia for the home has incar-
cerating and impeding effects for the woman whose function it is to pro-
vide its ground, as Irigaray has demonstrated. For instance, Bachelard 
says of the house: “Without it, man would be a dispersed being … It is 
body and soul. It is the human being’s first world. Before he is ‘cast into 
the world’ … man is laid in the cradle of the house” (Bachelard, p. 7). 
The nurturing protection and imaginative sustenance that the house ide-
ally provides for its inhabitants are described by Bachelard as its “mater-
nal features” (p. 7). The association between woman and home is under-
lined by the aspects of care and preservation: “housewifely care weaves 
the ties that unite a very ancient past to the new epoch”, and such care 
builds the house “from the inside … we become conscious of a house 
that is built by women, since men only know how to build a house 
from the outside” (p. 68). Valuable as Bachelard’s “topoanalysis” is, the 
house is not the “first cosmos” as he describes it, and is not originary 
of the nurture, protection, containment and creativity that he ascribes 
to it in his exploration (p. 68). In evoking such feelings and in enabling 
poetic reverie, the house reanimates the memory of the maternal body, 
a reanimation that resonates with the house’s structural contiguity with 
that body. There is a sense in which Bachelard’s topoanalysis, while ges-
turing toward the mother, again in his nostalgic longing fixes her as the 
ground of dwelling, simultaneously displaces her and in particular the 
transsubjective relation between the becoming-infant and the mother-
to-be that the house evokes, reinscribing these positions as subject/ob-
ject, positing the house as origin and source in place of what Ettinger 
describes as the matrixial borderspace, a space that has its origins in the 
transconnectivity of co-emergence in the womb that persists as a dis-
tinct, non-oedipal psychic structure. Irigaray has, of course, articulated 
the grounds of Heidegger’s “dwelling”, which is for him man’s way of 
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being in the world. Through building, man reveals this prior ground of 
dwelling: “The bridge gathers the earth as landscape around the stream. 
…the bridge does not first come to a location to stand in it: rather, a 
location comes into existence only by virtue of the bridge” (Heidegger, 
pp. 331–2). For Irigaray, “Dasein founds its being-in-the-world” on “a 
constitutive oblivion”, the “forgetting” of the mother, and this amne-
sic dwelling thus positions the maternal-feminine as “void” (Faulkner, 
p. 131). “Built on the void, the bridge joined two banks that, prior to its 
construction, were not: the bridge made the two banks. And further: 
the bridge, a solidly established passageway, joins two voids that, prior 
to its construction, were not: the bridge made the void” (Irigaray, The 
Forgetting of Air, qtd in Faulkner, p. 129). For Irigaray, then, Heidegger’s 
dwelling is built over the void that woman’s dereliction opens up. As 
Young pithily summarises, the woman’s role “is to be the home by being 
at home” so that the home that displaces and substitutes for the mother, 
is, like the dwelling-place of language, founded on the void where the 
relation to the mother once was and is impelled by a chronic nostalgic 
urge to recoup this loss by assigning woman “to be place without occu-
pying place” and by building for man a new home in language (Young, 
p. 129). Young describes woman thus positioned in space and woman be-
coming thing in terms of her function as mirror for man’s speculation: 
“Through projecting outward he makes objective works where he can 
see himself reflected. In this objectifying self-reflection woman serves as 
material both on which to stand and out of which to build, and wom-
en likewise serve as a primary object for reflecting himself, his mirror’ 
(Young, p. 128). ‘Home’ becomes for woman not a facilitative space, but 
her crypt, the place of her entombment.
The home in Enright wears the dual aspects that feminist phenom-
enology suggests: the house is protective, nurturing containment; the 
house is carceral, toxic entombment. In The Gathering, we witness the 
narrator Veronica’s deep mourning for her brother, who has committed 
suicide having emigrated to England, having become increasingly es-
tranged from his family, on the downward spiral of chronic alcoholism 
and the doss house. Her narrative is, however, focused on the trauma of 
sexual abuse that has led to Liam’s pitiable and lonely death; this trauma 
is the terrible “gap” at the centre of the novel, for most of the narrative 
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pointed toward through allusion, metaphor, metonymy, hallucination, 
slippage – those gaps in language that bespeak the unrepresentable – a 
trauma that her brother, and possibly herself, and, it is hinted, genera-
tions of her family have suffered. The houses that Veronica and Liam 
lived in as children are intimately, inextricably involved in this trauma 
and in its ‘passing on’ and persistence across generations – the parents’ 
house, the grandmother’s house persist within Veronica, lending her a 
particular psychic shape. These houses are suffused with animism: the 
family home grows as a living thing as the family sprawls outward, and 
the narrator describes it as haunted by the ghosts of the children she and 
her siblings once were. Not only are the houses haunted by these ghosts; 
Veronica is herself, importantly, haunted by these houses, too. These do-
mestic spaces – the houses that ‘gather’ the family, to limn Heidegger’s 
bridge that makes the void–are themselves crypts of the transgenera-
tional trauma of abuse, not static objects but rather vitally implicated 
with the transgenerational phantomatic preservation and passing on 
of trauma. Does this traumatic coinhabitation suggest a connection, 
a bridge, between Ahmed’s phenomenological reorientations, whereby 
she reanimates the mutually shaping interplay between objects and bod-
ies that coinhabit space, and Griselda Pollock’s exposition of the Lacan-
ian Thing, that shapeless yet shaping void? For Ahmed, “Bodies as well 
as objects take shape through being orientated toward each other, an 
orientation that may be experienced as the co-inhabitation or sharing 
of space. … Bodies are hence shaped by contact with objects and with 
others, with “what” is near enough to be reached. Bodies may even take 
shape through such contact, or take the shape of that contact” (Ahmed, 
p. 54). Filtering this through Enright’s enigmatic exploration of the mu-
tual shaping of the house, no longer quite an object but neither quite a 
subject, and the bodies that inhabit it, no longer quite present but yet 
shaping in their absence, bespeaks the enigmatic absence/presence of 
trauma itself. Pollock explicates:
“the Thing, la Chose, which is the affectively, corpo-real and for which the 
psychic object creates but a shaping within which the Thing’s unsignifiable-
ness, nonetheless presses, acting like the apparent void inside a vase that, in 
effect, determines the shape the vase takes for us to see and hold: does the vase 
hold nothing, or does that no-Thing press the vase/object into its perceptible 
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shape, on the other side of the Real revealing to us both the psychic shaping 
and the unsignified or unimaged ghost: the Thing which none the less donates 
something important to what we then work with psychically in the object?” 
(Pollock, p. 42).
In the traumatic currents relaying between the subject and the object 
that “holds” them, between the family and the house, as perhaps the 
most symbolically freighted of what Ahmed calls “kinship objects” that 
‘gather’ (Ahmed, p. 81) – and therefore in a sense give shape to while 
being shaped by – the family, where is this governing Thing that is no-
Thing to be located? For Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok, in their 
analysis of transgenerational trauma, the crypt is the no-place that 
‘hides’ or houses this no-Thing. Gabriel Schwab expands: “The crypt 
is a melancholic, funereal architectonic in inner space, built after trau-
matic loss [which] needs to be silenced and cut off from the world. The 
crypt contains the secrets and silences formed in trauma … entombed 
and consigned to internal silence by the sufferers” (Schwab, 45). This 
crypt finds expression in those ‘gaps’ that disarticulate language and 
symbolic representation – a “cryptonomy” concealed within the “house” 
of (phallic) language to which I will shortly return. Such trauma does 
not remain entombed within the bachelor subject, but can be both col-
lective and transitive: the “secret” is communicated beneath and within 
speech and representation, between generations, becoming a phantom 
whose origin is not within ‘me’ but that haunts me nonetheless. For 
Bracha Ettinger, the transitivity of trauma as described by Abraham and 
Torok reveals something that has somehow escaped full recognition: 
that is, that trauma is thus shared, not as a sealed-off tomb that passes 
from subject to subject, but on a sub- and trans-subjective level: at this 
matrixial level, trauma–its traces, its residues, its phantoms–is “carried” 
between partial subjects, and thus Ettinger proposes metramorphosis as 
the capacity that enables the passage of ‘crypts’ between subjects on the 
transsubjective level of the matrixial borderspace, a psychic capacity first 
inscribed in the transmissions between the partial subjects of mother-
to-be and becoming-infant before originary repression and castration. 
Ettinger describes the process:
“A crypt, when transmissible in the matrixial borderspace, is a lacuna that 
corresponds to an unsymbolized event belonging to someone else. Thus we 
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can conceive of a chain of transmissions, where the traumatic Thing inside my 
other’s other is aching inside me, and where a forsaken Event that took place 
between ‘my’ unknown others struggles for recognition through me and with 
me.” (2006, p. 166).
The representation of the house as a kind of body that must be gut-
ted and eviscerated, exorcised of its psychic ghosts through the evacua-
tion of the things that clothe it, recurs in Enright’s fiction, and it is here 
too in The Gathering. If it is true that, as Bachelard has it, each one of 
us is inhabited by the “oneiric house”, the “house of dream-memory”, 
then it is her grandmother Ada’s house, rather than her mother’s, that 
forms the “crypt of the house we were born in” for Veronica (Bachelard, 
p. 15). Toward the end of the novel, Veronica fantasises about buying her 
grandmother’s old house so that she can strip it down, gut it, unmake 
the scene of a trauma deepened by generations of wounds that have 
never been spoken:
“I am standing in Ada’s front room, pulling up a corner of the wallpaper, 
talking to some nice architect about gutting the place […] while telling him to 
rip out the yellow ceiling and the clammy walls; to knock down the doorway 
to the front room, but save the Belfast sink in the little kitchen […] I will ask 
him to get the place cleaned out with something really strong, I don’t want a 
woman with a mop, I will say, I want a team of men in boiler suits with tanks 
on their backs and those high-pressure steel rods” (Enright 2007, p. 238).
The only object that Veronica wants to preserve from Ada’s house is 
the Belfast sink: this is the place, she has told us earlier, where her imag-
ination began, and continues to begin. It also retains its specific integ-
rity here as a thing that cleans – in a full empathy with Veronica’s need 
to cleanse. The object mediates transconnection in the feminine, not 
solely ascribable to the sink’s association with domestic work, although 
that association is part of what is transmitted, not alone in its “preserva-
tive” function but also in the structuring trauma that is ‘passed down’ 
the female line in the phallic inscription of the female subject that the 
woman at the sink evokes. Like the pot holder that marks the place 
where Enright’s “head begins” in ‘Time’, so here the Belfast sink is where 
her imagination begins: both beginnings are also endings, separations, 
signifiers of originary trauma, but the transitivity again between not-
quite-object and not-quite-subjects manifests another and specifically 
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feminine stratum of exchange, an ethical relation that Veronica intui-
tively wishes to preserve.
The toxic and generative capabilities of domestic objects and spaces 
are recurring motifs in Enright’s work and this toxicity is often coun-
tered by the focalising protagonist’s evisceration of such spaces and the 
things that give these spaces and the gendered subjectivities they co-
constitute their shape. The Wig My Father Wore, What Are You Like? and 
The Gathering all feature climactic moments in which female protago-
nists tear the insides of the house apart, or fantasise about doing so, im-
pelled by a suffocated desperation toward necessary acts of unmaking 
and remaking. Torn wallpaper, and the shape of the gap it leaves behind, 
likewise recur in Enright’s fiction, a recurrence that recalls the yellow 
wallpaper of Charlotte Gilman Perkins’ short story.4 Talking elsewhere 
about the ‘Yellow Eyes’ chapter in The Wig My Father Wore, where Grace 
eviscerates her sitting room, Enright describes it as “a menstrual image.” 
She explains: “Well, it’s all buried under the wallpaper. We are living in 
it; it’s in bits, it’s half-mad, the wallpaper and all the historical bits and 
scraps which are all real things. That’s a menstrual image – we have to 
rip at the lining of this for something new to happen” (Moloney, p. 64). 
In The Wig My Father Wore, Grace first tentatively pulls off a tongue of 
wallpaper that has come loose, and then with an increasingly frenetic ur-
gency rips off its sedimented layers, down to the newspapers that line the 
walls, and finally gouging through to the “plaster underneath” which, 
anticipating the plaster revealed beneath the torn wallpaper in Making 
Babies, is “an old-fashioned pink” (Enright 1995, p. 86). In her analysis 
of this section of the novel, Patricia Coughlan draws out the historical 
and sociological significance of these layers of uncovered history:
The previously confessional nature of Ireland makes its presence felt … in 
the snatches of text from the 1930s and earlier which she finds when she strips 
the wallpaper in her house. [It is a] kind of anthology of Irish culture, especially 
in its devotional aspect, from the previous one hundred years … References 
to our Lady’s protection of Franco’s troops in the 1930s are jumbled together 
with a Theatre Royal 1939 playbill, a nostalgic emigrant’s letter, and a recipe 
for ‘Faggots’. (Coughlan)
Reproductive and menstrual images, images of an eviscerated female 
body that is “written over” by language, that language renders indeci-
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pherable–but a body which, in its return, calls into question the given-
ness of the reality language orchestrates, become inseparable from the 
space and ‘skin’ of the house here, suggesting the dwelling spaces of 
both home and language that Irigaray unfolds in her analysis of Hei-
degger’s dwelling that constitutes maternal origin as void and woman 
as home who is thereby left homeless. The gaps, the menstrual shreds, 
that Grace’s eviscerations leave in the newspaper and the madness of 
the textual palimpsest beneath the wallpaper render their conventional 
cultural meanings and inscriptions as vertiginously jumbled and only 
partially decipherable: “Sharp edged flakes of pink stick to the paper in 
liquid shapes, blotting out words and phrases, or they fall of in scabs, 
leaving the page pockmarked with meaning, or a piece shreds as I pull it 
off, leaving a central tongue stuck to the wall” (Enright 1995, pp. 86–7).
The breaching of the walls of the homely dwelling place by a kind of 
unhomely feminine writing are recalled by Jacqueline Rose during her 
critique of Christopher Bollas’ “fantasies of the mother” (Rose p. 156). 
Writing about H.D.’s narrative of her experiences as Freud’s analysand, 
Rose alludes to H.D.’s visions in her hotel room while on holiday in 
Corfu – a pivotal moment for her as a poet. H.D. describes her “pictures 
on the wall” as hieroglyphs, like the pictographic writing of the dream 
and the unconscious. Freud sees in what H.D. calls the “writing on the 
wall” “a desire for union with the mother”, interpreted not as the work-
ings of inspiration but as a disturbing symptom (Rose, p. 154). Freud’s 
discomfort, Rose observes, the “moment of danger”, is “the point where 
the boundaries of consciousness are transgressed, where the limits be-
tween inside and outside, between a subject and a world of objects that 
surround her, breaks down” (p. 154). For Freud, then, this blurring of 
the threshold between “me” and “not-me” evokes an uncanny return of 
what has been repressed, the relation to the mother. What might hap-
pen, Ettinger asks, what might be apprehendable and recognised, if this 
“intrapsychic remnant of the body” that so disturbs Freud here were 
acknowledged as revealing “a transferential unconscious field stretched 
between several individuals unknown to each other?” What is perceived 
as a dangerous breach of threshold between ‘me’ and ‘not me’ would 
instead be shown to belong to an entirely other order of psychic co-
inhabitation:
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“Such a transgression of the celibate boundaries would disclose what I call 
a matrixial aesthetic borderspace, where rhythms of interval capture and trace 
co-engendering with/by the stranger. … In matrixial transferential relations, 
several I(s) and uncognized non-I(s) are interlaced, beyond space and time, in 
matrixial space and time, together opening repeatedly the wounds of nomad-
ic places, and working-through to re-in/di-fuse the celibate place” (Ettinger 
2006, p. 158).
For Abraham and Torok, “cryptographic speech” manifests the traces 
of trauma in language: a “psychic aphasia” (Rand qtd in Schwab p. 54) 
whose “haunted language” (Schwab p. 54) disarticulates conventional 
signification and the speaking subject. Cryptographic speech, like the 
crypt itself, can be transgenerational, and in “extreme cases, secreted 
“phantom words” can become the carriers of another’s story” (Schwab 
pp. 54–5). Ettinger’s elaboration of metramorphosis and its manifestation 
and working-through in the transcryptum of art-working significantly 
reconfigure our understanding of this transmission of trauma. The crypt 
that travels across the boundaries of “bachelor” subjects 
“can be transmitted from one subject to another by metramorphosis, be-
cause a capacity and an occasion for this kind of transmission, co-affectivity, 
co-acting, co-making already occurred in the archaic relations between each 
becoming-subject and the m/Other. Metramorphosis turns the subject’s boun-
daries into thresholds, and co-affectivity turns the borderlines between subjects 
in distance-in-proximity and between subject and object, into a shareable bor-
derspace” (Ettinger 2006, p. 166, and qtd in Pollock pp. 49–50).
The potential for representational systems to act as a metramorphic 
“transport station” of a shareable trauma whose traces are transmitted 
in the matrixial rather than phallic stratum unfolds what would other-
wise be the “madness”, the “psychic aphasia”, of the three generations of 
women whose enigmatic transconnectedness is at the core of Enright’s 
second novel, What Are You Like? In this novel the sacrificial mother 
Anna speaks from the grave. She is literally the sacrificial mother: dur-
ing her pregnancy, she is diagnosed with a brain tumour, and in accord-
ance with the law of the theocratic state she is denied medical treat-
ment so that the lives of her daughters-to-be may be preserved. She 
bleeds to death while giving birth to her daughters, and her husband 
Berts makes the decision to keep one daughter, Maria, giving his other 
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daughter Rose up for adoption. The mutilation of the relation between 
mother and daughter within a phallic economy that both Irigaray and 
Ettinger have so powerfully elaborated in their work is shown in this 
all too recognisable material way, demonstrating the inseparability of 
the psychic dereliction of both mother and daughter within an Oedipal 
teleology from the transformation of the female subject to a fleshly ob-
ject whose primary value is in reproducing the nation and being made 
to carry the burden of the murderous consequences of an iconography 
of maternity as coerced sacrifice of the mother for the other. Despite 
this traumatic severance, and despite the fact that Anna and her daugh-
ters are unknown to each other – and that Rose, named as such by her 
adoptive parents, does not know her birth family or the circumstances 
of her abandonment by her father – each of these women carry traces of 
their transconnectedness, a transconnection that is both traumatic, trau-
matized, and generative. This transitivity expresses itself as, precisely, a 
kind of aphasia – a disruption in expression and in the relation between 
the woman and objects, particularly objects of domestic space. Phanto-
matic words ghost the narrative and bespeak both severance and joint-
ness; “Rose”- the name given to Anna’s abandoned daughter and thus 
the embodied “sign” of the traumatic wound to the matrixial enacted 
by phallic repression and matricide – becomes a signifier that haunts 
both Anna and Maria. Staying in her grandmother’s house–where she 
is expected to do the work for which she is, as woman-object, intended 
and attend to her male relatives, emphasising the connection between 
her severance from her sister and the ideology of compulsory domes-
ticity that was one of the founding principles of the Irish state–Maria 
sees roses everywhere, beginning with the unexpected contiguity of the 
“rose” with the animal-turned-object for consumption by the subject 
and then moving through conjunctions between roses and domestic 
things: “The blood of the joint was salty-sweet and pink, the same col-
our as the roses on her grandmother’s delph. There were roses on the 
cloth as well as roses on the wallpaper and modern roses blocked out in 
triangular petals on the new plastic breadboard” (Enright 2000, p. 48). 
When she speaks from the grave, Anna’s narrative likewise carries the 
traces of the daughter she has never known; her trauma manifests as a 
rupture between word and thing that, from a conventional perspective, 
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signals aphasia but that, “looking awry”, reveals the actual ‘gap’ between 
language and the objects it fixes in place, the illusion of the coincidence 
of language and the world that is the necessary fiction underwriting the 
speaking, “gathering” subject: “I wrote words down and I buried them 
in the garden, the names of flowers: wallflower, phlox, peony rose, dog 
rose, tea rose. A twist of baking soda, sugar, a wick, two wicks, a bar of 
soap cut down the middle so it leaves itself on the knife” (p. 247, my 
emphasis). The last list of household objects manifests Anna’s connec-
tion to her own mother, likewise “afflicted” by a kind of aphasia whereby 
she constructs her own “language” through the objects of the kitchen in 
place of conventional language: “My mother’s lists were things that she 
shifted around the kitchen; the tea cosy placed on the table for more 
tea, the lid of the bread bin propped open for flour … I would hold the 
list of things translated in my head as I ran down the road … a twist 
of baking soda, sugar, a wick, two wicks, a bar of soap cut down the 
middle so it leaves itself on the knife” (p. 234.) So, the aphasia that is 
attributed at the beginning of the novel to Anna’s brain tumour is re-
vealed enigmatically throughout the narrative and here, more explicitly, 
as a disruption in phallic language that is transgenerational and femi-
nine. This “psychic aphasia” is also transitive between the dead mother 
and the unknown daughter Rose; during her pregnancy Anna manifests 
“symptoms” that Berts attributes to the mysterious hormonal configu-
ration of the woman and that come to be retrospectively attributed to 
a more sinister disturbance in her brain’s functioning but that, read as 
metramorphosis, reveal the proximity-in-distance of the matrixial web: 
she drinks “out of the hot tap” and for her the “sound of a tap dripping 
smelt of roses” (p. 6), while later we are told of Rose that ‘When she 
opened her mouth, the wrong words hopped out of it. Everything she 
tried to do came out backwards. She drank from the hot tap” (pp. 153–4, 
my emphasis).5 In this novel, to recall Ahmed, both women and things 
fail to do the work that they are intended for. This “failure”, however, is 
the very idiom of a newly configured feminine proximity: a proximity 
that neither elides trauma nor deposits it to the account of the other, 
but that instead bespeaks the generative beyond the boundaries of the 
bachelor subject, a generative ethics of proximity that Ettinger likewise 
ascribes to the artwork as transcryptum: “In art, repetitions in anam-
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nesic working-through do not reestablish the lost object. Rather, they 
make present the unpresentable Thing, crypted in the artwork’s uncon-
scious, that keeps returning because its debt can never be liquidated’ 
(Ettinger 2006, p. 158).
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ality studies, and Irish literary and cultural studies.
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Bracha L. Ettinger
Diotime et le transfert matrixiel: 
L’événement-rencontre psychanalytique comme prégnance dans le Beau 
(2007)
In this analysis of the Platonian Diotima, I show how the awakening of the 
feminine-(pre)maternal matrixial Eros, this desire of co-emergence that works be-
tween individuals by borderlinking (bordureliance, reliance-bord) in a psychic preg-
nance is shared in Beauty in a way more transmissive than Platon suggests. A 
matrixial transferential borderspace (espace-bord) produces fragile and creative trans-
subjective differentiation-in-jointness. The awakening of the feminine-matrixial Eros 
for borderlinking-in-differentiation as shareable birthing in beauty produces a 
fragile, creative and dangerous state of fragile exposure.
The matrixial difference relates, for every human being, first of all to the 
borderlinking to a female-woman-m/Other (l’Autremère-femme-femelle.) The 
matrixial difference for women is a woman-to-woman difference. The erotic 
antenna that connects and transmits traces exposes she who gives birth in Beauty, 
the artist in her encounters with her materials, as well as the psychoanalyst in 
transference relations, to a traumatic contact that will turn her into her other’s 
intimate stranger, a Diotima. The ethics of matrixial subjectivization, where the I 
can not not wit(h)ness the other (pas être-avec-l’autre-et-témoigner) in com-passion 
and stands in besidedness to the m/Othe (tenir dans l’à-côtéïté avec l’Autremère) is the 
ethics of non-abandonment.
The gesture of the artist creates from-with a proto-ethical aesthetical compas-
sion. The desire of the artist for wit(h)nessing seals imprints of Matrixial Trauma 
and Matrixial Eros in the artwork as a new impregnated cluster created like a cloud 
from sparkles of traces of internal and external encounter-events, that produces 
transformations in earlier insights and opens the potential for new ones, for the 
artist and the viewer.
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Gina Rae Foster
The Dissonant Resonance of Becomings:  
Copoiesis and (Non-)Pulsed Time in Musical Proximities
Examining bodily proximities through music (and in particular, music as aes-
thetic sound) raises questions of bodies and proximities as becomings. Through 
the bodily proximities of performance, music reveals and conceals temporospatial 
becomings that are part of human co-emergence and divergence. Bracha L. Et-
tinger writes of borderspacing, borderlinking, and borderswerving in copoiesis, which 
might be read as one approach to an aesthetically ontological proximity. Gilles 
Deleuze explores pulsed and non-pulsed time in music as an extension of his and 
Felix Guattari’s conceptions of territorialization and time as Aion and Chronos. In 
thinking through temporospatiality, matrixiality, and territorialization, Ettinger 
and Deleuze think through the aesthetics of bodily proximities, and in these prox-
imities, the performance of music finds its own potentials for copoiesis through 
borderlinking and borderswerving, through territorialization and deterritorializa-
tion. The resonance of embedded and contained time with Chronos and Aion 
opens possibilities for musical co-performances and co-emergences that not only 
may but will differ in each nearing and distancing of shared performance/hear-
ing, even when recorded versions are repeated. Perceptions gained through hearing 
might then be considered subject to the velocities of becoming.
Julia Hölzl
In/Possible Relation: 
Being, Time, Death
Touching upon death, time, and being, the aim of this essay is to open in/
possibilities of relation. In/possibility: a possibility/not. Closeness and distance at 
the same time, it designates the possibility yet to be/come, the only form of pos-
sibility possible.
Being, death, and time: they are always already (as) else-where, and it is in 
such elsewhere that the here of relation can be touched, from where relation must 
be thought. There is no presence for relation; presence, as relation itself, is a(s) 
distance.
It might be, then, the in/possibility of relation that allows for proximity–always 
already anticipating some body else, its presence presents itself with,in the very 
absence it pretends to present: For there to be relation, relation must remain out-
side relation.
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Such relation is to remain different, is to remain a(s) different relation, a(s) 
relation of difference and in difference. Neither one nor the other, but the Other, 
always.
Relation must, therefore, bear its impass(e)ability: The ability to bear the in/
possibility of its impasse, that is.
Roula Haj-Ismail
The impossibility of being self/other
My aim in this paper is to try and understand the fundamental role of the 
body: in the formation of ‘who we are’, and how ‘we can know’. Both Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty and Emmanuel Levinas elucidate these two inquiries in terms of 
the primacy of the body. I seek examples within artistic production, pedagogical 
instruction and political action where the body is ever-present both conceptually, 
and concretely. In these examples there lies the potential for bodily proximity and 
at the same time the impossibility of such a potentiality. This impossibility is due 
to ideology, and its ever-presence in everything that we are, and all that we do. The 
power of the work of Luce Irigaray lies in her stripping away of all that we are, in 
social/ideological terms, in order to reach a place of silence and breath. To begin at 
the beginning: So that the possibility of bodily proximity may be possible within 
this space in the age of breath.
Tadashi Ogawa
Global Philosophy from the Viewpoint of Living Flesh
In this article I would like to talk about my confrontation with European Phi-
losophy. Philosophy is an international and common spiritual activity of human 
being. Although philosophy is originally from archaic Greece, there were at the 
same time great thinkers in India and China considering the relation of humans 
and the world, nature and the cosmos. Regarding methodology and terminology 
there were certainly great differences, but it is clear that at the level of questions, 
the matters about which they wondered—these were the same: the relation of 
Humans and Nature, Mankind and the Cosmos. My intention is to elucidate the 
possibility of Global Philosophy explicitly and to explicate the relation of Global 
Philosophy to the embodied existence of mankind. This discussion will be an at-
tempt at a synthesis of two directions in philosophy: world philosophy as objective 
sense and existential philosophy as subjective sense, coming together through the 
viewpoint of the body-living flesh.
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Wolfgang Schirmacher
Homo Generator in the Postmodern Discussion: 
From a Conversation with Jean-François Lyotard
I first met the most important postmodern philosopher in 1991, when he ac-
cepted my invitation to hold a lecture at the New School for Social Research in 
New York. That both of us work primarily in phenomenology, and that Nietzsche 
and Heidegger strongly influenced our work, certainly contributed to a rapid 
deepening of our relationship. But more importantly, Lyotard was an extraordi-
narily genial and generous soul. Despite his immense workload of teaching duties 
all over the world and his numerous publications, he took the time for a conversa-
tion with a younger philosopher. The following excerpts are taken from a conver-
sation held on April 22, 1992 at Yale University, where Lyotard spent a semester as 
the Henry Luce Scholar at the Whitney Humanities Center. The discussion took 
place in English, a foreign language for both of us, and Lyotard never got the op-
portunity to edit the transcript. Video and tape recordings were made, and Lyotard 
expressly authorized me to change the wording to ensure that our philosophical 
points would prevail over any inadequacies in the language we used in the discus-
sion. It goes without saying that under these circumstances, I assume responsibil-
ity for the entire text.
Lenart Škof
Ethics of Breath: Towards New Ethical Spaces of Intersubjectivity
In this paper we try to establish a platform for an ethics of otherness – an ethics 
of breath. This is work in philosophy, oriented toward an ethics as a place for the 
future conversation of mild gestures – such as compassion, forbearance and care. 
First we deal with breath as an intercultural phenomenon. Different macrocosmic 
and microcosmic designations for wind/breath in the history of religions and phi-
losophies are presented in order to inaugurate a common physico-anthropological 
phenomenon of life as a basis for the future ethics. T. Ogawa’s elaboration on qi 
as ethical phenomenon and ancient Indian Vedic teachings on prana are in the 
foreground of our analyses. In the second part we deal with the epistemological 
analysis of breath in W. James’s Essays on Radical Empiricism. We critically confront 
another pragmatist model (R. Shusterman) and show the potential of James’s in-
sights for the future ethics of breath. Finally, we connect the first and second parts 
in the concluding third part of the paper, which brings a dialog with Luce Irigaray 
and her philosophy of breath.
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Stephen David Ross
Living with the animals… 
In the fullness of our nonidentities…
A meditation on the fullness of being, understood as the nonidentity of bodies 
with themselves, beginning with animals and animality. Through readings of Nie-
tzsche, Derrida, and Coetzee on animals, other possibilities of being human are 
explored, in terms of the nonidentity of every identity with itself. What it is to be 
human is other to itself, embodied, embedded, and entangled among other bod-
ies, near and far, human, animal, and other. We do not know what bodies can do, 
as Spinoza said. We do not know who and what we are. Being is difficult, difficult 
to know, difficult to be. We live, we speak, we believe in the subjunctive, where 
the fullness of being meets the abundance of love.
Sigrid Hackenberg y Almansa
A Secret Life of the Hand
The secret of the hand lies in its mystical proclivity. Engulfing the properties 
of time, nature, and the divine, the hand presides alongside and beyond itself as a 
mere apparition encompassing infinite kingdoms, large and small, transparent and 
opaque. Its secret lies in its propensity for abundance and bareness, indistinctness 
and equivocality, enfolding nothing and everything, beyond, after, and without 
beginnings. We here propose a metá physiká “on the edge of the unconscious” that 
is neither religion nor its contrary, a metá physiká of reverie, in “journeys to the 
opposite limit” of knowing, in a passage of no return. A gesture of the hand as an 
instance where we may approach the sensuous in all its possible differences and 
resistances, ungathering that which we may fold upon nature, in a metá physiká 
that “resides in that transition and that passage” where the hand itself prefigures 
the crossing in an “exceptional” and “strange” fashion.
Anne Mulhall
‘This is where my head begins’: things, trauma and feminine proximities
The relation between the thing and the woman is one of the informing grounds 
of both psychoanalytic and phenomenological tradition, whether this preoccupa-
tion is acknowledged or goes unrecognised. This informing ground subtending 
canonical analyses of psychic being and being-in-the-world have, of course, been 
significantly exacavated and reconfigured by and in feminist critiques of both psy-
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choanalytic and phenomenological orthodoxies. In this essay, I attempt to bring 
the work of the feminist psychoanalytic theorists such as Bracha L. Ettinger, Luce 
Irigaray, Jacqueline Rose and Griselda Pollock into conversation with the phenom-
enological work of Iris Marion Young and Sara Ahmed’s Queer Phenomenologies 
and with the writing of the Irish novelist Anne Enright in order to explore the 
transsubjective, transconnective relation between ‘woman’ and ‘things’ in a way 
that expresses a sharing of traces in the feminine-matrixial that both bespeaks the 
traumatic ‘fixing’ of woman as man’s dwelling and that enigmatically articulates 
a generative ethical relation before and beyond such confinements within home 
and language in their castrating aspects.
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